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Public values at stake
Diverging expectations of animal
research in the Netherlands
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1  Public values at stake It seems hard to think of an issue that raises so many strong emotions and ethical concern among the public, while remaining a relatively minor issue in public policy, as animal 
experimentation. Public debate on animal experimentation has a long history of arguments 
regarding the moral and ethical justification of using animals for research purposes. The 
Dutch debate appeared to hit rock bottom in the mid-1990s when a series of arson attacks 
astounded the Netherlands (AIVD, 2004), and opponents and proponents1 of animal 
research stood diametrically opposed to each other. 
In comparison, the current public debate on animal experimentation appears to be very 
different. It would seem that most (although not all) of the former camps have merged into a 
new coalition that works collectively towards what appears to be a shared normative horizon 
of alternatives to animal experimentation (subsequently, “animal-testing alternatives”). 
Devoted politicians, engaged animal protectors, lucrative multinationals and curious scientists 
all seem to value such alternatives to the practice of animal experimentation. We may even 
speak of an “industry per se” that has its own research programmes, policy interventions, 
organisations, vision documents and connecting technologies. The mobilising power seems 
to lie in the promise – or perhaps even the expectation – of a sustainable future in which 
animal welfare is associated with other generally shared public values, such as economic 
progress, scientific relevance and technology development, in a fair and equal manner. 
The question remains why only a handful of people are truly committed to changing animal 
experimentation while almost everyone seems to have an opinion about it. Why is it so 
hard to make a real impact and to continue the steep decrease in research animal numbers 
that marked the 1980s and 1990s? Why have today’s technological possibilities not made 
animal experimentation superfluous yet? In other words, why does a transition – a radical, 
structural change of a societal (sub)system (Rotmans, 2005; Rotmans et al., 2001) – seem 
so difficult to achieve despite the availability of what appear to be the main components? 
1.1 Animal experimentation: a persistent policy problem
Animal experimentation is a complex issue that has been studied quite intensively in the 
literature. Most contributions, including the “intrinsic value” of research animals (Brom, 
1999; Dol, Fentener van Vlissingen, Kasanmoentalib, Visser, & Zwart, 1999; Verhoog, 1992), 
our duties to laboratory animals (De Vries, 2009), animal rights (Regan & Singer, 1989/1976; 
1  Obviously, there seem to be no real proponents of animal research. Proponents here refer to people that 
accept animal research under the present conditions (e.g. regard animals models relevant for their questions, 
or in the absence of suitable animal-free alternatives for their animal experiment).
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Singer, 1975), moral frameworks in the animal biotechnology debate (Kupper, Krijgsman, 
Bout, & De Cock Buning, 2007) and a philosophical inquiry into the genetically engineered 
mouse (Ter Gast, 2007), have come from the humanities. More recently, the social sciences 
have picked up the issue as well, including through studies about the “visual politics” of 
animals in bioscience (Brown, 2006), discursive strategies of scientists in attempt to defend 
their practices (Michael & Birke, 1994) and policy instruments in bioethics governance 
(Paula, 2008). 
Yet, an understanding of animal experimentation as a policy issue is missing from the vast 
body of literature. This research studies animal experimentation as a public policy issue in 
order to stimulate the development of animal-testing alternatives as innovations amidst 
diverging societal values. It starts from the assumption that there is at least some societal 
desire to limit animal experimentation as much as possible. However, this wish for reducing 
research animal number connects with other wishes that are generally common in Dutch 
society, including for safe food products, for an understanding of the underlying biological 
mechanisms of sickness and disease, for healthy livestock, and for new medical treatments 
with fewer side effects. These wishes have a high impact on the current use of animals and 
come at a high cost, with over 500 000 research animals being used in the Netherlands 
alone (NVWA, 2014).2 
Animal research is a complex issue comprising many actors that perform animal 
experiments (e.g. universities, industries, knowledge institutes, contract companies), 
fund the experiments (e.g. research councils, industries, universities, academic hospitals, 
private companies), demand animal experiments (e.g. regulators, editors of academic 
journals, fellow-scientists), depend on the knowledge obtained from animal experiments 
(e.g. patients, consumers, fellow scientists), make a living out of animal experiments (e.g. 
breeders, suppliers) and are otherwise involved in the public debate (e.g. non-governmental 
organisations, umbrella organisations).3 The issue involves many sectors, including the 
medical sector (e.g. drug development, clinical innovations), the agro‑food sector (e.g. 
food ingredients, dietary products), the chemical sector (e.g. food additives, house-hold 
products), the defence sector (e.g. effect of neurotoxins in warfare) and the academic sector 
(e.g. knowledge production). There is no doubt that each of those actors and sectors has a 
different value in relation to animal experiments.
2  The total number of animals involved in the research practices adds up to almost 1 million. However, these 
animals are not counted as research animals and therefore hardly ever mentioned. See also Section 1.2.3 below.
3  The goal here is to sketch a simple overview of the many actors involved in the “chain of animal research” 
and not to assess the value, relevance or truth of their actions. For example, it is unlikely that anybody will 
formally demand animal experiments, perhaps with the exception of regulatory bodies. However, as long as 
animal experimentation plays an important role in the scientific credibility of many academic fields, we could 
argue that this peer pressure almost demands animal experimentation. 
These diverging values and expectations are also visible during policy formation. Indeed, 
the extent to which animal experimentation is understood as a single policy issue that is 
worthy of attention – and whether this issue is in fact a problem – seems to depend on how 
the topic is perceived and framed. For example, animal experiments may be framed as a 
“necessary evil” (Freriks, Van der Meulen, Van den Belt, Ten Holt, & Verstappen, 2005), a 
“deception” (EDEV, 2014), or as “indispensable” (Nefarma, 2015). The process of framing 
is problematic in the sense that different frames and their underlying appreciative systems 
create multiple social realities and require different (policy) solutions. Expectations, beliefs 
and interpretation thus shape the world we (want to) live in. Indeed, diverging policy frames 
have been found to have a prominent role in policy controversies (Rein & Schön, 1993) and 
intractable conflicts (Lewicki et al., 2003). 
The framing of a policy issue takes place within a nested context: “[I]ssues tend to arise 
in connection with governmental programs, which exist in some policy environment, 
which is part of some broader political and economic setting, which is located, in turn, 
within a historical era” (Rein & Schön, 1993, p. 154). The specific understanding of 
animal experimentation, the meaning of animal-testing alternatives in the light of animal 
experiments and public values, and the interpretations of three-R research4 as societally 
relevant therefore only make sense in a particular context (i.e. “discourse”, (Hajer, 1995)). 
The diverging underlying appreciative systems involved in animal experimentation, the 
difficulty to describe the problem, the improbability of an optimal solution and the on-
going substantial political debate relate to the “wickedness” of the policy problem (Hoppe, 
2011; Rittel & Webber, 1973).5 
Over the past few decades, animal experiments have become deeply embedded in our 
societal structures, including the lock‑in of animal studies in drug development (Kooijman, 
2013; Van Meer, 2013), the regulatory process (Schiffelers et al., 2007; Schiffelers, 2016 
(expected)), the research practice (Birke, Arluke, & Michael, 2007) and risk assessment 
process (Abraham & Ballinger, 2012). Animal experimentation thus appears to be a 
4  William Russell and Rex Burch introduced the three Rs in their 1959 book, Principles of humane experimental 
techniques, but the term gained more attention in the scientific community after the publication of Smyth’s 
Alternatives to animal experiments in 1978 (Balls, 2005). As described in their 1959 book, “replacement means 
the substitution for conscious living higher animals of insentient material. Reduction means reduction in the 
numbers of animals used to obtain information of a given amount and precision. Refinement means any 
decrease in the incidence or severity of inhumane procedures applied to those animals which still have to be 
used” (Russell & Burch, 1959). The term “alternatives” was often used to summarise all methods and situations 
that offered an alternative to the practice of animal experimentation. The term itself has been contested, and 
over the years, many have tried to get rid of it. However, I use this term throughout this study, as it is still very 
much present in the discourse on animal research.
5  “The information needed to understand the problem depends upon one’s idea of solving it. That is to say: 
In order to describe a wicked problem in sufficient detail, one has to develop an exhaustive inventory of all 
conceivable solutions ahead of time.” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160)
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“persistent problem” (Dirven, Rotmans, & Verkaik, 2002) that finds expression as “new types 
of social problems that are characterised by significant complexity, structural uncertainty, 
high stakes for a diversity of stakeholders involved, and government problems” (ibid.). Such 
problems are related to the system failures, such as technological bias, weak or dominant 
networks and institutional barriers, which cannot be corrected by the market or current 
policies (Rotmans & Loorbach, 2009). 
These problems appear to be too complex to solve with technological interventions alone. 
Indeed, numerous studies have shown that the innovations that research developed 
have often not been adopted, and that successful innovations were usually based on an 
integration of (technological and other) ideas and insights from scientists as well as users, 
intermediaries and other societal agents (e.g. Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Rip, 1995). Besides 
the technical arrangement, innovations need to include new social and organisational 
arrangements, such as new rules, perceptions, agreements and social relationships (Leeuwis 
& Aarts, 2010), which means that it will not be easy to introduce animal-testing alternatives 
into the present system of animal experiments, nor for these alternatives to manage the 
problem of animal experimentation successfully. 
Such a socially embedded understanding of innovation suggests that the stimulation 
of animal-testing alternatives through research (i.e. “three-R research”) alone will not 
suffice. Recent developments regarding “responsible (research and) innovation” (Owen, 
Macnaghten, & Stilgoe, 2012; Stilgoe, Owen, & Macnaghten, 2013) and the “societal 
relevance” of research (Bouter, 2008; EriC, 2010b; Hessels & Van Lente, 2008; Spaapen, 
Dijstelbloem, & Wamelink, 2007), including the cooperation between natural and social 
scientists in the R&D process (Flipse, Van der Sanden, Radstake, De Winde, & Osseweijer, 
2014), appears to have a better chance of improving the system in a sustainable manner.
1.1.1 Dutch animal research policy under pressure
The existence of various diverging and often conflicting public values on a range of topics 
points to the value that is pluralism in Dutch society. In this pluralism, public policy – including 
the one on animal research – has a tough task to manage all. Desperately searching for 
new ways to live up to all societal values relevant to the topic, the policy programme has 
seemingly put its faith in the hands of animal-testing alternatives. Public policy addresses 
the welfare of animals in or after experiments, too, for example, through an exploration of 
the possibility of prohibiting the practice of giving mice a “toe cut” as a means to identify 
them6, or of giving the animals up for adoption after the experiments have been concluded 
6  A toe cut is frequently used to identify mice in the same birth nest. Possible alternatives, such as the use of a 
marker on their coat or an ear puncture, appear less reliable, as the marker fades, and the punctures may close 
(EZ, 2014b). Yet, the most drastic change in number seems to be expected from the policy 
programmes regarding animal-testing alternatives. Such alternatives are believed to hold 
the promise of not only reducing the need for animal experiments but also of producing 
more relevant knowledge than animal experiments do, and in a cost-effective manner.
Despite the public attention and the apparently societal wish to lower the number of 
animals used in research, the number of animals has hardly decreased over the past decade. 
Animal experimentation has remained a policy issue in need of further work, attention 
and public investments ever since the 1970s. The policy programmes have been promising 
improvements and changes, but to date, few of those promises have been fulfilled, and the 
present public policies on animal experimentation seem to have led to a deadlock. 
These signals indicate that the present (policy) discourse on animal experimentation is 
not living up to societal concerns and values regarding animal research, and that there is 
incongruence between what is socially expected from animal research policy and what the 
dominant voices promised animal-testing alternatives would deliver. In other words, the 
present policy system regarding animal research, including animal-testing alternatives, is 
under pressure to live up the societal expectations. 
The following section draws attention to the rational approach to animal research policy 
and exposes some of its limitations.
1.2 Questioning the rational approach of Dutch animal research policy
This section dives into the Dutch policy practice of animal research, including its monitoring 
and evaluation systems. It explains the rational approach to animal research policy and 
makes clear the limitation of such an approach for the questions in this study.
1.2.1 Evaluating success by counting animal numbers
Each year, the Dutch Food and Safety Organisation’s (NVWA) publication of a report containing 
the total number of registered research animals draws much attention in the Dutch media 
and in Parliament (Anonymous, 2014; EZ, 2014a; Proefdiervrij, 2014a; Van Kessel, 2014; 
Van Santen, 2014). This report is based on the registration of all the institutes that perform 
animal experiments in the Netherlands (i.e. “licensee”). The Animal Experimentation Act 
in time. Note that while an alternative to the toe cut is regarded as a refinement of the animal experiment (i.e. 
animal-testing alternatives), such an improvement will not have any effect on the numbers of animals used in 
the research. 
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obliges these licensees to register all the research animals used in their studies over the 
past year, including the species and the purpose of the experiments.7 The NVWA quantifies 
all the data in multiple categories in the annual report Zodoende [which may be translated 
as Thus].8 For example, the 2014 report showed that 517 181 research animals were used 
for 526 593 animal experiments in 2013 (NVWA, 2014).9 
The public uproar appears to be focused on the number of research animals serving as an 
indicator to measure the effectiveness of animal research policy in the Netherlands. This 
indicator suggests that a decline in research animal numbers correlates with a successful 
policy, whereas an increase is tied to a failing policy. The indicator has been used for both 
policies regarding animal research as animal-testing alternatives (i.e. “three Rs”). The use of 
this indicator has mainly been criticised by the scientific community, especially in relation 
to the effect of animal-testing alternatives. For example, scientists have argued that the 
relationship between an investment in animal-testing alternatives and a decrease in animal 
numbers is too simple and that only scientific experts can judge the developments in this 
respect (Van Zijverden et al., 2013b). Yet, the number of research animals remains the main 
indicator for an assessment of the success of Dutch policies with regard to animal research, 
including the three Rs, at present.
The reliance on (quantitative) indicators fits within a rational model of policy-making, 
which builds on the assumption that eventually the policy alternative that maximises the 
decision maker’s value most is the one that gets chosen.10 In the case of animal research, 
this implies that counting animals says something relevant about that value. Before going 
into the limitations of such an understanding of policy-making for the present case study, 
the following section will briefly introduce the assumptions of such rational models. 
1.2.2 A rational approach to policy: a short introduction to the literature 
Rational decision-making draws on dominant policy theories that are collectively known as 
7  A local Animal Ethics Committee (DEC) has granted permission prior to the start of these experiments for 
them to be carried out. Since 18 December 2014, the new Animal Experimentation Act [‘Wod’] has been in 
force. Since then, licensees need to obtain permission from the Central Authority for Scientific Procedures on 
Animals [Centrale Commissie Dierproeven, CCD] before starting their projects. A research project may include 
one or more animal experiments.
8  In 2012, the former VWA merged with two other inspectorates into the New Food and Safety Authority, 
NVWA. Later, this acronym was used for the Netherlands Food and Safety Authority. Meanwhile, the NVWA 
continued with the publication of the yearly Zodoende reports. 
9  Owing to the re-use of research animals in other experiments, the number of animal experiments is slightly 
higher than the number of research animals. 
10  Note that a policy alternative is not the same as an animal-testing alternative, and that many policy 
initiatives are presented in a linear, rational manner; e.g. policy x will lead to more y, contributing to goal z. 
rational choice theories (RCTs).11 This rational approach to policy entails a comprehensive 
analysis of all policy alternatives and their consequences, after which an alternative is 
chosen that will maximise the decisions maker’s value (Griggs, 2007; Hill, 2005).12 The ideal 
rational model postulates the prior specification of objectives and the identification of 
means to reach these ends (Bekkers, 2007; Hill, 2005). Following this approach, only the 
best-suited policy alternative will be chosen, namely the one that maximises its outcomes 
(i.e. utility-maximisation). In the case of animal experimentation, this desired outcome may 
thus be defined as the lowest amount of research animals possible, which implies that 
only those policy alternatives would be chosen that are likely to minimise the dependency 
on animal experimentation (as measured by a decrease in animal numbers). The rational 
model is built on decisions to implement policy programmes that contribute to societal 
goals (e.g. fewer research animals) that can be evaluated later on (e.g. counting animal 
numbers). In a rational approach to policy, policy objectives rely on specific, measurable, 
attainable, relevant and time-bounded definitions (i.e. “SMART”). 
The rational approach to policy-making understands the central government as a single 
entity with a coherent, instrumental and hierarchical “mind of its own” that can act without 
the approval of others (Colebatch, 2009). 
The rational models of policy have garnered much criticism over the years, especially 
regarding the extent to which the decisions of political leaders (e.g. ministers) can actually 
be seen as a choice between various types of actions to reach a stated objective. For 
example, political decisions often seem to be derived from present situations just as much 
as stated objectives, goals are often vague and ambiguous, and they overlap or contradict 
with other policy goals. Where multiple goals are in conflict, the outcome seems likely to 
be a compromise that reflects the power of different interests (Colebatch, 2009, p. 47 and 
beyond). Moreover, others may redefine policy choices, too.13,14
11  It is worth pointing out that the RCT literature encompasses a variety of other names, including public 
choice theory, social choice theory, game theory, rational actor models, positive political economy and the 
economic approach to politics (Borooah, 2002).
12  An important assumption in the rational policy model is that of a linear process that distinguishes several 
steps. These steps are i) defining goals; ii) imagining alternative means for attaining them; iii) evaluating 
the consequences of each course of action; iv) choosing the alternatives most likely to attain the goal; v) 
implementing and vi) evaluating (Stone, 1997b).
13  According to the rational choice models, rationality and power can be seen as separable, where rationality 
– in the form of knowledge – precedes power. In reality, however, power often ignores or designs knowledge as 
it chooses. As Flyvbjerg’s study on the Aalborg Project has shown, power and rationality are very much related, 
albeit asymmetrically. Power has a clear tendency to dominate rationality in the dynamic and overlapping 
relationship between the two. Whoever gets to have the most power behind its interpretation or rationale is 
the one who defines the new truth (Flyvbjerg, 2002).
14  The theories have evolved over time by taking into account much of the criticism levelled against the 
model’s previous, more polarising assumptions. This led to the insight that the policy process is in reality far 
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Choosing the policy alternative that best suits the objective is therefore much more restricted 
in practice than the rational model assumes, especially for as wicked and persistent a 
problem as animal research and the Dutch polder model of consensus-based economic and 
social policy making. The issue involves multiple and often conflicting values that include 
animal welfare (e.g. the reduction of the use of research animals), improving health (e.g. 
prolongation of life), economic progress (e.g. market introduction of new products) and 
enhanced academic understanding (e.g. unravelling the relationship between genes and 
mechanisms of toxicity). From this perspective, policy-making seems to be a compromise 
reached to satisfy a powerful field of various actors, values and priorities.
Rational models for policy thus assume (and require) the definition of unambiguous policy 
goals and the measurability of their effects in terms of numbers. If policy outcomes cannot 
be measured clearly and unambiguously, the calculation of optimal choices becomes 
unstable. The next section will show the limitations of the rational models in understanding 
animal research policies by looking into the problems of counting research animals as a 
policy indicator. 
1.2.3   The problem of evaluating from a rational approach: categorising and counting research animals
To count research animals, one needs to decide what counts as a research animal and what 
does not. The same goes for counting animal experiments. Should each procedure be counted 
as an experiment, or should the sum of procedures with one animal count as such? Whoever 
makes the classification has the power to decide what is counted, what is included, and 
what is excluded. In the words of Deborah Stone (1997b, p. 164), “there are many possible 
measures of any phenomenon and the choice among them depends on the purpose for 
measuring”. Counting thus always involves decisions about “counting as” (Stone, 1997a).
Counting research animals, animal experiments and animal-testing alternatives assumes 
categorisation, which also involves classification. Categorisation involves the establishment 
of boundaries in the form of rules or criteria that reveal whether something belongs to a 
particular category or not (Stone, 1997a). Counting assumes mutually exclusive categories 
and a classification system that is complete with consistent, unique classificatory principles 
in operation (Bowker & Star, 1999). However, many scholars have shown the ambiguity and 
multi-interpretability of classification systems, including that of invasive species (Boonman-
Berson, Turnhout, & Van Tatenhove, 2014), nature (Turnhout, 2009; Waterton, 2002) and 
biodiversity (Bowker, 2000). 
from rational, and that examining all alternatives is an impossible job. Herbert Simon, often seen as the father of 
the RCTs, recognises the difficulties and elaborates on the idea of “bounded rationality” in his later work. Here, 
he expands on the original idea of rationality, as intended to maximise the values of the decision maker, to strive 
for alternatives that are satisfactory or good enough (In: Hill, 2005, p. 147).
Counting involves selection, too, as it allocates privileges and discrimination: Animals that 
fall within the boundaries of the category (e.g. vertebrates) have legal protection, while 
animals outside the category (e.g. most invertebrates) do not. Counting research animals 
therefore also implies value judgments about which animal counts more (Stone, 1997a). 
Counting also implies a need for policy action (Stone, 1997a): Animal numbers are counted 
to support (the absence of) policies. The fact that the same numbers are used to support 
opposing arguments (e.g. decreasing trend since 1977, or an increasing trend in relation to 
the year before) supports the assumption that numbers are far beyond neutral and have 
different meanings in different contexts over time. Numbers thus seem to support a certain 
policy direction over others (i.e. they make “normative leaps” (Stone, 1997a, p. 167). The 
way in which the measurement is framed and understood thus seems to be more important 
than the actual outcome of the counting. 
1.2.3.1 Ambiguous demarcation of legal categories 
One may argue that the definition of what counts as a “research animal” is clearly defined 
in legislation on the matter. However, this legal clarity is elusive: Even the clearest definition 
needs interpretation and elaboration in concrete situations. In addition, categories are only 
temporarily fixed and always subjective to challenges. For example, Article 9.1 from the 
EU Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes states: 
“Animals taken from the wild shall not be used in procedures” (my emphasis) (European 
Parliament & Council of Europe, 2010). A procedure is defined as: 
(…) any use, invasive or non‑invasive, of an animal for experimental or 
other scientific purposes, with known or unknown outcome, or educational 
purposes, which may cause the animal a level of pain, suffering, distress or 
lasting harm equivalent to, or higher than, that caused by the introduction of 
a needle in accordance with good veterinary practice. (European Parliament 
& Council of Europe, 2010, Art. 3.1)
Based on the definition above, it seems at least questionable to what extent the swabbing of 
a goose to determine the virus strains this bird carries as part of zoonosis15 research should 
be interpreted as a “procedure” and hence should be counted as an animal experiment, 
too. The inclusion or exclusion seems to be left to the evaluation of the swabbing of the 
goose against the “introduction of a needle in accordance with good veterinary practice” 
(European Parliament & Council of Europe, 2010, art. 3.1).16 
15  Zoonoses are infectious diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans and vice versa.
16  This example was given by a virologist at the workshop on the implementati on of the European Directi ve 
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Moreover, legal categories may have unintended side effects that diverge from the original 
goal of policy (e.g. improving welfare of research animals). Consider the response from the 
former Minister of Health, Sport and Welfare Ab Klink when he was asked to reflect on the 
possible inclusion of invertebrates’ embryos into the classification of research animals: 
(…) embryos of invertebrates should be included in the regime. That leads to 
several things. Firstly, the amount of research animals will increase, as these 
animals will be considered research animals, too. Moreover, some animal-testing 
alternatives will not remain animal-testing alternatives...as they [the embryos 
of invertebrates] are now counted as research animals ‑ which we want to get 
rid of - the amount of animal-testing alternatives decreases as a consequence. 
(my translation) (CDA Minister Klink in Tweede Kamer, 2009, p. 152)
Interestingly, counting research animals and animal-testing alternatives may also pose 
a threat to the protection of animals in the research setting. The quotation above also 
highlights the fragility of the boundaries of an “animal-testing alternative”, including its use 
as a policy indicator. After all, accepting more (life stage of) animals as research animals will 
decrease the number of possible animal-testing alternatives and therefore negatively affect 
the evaluation of related policies. 
The two examples above reveal the difficulties in practice. The difficulty of deciding what 
belongs or “counts as” and what does not is strengthened even further by the challenges to 
which temporarily fixed categories always appear to be subject to: the challenge to include 
and the challenge to exclude (Stone, 1997a, p. 163).
1.2.3.2 Challenging the categories
Because of the temporal meaning of categories, it seems like the latter are always being 
challenged. Animals that fall within the category of research animals may rely on the 
privilege of protection. Therefore, there seems to be more “challenges to include”17 than 
“challenges to exclude”18 animal from the legal definition (Stone, 1997b, p. 163). 
organised by the Nederlandse Vereniging van Proefdierkunde (NVP, the Dutch Society on Animal Experimentation 
Practices) on 29 October 2010. 
17  Stone identifies these as challenges to include: “a real likeness where the measure finds a difference, and 
insists on inclusion of something the measure excludes” (Stone, 1997a, p. 164). In other words, something that 
is at present excluded from the measure has some similarities with something inside the measure.
18  Stone describes the second challenges as “a real difference where a measure finds a likeness, and insists 
on exclusion on something the measures includes” (Stone, 1997a, p. 164). This is the direct opposite of the 
challenge to include, as it aims to exclude that which is still inside.
For example, as more and more scientific evidence points to the pain sensation of several 
invertebrates, the exclusion of invertebrates from the legal category of research animals 
seemed difficult to uphold.19 In 2005, the scientific panel on Animal Health and Welfare 
(AHAW) of the European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA) was asked to consider the 
scientific evidence for the sentience and capacity of all invertebrate species used for 
experimental purposes and of foetal and embryonic forms to “experience pain, suffering, 
distress or lasting harm” (EFSA, 2005). Based on the pain system, brain complexity and 
social relationships, the panel concluded that “cyclostomes, all Cephalopoda and decapod 
crustaceans fall into the same category of animals as those that are at present protected” 
(EFSA, 2005, p. 3). The advice challenged the EU directive in force at that time (i.e. Directive 
86/609/EEC) to include specific types of invertebrates in the definition of research animals 
and count them as such. Moreover, the former EU Directive 86/609/EEC had excluded 
foetal or embryonic life stage from the legal category of research animals (EFSA, 2005, p. 
9). To the scientific panel, this point raised questions about the grounds on which such 
forms were excluded. The EFSA report did not go into detail on this question. However, it 
recommended that “whenever there is a significant risk that a mammalian foetus, or the 
foetus or embryo of an oviparous animal, is for any length of time sufficiently aware that it 
will suffer or otherwise have poor welfare when a procedure is carried out on it within the 
uterus or egg, or after removal therefrom, such animals should be included in the list of 
protected animals” (EFSA, 2005, p. 18). In the new EU Directive 2010/63/EU, both formerly 
excluded categories are included.20 
Yet, other animals remain - at least for now - outside the legal category of research animals. 
These include animals that are kept or bred for research purposes but do not end up in 
experiments themselves. These so-called “killed-in-stock animals”21 fall outside the legal 
definition of research animals and hence do not add up to the total number of research 
animals in the Netherlands. This group consists of around 600 000 animals and would 
double the number of of research animals in the Netherlands if they were included in the 
count. Other “excluded” categories of animals include spiders and free-swimming tunicates. 
The EFSA positioned these animals in a “borderline area”, as it found evidence for sensory 
processing and awareness in these animals but no evidence for a pain system (EFSA, 2005). 
Future scientific evidence on the existence of a pain system in these species would likely 
mean they would be included in the legal category of research animals, too.
19  Invertebrates were not regarded, and therefore not protected, as research animals within the former EU Directi ve 
86/609/EEC. Some member states, however, did already include some invertebrates in their national legislation. 
20  Directive 2010/63/EU defi nes research animals as “(a) live non-human vertebrate animals, including: (i) 
independently feeding larval forms; and (ii) foetal forms of mammals as from the last third of their normal 
development; (b) live cephalopods” (Art. 3).
21  In Dutch, this group is referred to as “in voorraad gedode dieren”.
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By contrast, the legal category of research animals hardly ever seems to be challenged by 
groups that wish to escape the categorisation (i.e. “challenge to exclude”). As inclusion 
also gives protection to those animals, the voluntary exclusion of some groups (e.g. certain 
species) seems unlikely. Nevertheless, some species attract more protection than others. 
Consider, for example, the quotation from Member of Parliament Harm Evert Waalkens 
during a debate on the phasing out of non-human primates for research purposes: 
Ormel said that they are all animals. But just like with people: We’re all equal, 
only some are a bit more equal than others. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 
2009, p.22)
He appears to argue for a further specification within the legal boundaries of the category. 
This example may come closest to Stone’s definition of the challenge to exclude and giving 
some research animals more protection than others (e.g. primates over dogs, rabbits over 
fish). 
The examples above show even smart (legal) definitions will not guarantee that past 
ambiguities will be resolved. Categories can always be subject to challenges to include and 
to exclude, such as the ones described above. These examples also show that the practice 
of counting is very much subject to normative choices and public scrutiny, rather than a 
neutral and objective measure of policy success. As the rational account of policy denies 
the existence of such challenges, such an approach seems unfit to grasp the incongruence 
between technological promises and societal expectations on animal-testing alternatives in 
the Netherlands.
1.2.4 The problem of implementation from a rational approach: redefinition of values 
A rational approach to policy postulates a causal relationship between policy and outcomes. 
This approach concentrates on the ability of single authority structures (i.e. the government) 
to effectively manage the implementation process. The politics of implementation is 
viewed in terms of the administrative process, not as a contradiction of values (e.g. Goggin, 
Bowman, Lester, & O’Toole, 1990). 
Such an understanding of policy implementation has the intuitive appeal of all means-end 
theories, which seems to embody the very essence of rational action. From this theoretical 
perspective, “implementation problems” occur in the absence of strict policy formulation: 
Effective management is the key to solving the implementation problem. 
In practice, however, implementation appears to be a complex process of putting policy 
into practice by means of a variety of mechanisms and procedures that involve a wide 
and diverse array of actors. It is the stage of the policy process where the underlying 
theories of policy decisions, the choice of policy instruments and the resources allocated 
during the formulation process are tested against reality (Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 
2001). We might think of implementation as a process of learning rather than carrying out 
instructions (e.g. Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). In most policies of interest, the objectives 
are characteristically manifold (because we want different things, not just one), conflicting 
(because we want different things) and vague (because that is how we can agree to proceed 
without having to agree also on exactly what to do) (Page, 2006, p. 211). 
Policy implementation thus appears to be a bidirectional process, in which interpretation 
and sense-making in “the field” also reshape policy interpretations. The government is no 
longer understood as a singular entity with authoritative choice (Colebatch, 2009). 
Viewing implementation as a process also dismisses a simple and linear implementation 
of public policy into research calls and research programmes, including those on animal-
testing alternatives. Implementation involves the (re)definition of the relevant concepts 
(e.g. societally relevant research and animal-testing alternatives), as well as the prioritisation 
of public values. “[I]mplementation is the continuation of politics by other means,” says 
Eugene Bardach (1977, p. 85). 
Understanding implementation as an execution of public policy in policy programmes 
seemingly ignores the (re)definition and (re)prioritisation of public values. Such a rational 
approach to policy therefore seems unhelpful to understand the incongruence that is 
central to this study. 
1.2.5 The need for an interpretive approach
The rational model (“goal-orientated perspective” or “authoritative account”) views policy 
as a process of choosing goals and finding optimal measures to achieve them. From this 
perspective, policy embodies a theory of cause and effect: If we invest in animal-testing 
alternatives, then the number of animals will go down. The authoritative choice account 
recognises that many organisations may be in involved in exercising public authority, but 
views them all as being part of one system that exercises the will of the government. This 
account assumes that the decisions at the top coincide exactly with the outcomes at the 
bottom (i.e. implementation). From a rational account of policy, the stable number of 
research animals is likely understood as a “problem of implementation”, and the argument 
would be that more (governmental) investment is needed, and a stricter definition of the 
categories would overcome the problems of “counting as” that were presented above. 
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However, an authoritative choice account of policy seems unable to understand the 
present incongruence for at least four reasons. Firstly, a rational account denies the political 
and ambiguous classification of categories such as research animals and animal-testing 
alternatives, which figuratively assumes these categories to be stable. Secondly, the rational 
account assumes that a quantitative measurement (e.g. the number of research animals) 
represents a relevant indicator to measure the effectiveness of the policy. Furthermore, 
this indicator assumes a causal connection between animal-testing alternatives and animal 
numbers. Thirdly, such an understanding ignores that organisations and researchers involved 
in three-R research are not so much after the animal-reducing potential of their work as 
they are doing their job (e.g. doing science, funding research) and the extent to which the 
policy programme can contribute to their own agendas (e.g. public accountability, social 
impact) (After Colebatch, 2009). Finally, such an approach takes the existence of animal 
research as a policy issue for granted. The questions of what is the issue, why and to whom 
it is an issue are therefore assumed to be irrelevant. Yet, within the context of societal 
expectations to animal research policies, these questions may well be relevant. 
Like Deborah Stone and others, Frank Fischer and John Forrester described policy-making 
as “a constant discursive struggle [emphasis added] over the criteria of social classification, 
the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective interpretation of common 
experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definitions of ideas that guide 
the ways people create the shared meaning which motivate them to act” (1993, p. 2). 
Such an “interpretive” approach to policy-making seems more capable of understanding 
the many challenges and ostensible lack of progress that this policy issue faces. In animal 
research, the discursive struggle continuously redefines the terms of the debate. It alters 
the outcome of policy not by making it more (or less) effective but by redefining what 
counts as effective. This research will therefore start from an interpretive account to policy-
making.22
1.3 Research objective, relevance and research questions
This study starts from the premise that the apparent incongruence between societal 
expectations regarding animal research policies and the technological promise of the 
discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands hampers a sustainable 
transition, namely one that better reflects the societal values present in the dominant 
discourse23 on animal research in the Netherlands.
22  Chapter 2 will outline the theoretical framework on which this study is based. 
23  This research uses Maarten Hajer’s definition of discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
Building on interpretive approaches to policy that assume the discursive character of policy-
making and the constant struggle over interpretation and power, this study fits within an 
argumentative tradition to policy analysis (e.g. Fischer & Forester, 1993).24 
This research aims to more fully understand the apparent incongruence by studying the 
implementation of public policy on animal research along the science-policy nexus in the 
Netherlands in general, and of animal-testing alternatives in particular. This research analyses 
how the incongruence may have evolved by analysing the framing and interpretation of the 
concept of animal-testing alternatives in different settings (e.g. policy discourse, research 
councils, and research programmes). It also studies the promises within the dominant 
discourse coalition25 on animal-testing alternatives amidst diverging societal values in order 
to work towards a more sustainable transition.
The central research question in this study is the following: 
To what extent does the present discourse coalition on animal-testing  
alternatives have the ability to reflect the societal concerns regarding animal 
experimentation in the Netherlands?
This study takes a formative approach26 to policy evaluation, as reflected in the following 
three sub-questions: 
1. Analyse: How can the present incongruence between societal expectations and 
technological promises from the dominant discourse coalition on animal-testing 
alternatives be understood from an interpretive framework of policy evaluation?
2. Assess: How can the mobilising power of the dominant discourse coalition on 
animal experimentation in the Netherlands be valued?
categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44: See also Chapter 2). 
24  Whereas the rationalistic tradition of policy evaluation tries to save evaluation from the pressure, the 
argumentative tradition sees policy evaluation as a contribution to the informed debate amongst competing 
interests and therefore explicitly incorporates politics in the ex post analysis of policy performance. See also 
(Bovens, ‘t Hart, & Kuipers, 2006) for an overview of the two schools of policy evaluation. 
25  This research uses Maarten Hajer’s definition of discourse coalitions as “the ensemble of a set of story lines, 
the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all organised around 
a discourse” (Hajer, 1995, p. 47: See also Chapter 2).
26  A formative evaluation focuses on learning and reflection, in contrast to a summative evaluation, which 
focuses on judgement and goal-achievement.
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3. Improve: How can there be a sustainable change in policy that would do justice to 
the societal expectations regarding animal experimentation in the Netherlands?
1.4 Research outline
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework and interpretive research approach of this 
study. Part II include the empirical chapters of this study: Chapter 3 studies the shifting 
interpretation of animal-testing alternatives in Dutch policy discourse since the introduction 
of the Animal Experimentation Act in 1977. Chapter 4 analyses how societal values 
regarding animal research are re-interpreted in research programmes on animal-testing 
alternatives during policy implementation. Chapter 5 studies how scientists give meaning 
to the concept of animal-testing alternatives in their attempt to achieve societal relevance 
in research programmes. Part III includes the overall assessment and conclusions: Chapter 
6 analyses the development of the discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives and 
describes the discursive process that may have contributed to the current tensions within 
the coalition. Chapter 7 describes the means and corresponding public policy instruments 
that may stimulate policy change on several levels of policy reflection regarding animal 
experimentation in the Netherlands. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the general conclusion and 
discussion to this study. 
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2 Theoratical framework and approach
The previous chapter showed the limitations of a rational account of policy to analyse the present public policy on animal research in the Netherlands, by pointing to the 
many challenges that categorising and counting – both central to the rational account – 
are subject to. Instead, it was argued that an interpretive account of policy seems better 
capable to understand the apparent incongruence between the societal expectations 
regarding animal research policies and the technological promise of the discourse coalition 
on animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands. 
This chapter starts with an outline of the study’s theoretical framework and builds towards 
the research approach. Section 2.1 sketches the assumptions of an interpretive account of 
policy, followed by a section on interpretive policy analysis (§2.2). The chapter continues with 
two ordering devices of meaning, namely discourse (§2.3) and frames (§2.4). It continues 
with an examination of the role of promises in the shaping of societal expectations (§2.5). 
Section 2.6 integrates the various theoretical building blocks into a coherent framework. 
Finally, §2.7 outlines this study’s research approach. 
2.1 An interpretive account of policy
An interpretive account of policy is based on the belief that the social world is characterised 
by multiple possible interpretations. From this perspective, policy is seen as a social construct 
of reality, a result of on-going interaction between the various parties in the debate (Bekkers, 
2007). This view contrasts sharply with traditional approaches to policy analysis, which are 
taken under the assumption of positivist-informed science, which means they claim it is not 
only necessary but also possible to make objective, value-free and univocal decisions (Fischer, 
2003; Yanow, 2000b). Moreover, the interpretive account acknowledges that much of the 
work takes place across or outside organisational boundaries, and it is much more concerned 
with identifying new players and negotiating with them than it is with selecting and perusing 
goals. It is for this reason that Colebatch (Colebatch, 2009, p. 26) talks of “policy making as 
negotiating” (in contrast with the authoritative choice account of policy that perceives “policy 
making as deciding”). From this perspective, policy making is about relationships, linkage and 
creating meaning. Consequently, the meaning and interpretation of policy is not something 
vague, or something that follows the decision-making process, but an integral part of the 
policy process. It is precisely for that reason that meaning can shape practices, institutions 
and policies and brings them into being. In the words of Henk Wagenaar, “meaning does 
not merely put a particular affective or evaluative gloss on things, but (...) it is somehow 
constitutive of political actions, governing institutions, and public policies” (2011, p. 4).27
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As such, policies’ meaning is “situated” and only makes sense within a particular context 
(e.g. Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Dvora Yanow speaks of the “reading” 
of a particular context, which means capturing the meaning of a particular socio-cultural 
environment at a particular point in time (Yanow, 1993, 47). Data and conclusions are thus 
constituted by the shared expectations, beliefs, values, routines, and practices of specific 
cultures. This culture can be small (e.g. a particular science domain or a specific practice of 
an organisation) or large (e.g. Dutch society, Western societies). As Heclo (in Freeman, 2006, 
p. 372) formulated it, “[p]olicy is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf”, asking 
“What is normal and what is deviant?”, and “Who are the experts?” (Heclo in Colebatch, 
2009, p. 30). This dimension of policy formation is perhaps hard to see, because it is 
concerned with things that are often taken for granted. It seems logical for the government 
to be concerned with problems, and if the government is dealing with an issue, it has to 
be a problem. However, this “scene-setting” dimension of policy practice28 is important to 
recognise and study, as it informs us to some extent about “why is this a problem, or why 
is this a problem now but not before?’ (Colebatch, 2009: See also Chapter 4). Whether or 
not topics become a policy issue has much to do with how they are (re)framed (Colebatch, 
2009, p. 30: See also §2.4 about framing). For example, whales used to be seen as a source 
of oil, but hunting them is a practice that most countries, with the exception of a few, 
condemn today. Similarly, research animals used to be considered ethically neutral, as 
objects, models or laboratory instruments in the 19th century. At present, many countries 
have regulations in place that acknowledge the intrinsic value of research animals.29 
From the angle of an interpretive account of policy, multiple meanings and interpretations 
are the rule rather than the exception. It is exactly the multivocality of policy that becomes 
the reason for and the explanation of implementation difficulties as well as successes 
(Yanow, 1993). Ambiguity can “unite people who might benefit from the same policy but 
for different reasons” (Stone, 1997b, p. 243). This leaves room for the forming of new 
“discourse coalitions” to link two formerly unconnected policy domains (Hajer, 2003). By 
contrast, the benefits of ambiguity may prove to be only temporary. If policymakers do 
not make their meanings explicit, multivocality is passed on to an administration agency 
27  Henk Wagenaar (p.4) points to the trite and controversial connotation of the concept “constitutive”. He 
argues that it is trite in the sense that its synonym, “constructed”, has become so pervasive in interpretative 
social sciences that it is now a symbolic marker signalling that “you speak the right language” (p.4). Furthermore, 
he finds the use of the concept controversial as “it glosses over a slew of philosophical and practical difficulties 
that are usually more hinted at than explicated”.
28  Colebatch also speaks of the “social construction account” of policy (p.29).
29  The term intrinsic value is not easily definable but generally refers to the animal’s value on its own and 
defies the instrumentalisation of animals. Yet, the philosophical consequences for the recognition of such a 
value and the practical consequences for our daily interaction are still under debate. For an interesting overview 
in this regard, see the edited volume Recognising the Intrinsic Value of Animals. Beyond Animal Welfare (Dol et 
al., 1999).
or to others (Stone, 1997b). A lack of precise definitions at this stage postpones the phase 
of interpretation even further. In other words, the longer the policy journey is, the more 
divergent and dispersed its meaning may become. 
2.2 Interpretive policy analysis
To do justice to the interpretive account of policy, one must use interpretive methods.30 
But, what is “interpretive” about interpretive methods? Is it not the case that all science 
engages with the interpretation of data? Dvora Yanow and colleagues open the discussion 
in Interpretation and Methods (2006) with these questions. While the use of the concept 
is not exclusive, interpretive methodologists share the view of “taking language seriously”, 
an overarching appreciation for the centrality of meaning in human life in all its aspects 
and a reflexivity on scientific practices related to the production of meaning and to 
knowledge claims (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Interpretative approaches assume that 
prior knowledge, whether derived from a person’s education, experience, and training or 
some other form of personal background, plays a central role in sense making. Interpretive 
approaches may therefore be defined as approaches that focus on “meanings that shape 
actions and institutions, and the ways in which they do so” (Bevir and Rhodes in Wagenaar, 
2011, p. 3), or “meanings of policy, on the values, feelings, or beliefs they express, and on 
the process by which those meanings are communicated to and ‘read’ by various audiences” 
(Yanow, 2000b, p. 14).31
30  The conceptual bases for these ideas were developed by philosophers, phenomenologists and hermeneutic 
scholars from the late 19th century onwards (for an overview, see (Yanow, 2000b; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 
2006)). In the late 1980s, Rabinow and Sullivan (1979) coined the phrase the “interpretive turn” to describe 
the epistemological shift that occurred in the social sciences in the mid- to late 20th century, namely as 
a shift away from positivism and towards interpretivism. Charles Taylor addresses the point explicitly in his 
work from 1985, in which he rejects the view that there can be any neutral, impersonal language (a central 
tenet of positivism) with which to describe and interpret human activity. Rather, he argues “human beings 
are self-interpreting animals” (, p. 45). In the 1970s and 1980s, these ideas began to enter the realm of the 
policy sciences through the work of Murray Edelman, Martin Rein, Donald Schon, John Dryzek, Frank Fisher, 
Debora Stone and others. This conceptual work was boosted by parallel developments in the areas of program 
evaluation and policy implementation, as well as influences from interpretive work in other fields, in particular 
developments in symbolic anthropology (e.g. Geertz), in the philosophy and history of science theory (e.g. 
Latour) and contemporary philosophical philosophy (e.g. Habermas, Ricœur) (For a more detailed overview, see 
Yanow, 2000b, 2006b).
31  ‘Interpretive’ should not be misunderstood as ‘qualitative’, as qualitative methods may still hold positivist 
ontological and epistemological presuppositions. In this regard, see also (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006, p. XV). 
One of challenges that interpretive approaches often encounter is the claim that their methods are neither 
rigorous nor objective. In the edited volume with Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, Dvora Yanow refutes such critics by 
arguing that interpretive research cannot possibly achieve these evidentiary standards, as “these expectations 
often reflect substantive misunderstandings of the character of the criteria themselves, definitionally, as well 
as of what interpretive research entails – what its own procedures are”. Another point is that these criteria 
have “developed over time out of positivist positions, which interpretive philosophies long ago rejected as 
inapplicable to human sciences” (Yanow, 2006a, p. 67). 
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As meaning is inherent in all aspects of policy, interpretive analyses consider a wide range 
of discursive resources, including not only the written language of the policy itself but also 
the spoken and written language of committee debates, including agencies’ manifold types 
of documents (annual reports, correspondence, etc.) and interviews (Yanow, 2000a). Yanow 
calls artefacts conveyors of meaning, including agency buildings, their furnishing and dress 
codes and other allegedly “external” items (Yanow, 1993, 1996, 2000a)32. In summary, “the 
‘data’ of interpretive analysis are the words, symbolic objects, and acts of policy-relevant 
actors along policy texts, plus the meaning these artefacts have for them” (Yanow, 2000b, 
p. 27).
The interpretive approach to policy analysis is not a singular method but rather a family of 
approaches, including – and certainly not limited to – narrative analysis, metaphor analysis, 
content analysis, category analysis, frame analysis, and discourse analysis (Hajer & Laws, 
2006; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Their shared assumption is that 
policy formation and implementation – or more broadly, the activities and interactions of 
government agencies, public officials, and their publics in civil society – cannot be properly 
understood unless we grasp their relevant meaning (Bevir and Rhodes in Wagenaar, 2007).
From an interpretive account of policy (or the post positivist tradition in social sciences), 
language is thus “recognised as a medium, a system of significance through which actors 
not simply describe but create the world” (Hajer, 1993, p. 44). The task of the analysts is 
to unearth the larger configurations of ideas, practices, artefacts and doctrines that shape 
the texture of social reality as we recognise and experience it (Wagenaar, 2011). These 
configurations can be understood through the concept of discourse, where meaning is 
discursive meaning. The next section explores the ”ordering function” (Hajer & Laws, 2006) 
of discourses in the policy process. 
2.3 Ordering through discourse 
The previous section showed the consequences of an interpretive account of policy as a 
sharp contrast to the rational models or authoritative account of policy (see also Chapter 
1). I understand policy problems – such as animal research – as socially constructed.33 By 
32  The study of artefacts goes beyond the scope of this research, although one can imagine its importance: 
for example, the contribution of laboratory animal facilities to the dominant safety discourse as closed and non-
transparent, and a strong distinction between expert and layman.
33  To be sure, and following Hajer’s example of dead trees (Hajer, 1993, p. 44), I do not see the animals in experiments 
as social constructs; the point is how one makes sense of those animals. In this respect, there are many realities. For 
example, one may see those animals as victims of modern humanity, or as relevant models of knowledge production. 
drawing upon discourse theories, this section describes how public officials, policy analysts, 
researchers and stakeholders make sense of the complex and politically charged world. It 
will introduce the concept of discourse and related concepts, such as discourse coalitions 
and discourse maturation.
The concept of discourse is understood in a variety of ways and used in many different 
disciplines, including sociology, literature, and political science.34 However, an important 
common denominator is that discourse is broader than speech: It is not seen as synonymous 
with discussion or understood as a mode of talking. Given the central focus of this study 
on the discursive meaning of policy, I follow Maarten Hajer’s definition of a discourse as “a 
specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, 
and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44).35 
2.3.1 Closure and discourse dominance 
The post-structuralist approach to discourse theory stresses the change of discourses over 
time, as well as their partial fixation of meaning (e.g. Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). A 
discourse always invokes a temporary closure: It fixes meaning in a particular way but does 
not dictate that meaning to be fixed forever. As such, there is always room for struggles 
over what the structure should look like and which definitions should prevail. Accordingly, 
discourses are structured differently over time (see also frame shifts in Chapter 3 and 4).
 
The concept of hegemony in discourse theories affirms the primacy of politics in the 
construction of discourses.36 In the words of Margo van den Brink, “politics is perceived in 
34  For an overview of the emergence of discourse theories and some critiques of each of the traditions, the 
work of Margo van den Brink (2009, p. 22 onwards) is very helpful. She distinguishes between the first tradition 
in discourse theory, which is concerned with the investigation of “language in use” and the analysis of “talk and 
text in context”; the second tradition, which defines the concept in a broader sense and extends to a wider set 
of social practices and phenomena (e.g. Foucault, Fairclough); and the third tradition, which further extends 
the notion of discourse, so that it covers all social phenomena, both discursive and non-discursive practices and 
elements (e.g. Laclau, Mouffle). These three traditions of discourse theory thus show a gradual development 
towards a more inclusive notion of discourse.
35  Like Hajer, I follow a more discursive meaning of discourse for the purpose of this study. Nevertheless, 
I agree with the post-structuralist approach to discourse theory, which abandoned the distinction between 
the discursive and the non-discursive and argued that non-discursive phenomena, such as technology and 
institutions, are ultimately constructed in and through discourses (“scripts” (e.g. Akrich, 1992) (Van den Brink, 
2009, p. 25). Yet, given the scope of the research, the interpretive methods used are orientated towards 
discursive meaning (in policy and political debates) rather than non-discursive meaning, for example of 
technologies and buildings (e.g. laboratories). 
36  Discourse theorists distinguish between the high-order level of the political, constitutive of the social order 
and inherent in every society, and the lower-order level of politics, with its party politics and the representation 
and pursuit of individual or collective interests (Dyrberg, 2004: See also Fischer’s level of arguments in §2.6). 
The political thus refers to the terrain in which articulation take place, and politics refers to the structuring of 
articulations. 
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terms of hegemony, generally referred to as the political creation of order out of disorder” 
(p.28). Because a discourse is defined in relation to an outside, it is always in danger of 
being undermined or challenged. The political struggle over what and who is included and 
excluded from the hegemonic discourse is central to the discourse-theoretical approach of 
Laclau and Mouffe: What constitutes the friendly inside, and what the threatening outside? 
(Van den Brink, 2009, p. 29).37
Maarten Hajer (2005) uses a two-step approach that seeks to determine whether or not a 
discourse is dominant in a particular domain. Firstly, discourse structuration occurs when a 
particular discourse starts to dominate the way in which people conceptualise the world. In 
Hajer’s own words, when “the credibility of actors in a given domain requires them to draw 
on the ideas, concepts, and categories of a given discourse” (, p.60). Secondly, discourse 
institutionalisation occurs when a given discourse solidifies into specific institutional 
arrangements and organisational practices, i.e. when its ideas become concrete policies. If 
these conditions are satisfied, a discourse can be said to be “hegemonic” (, p. 61) in a given 
domain: The discourse is understood - at least temporarily - as dominant. 
The next section will explore the role of discourse coalitions and their role in dominating the 
field of discursivity and constructing a centre for partial fixation. 
2.3.2 Discourse coalitions
In the struggle for discursive hegemony, discourse coalitions are formed among actors that, 
for various reasons, are attracted to a specific set of story lines (or discourse). The discourse 
coalitions approach suggests that politics is a process in which different actors from various 
backgrounds form specific coalitions around specific story lines. The coalitions are held 
together by discursive affinity: Arguments may vary in origin and come from people with 
widely varying backgrounds but who still have a similar way of conceptualising the world.38 
Following the lead of Maarten Hajer (1993), I understand discourse coalitions as “the 
ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that 
conform to these story lines, all organised around a discourse” (, p. 47). In this definition, 
story lines are “narratives about social reality through which elements from many different 
domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that 
suggest a common understanding” (Hajer, 1995, p. 62).
Essentially, story lines are political devices that engage in three roles to (temporary) 
discursive closure (Hajer, 1995). Firstly, they have the functional role of reducing the 
37  For a more elaborate account of the concept of hegemony, refer to the work of David Howarth (e.g. 2004).
38  In a sense, the idea of discursive affinity relates to the concept of boundary object. Boundary objects are 
defined as “objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several parties 
employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (Star & Griesemer, 1989). 
discursive complexity of a problem and creating possibilities for problem closure (see also 
§2.4 on the function of frames). Secondly, they provide some stability to the debate, once 
more and more actors start using them. Thirdly, story lines allow different actors to expand 
their own understanding of the phenomena beyond their own discourse of expertise or 
experiences. In other words, “a story line provides a narrative that allows the scientist, 
environmentalist, politician, or whoever, to illustrate where his or her work fits into the 
jigsaw” (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). 
Story lines not only help to construct a problem; they also play an important role in 
the creation of a social and moral order (in other words, a solution) with ideas about 
responsibility or blame. These devices help to position actors as problem solvers, as top 
scientists, as victims, or as scaremongers within a coherent story. Story lines are thus the 
“discursive cement” (Hajer, 1995, p. 65) that keeps a discourse coalition together (see also 
§2.4.3, about the parallel functionality of frame characteristics).
Discourse coalitions differ from traditional political coalitions or alliances in the sense that 
story lines, rather than interests or beliefs, form the basis of the coalition.39 Story lines may, 
however, change the previous understanding of what the actors’ interests are. Moreover, 
the scope of where participating actors are located is broader than is the case with political 
coalitions. The discourse coalitions approach suggests searching for politics in new areas, 
such as science, media and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (Hajer, 1995). 
A discourse coalition can be said to dominate a given political realm when it dominates the 
discursive space; that is, central actors are persuaded or forced to accept the rhetorical 
power of a new discourse (“discourse structuration”) when the actual policy process is 
implemented according to the ideas of a given discourse (“discourse institutionalisation”). 
Discourse coalitions are thus always subject to tensions challenging the boundaries of the 
coalition. When the coalition can no longer manage the tensions, it will likely disrupt the 
corresponding discourse as well (“discourse dislocation”) (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Van den Brink, 
2009). 
39  In this sense, discourse coalitions thus also differ from ‘advocacy coalitions’ in the advocacy coalition 
framework as developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (e.g.Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
Within the political subsystem “it is assumed that actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions 
composed of people from various organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often 
act in concert.” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133).
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Given the plurality of positions with which individual actors can identify, they can participate 
in different discourse coalitions at the same time.40 Therefore, it is more natural to speak 
of plural discourses than a singular discourse. However, discourse formation takes place on 
many different levels and in many different localities. Whether or not a specific discourse 
level is relevant depends on one’s specific object of study (Hajer, 1993). For example, 
political and scientific discourses do not form a unified whole but are rather a mix of 
elements from various discourses. Yet, it may be relevant for a specific study to talk of the 
‘political discourse’ as a contrast to the ‘scientific discourse’ on a specific issue or domain 
(see Chapter 3 on the political discourse of animal research).
In summary, the discourse coalition approach illuminates how different actors and 
organisational practices create meaning without necessarily orchestrating or coordinating 
their actions or sharing deep values. In fact, and analogous to the notion of “boundary 
objects” (e.g.Bowker, 2000; Star & Griesemer, 1989), this space for diverging norms, values, 
and agendas actually strengthens the power of a discourse coalition.
2.3.3 Discourse analysis
A key discourse-analytical assumption is that language profoundly shapes one’s view of the 
world and reality rather than being a neutral medium mirroring it (Van den Brink, 2009). 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the truth exists out there, waiting to be discovered (i.e. 
a central tenet of positivism). Truths are created and maintained through social interaction 
and depend on the specific contexts in which they arise. The analysis of discourse fits inside 
the interpretative and social-constructionist tradition of the social and policy sciences. 
Discourse analyses come in various shapes and sizes (e.g.Hajer & Laws, 2006; Van den 
Brink, 2009; Wagenaar, 2011: See also §3.3 on ordering through discourse ).41 However, 
what stands out is that discourse is no longer synonymous with “discussion” but is seen 
as “patterns in social life, which not only guide discussions, but are institutionalised in 
particular practices” (Burchell et al. in Hajer & Laws, 2006, p. 261). Moreover, an essential 
assumption is that the political power of a text is not derived from it consistency (although 
this may enhance its credibility), but comes from its multi-interpretability (Hajer, 1995). As 
such, knowledge becomes politically relevant once it is inscribed in a higher-order (political) 
discourse (see also §2.6 on the levels of policy reflection). 
40  Laclau and Mouffe (1985), following Foucault, use the concept of “subject positions” for actors who 
participate in the struggles about the definition and shaping of society. The concept thus refers to the positioning 
of subjects in various discourses (Van den Brink, 2009, p. 32). 
41  While the focus of this study does not allow for an elaboration on discourse analyses, the Handbook of 
Discourse Analysis (Schiffrin, Tannen, & Hamilton, 2001) is a good point of departure for further information in 
this regard. 
In discursive analysis, language is seen as action (Wagenaar, 2011). The intention of 
the analysis is to make visible the discursive structures (i.e. belief systems, ideologies, 
institutions, and public policies) that envelop us. Discourse analysts may adopt a reflexive 
position outside the cognitive domain of policy makers, for example, with “analytic leverage 
on how a particular discourse (…) orders the way in which policy actors perceive reality, 
define problems, and choose to pursue solutions in a particular direction” (Hajer & Laws, 
2006, p. 261). As an extension to Foucault’s lectures on governmentality, discourse analytic 
approaches have been employed to expose a particular power regime in policy domains 
(Hajer & Laws, 2006; Van den Brink, 2009).42
The next section explores the framing theory for useful and adequate practical tools for the 
analysis of discourse and discourse coalitions. After all, both discourse theory and framing 
theory provide “ordering devices” to analyse sense-making processes (Hajer & Laws, 2006, 
p. 252).
2.4 Frames as sense-making devices
Maarten Hajer and David Law (2006) talk of frames as “an account of ordering that makes 
sense in the domain of policy and that describes the move from diffuse worries to actionable 
beliefs” (, p. 256). Although frames have had different meanings in different locations, they 
are always referred to as sense-making devices that involve selection and salience. Frames 
may be understood to be an “organising principle that transforms fragmentary information 
into a structured and meaningful whole” (Van Gorp in Fischer, 2003, p. 144). They are also 
“intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander supports, 
and to demobilize antagonists” (Benford & Snow, 2000). Frames thus privilege some parts 
of reality by excluding others. As such, they determine what actors will consider “the facts” 
to be and how these lead to normative prescriptions for action (e.g. Fischer, 2003; Rein & 
Schön, 1993; Yanow, 2000b). The analysis of frames therefore helps to understand how 
animal-testing alternatives are understood in particular contexts. 
42  In short, the concept of governmentality encourages us to think of power beyond the traditional terms 
of the hierarchical, top-down power of the state, so as to include forms such as social control in disciplinary 
institutions as well (i.e. schools, psychiatric institutions, prisons) (e.g. Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). Or, in the 
words of Steven Lukes (2005) “a neologism referring to the way in which modern society’s various authorities 
administer populations, to the way in which individuals shape their own selves, and to the way in which these 
processes get aligned” (, p. 91).
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2.4.1 Exploring the interpretive framing perspective
The metaphor of the frame in interpretive social science can be traced to the work of Erving 
Goffman.43 He defined frames as a principle of organisation that “governs the subjective 
meaning we assign to social events” (Goffman in Fischer, 2003, p. 144). Frames represent 
“schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” 
occurrences in their life space and the world at large (Goffman in Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 
614). At present, the interpretive and social constructionist framing perspective is used by 
scholars in a broad range of disciplines, including policy studies (e.g. Rein & Schön, 1993, 
1996), conflict and negotiation research (e.g. Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon, 2004; Lewicki et al., 
2003), social movement research (e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000), and science and technology 
studies (e.g. Bijker, 1995; Zwartkruis, 2013). 
The notions of “interpretive frames” (Fischer, 2003) or “interactional co-constructions” 
(Dewulf et al., 2009) focus on the meanings assigned to social events in interaction. 
Such an approach differs from a more cognitive understanding (i.e. frames as “cognitive 
representations”(Dewulf et al., 2009)) that focuses on individuals’ sense-making 
processes.44 Furthermore, the interpretive account of frames denotes a more active and 
dynamic perspective on change, showing how the process of “framing” evolves over time, 
even within a single community of meaning, at the level of reality construction (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; Dewulf et al., 2009; Yanow, 2000a). 
Building on the interpretive account of frames, this research starts with the assumption that 
the meaning of animal-testing alternatives is produced through the interactions between 
individuals. Interaction may occur directly (e.g. two or more people having a conversation) 
or indirectly (e.g. with the outside world as subsequent policy papers).45 This notion of 
frames also leaves room for the more deliberate and strategic character of framing, in 
which some elements receive more attention than others.46 For example, the innovative 
possibilities of animal-free methods are emphasised more than the ethical dimension of 
43  The origin of the concept of frame is found in the fields of cognitive psychology and anthropology (e.g. 
Dewulf et al., 2009; Van den Brink, 2009). 
44  For a discussion of the different branches in academic literature, refer to the work of Art Dewulf and 
colleagues (2009). They disentangled divergent approaches to framing by analysing their assumptions about 
the nature of frames (cognitive representations or interactional co-constructions), and what is framed (issues, 
identities or interaction process). The strict separation, however, is difficult to uphold in practice, as one can 
question whether cognitive representations are in fact ever static, because they are continuously challenged by 
other representations, opinions and beliefs.
45  Note that the production of the policy paper itself involves many direct interactions. However, the meaning 
of a particular policy issue is at least temporarily frozen upon publication (see also §2.4.3).
46  The intention here is not to prove (if that is even possible) that a particular collective is responsible for 
the reframing of the policy issue. This research aims for more awareness regarding the process of reframing, 
which elements are given more attention, and which elements are left out. This awareness may improve our 
understanding of the present mismatch between societal expectations and technological promises. 
animal research in today’s policy papers (see also Chapter 3). This process of redefining 
meaning in a particular discourse is often indicated as reframing (e.g. Benford & Snow, 
2000; Lewicki et al., 2003). Note that the existence of one frame does not necessarily 
exclude another; other frames – even ones that are competing with each other – may (and 
will) co-exist. 
2.4.2 Role of frames and framing in policy controversies 
Competing frames play a pivotal role in policy controversies (Schön & Rein, 1994), such 
as animal research. Such controversies occur not only because different interpretive 
communities (i.e. “discourse coalitions”) focus cognitively and rationally on different 
elements of a policy issue, but also because they value different elements differently (Yanow, 
2000a). For example, one frame may place a high value on the healthy aging of humans, 
another on the economic valorisation of scientific results, and a third on the intrinsic value 
of animals. Different prioritisations of values often hamper successful integration into a 
new frame. 
In their seminal book, Frame reflection. Towards the Resolution of Intractable Policy 
Controversies, Schön and Rein (1994) point to the ways in which public policies rely on 
“policy frames” that supply them with underlying structures of beliefs, perceptions and 
appreciation. They argue that the presence of multiple conflicting frames makes intractable 
policy controversies resistant to resolution; the different problems and solutions that are 
put forward are grounded in different problem-setting stories, which are rooted in different 
frames. Defining the problem of animal research, for example, as a lack of animal-testing 
alternatives demands (and justifies) an investment in such alternatives. As such, frames and 
framing actually change the problem. In the process of policy making, Schön and Rein show 
that policymakers turn to reframing as a primary strategy in situations where conflicting 
frames have paralysed the decision-making process.47 
2.4.3 Frame analyses 
The interesting part of policy controversies is not so much that framing occurs, but what, 
how, when and by whom it occurs. The central question for the interpretive policy analyst is 
“How is the policy issue being framed by the various parties to the debate?” (Yanow, 2000a, 
11). In frame analysis over disputes, the researcher identifies two or more interpretive 
communities and the language that each of them uses to ‘frame’ the policy issue. Analysis 
consists of identifying the values underlying these frames, often to solve (reframe) the 
47  The active process of reframing, as deployed by policy makers and other actors, falls outside the central 
scope of this research. The work of Schön and Rein (e.g. 1994), Lewicki (e.g. 2003) and Dewulf (e.g. 2004) may 
be of interest in this respect. 
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particular dispute, (e.g. Dewulf et al., 2004; Lewicki et al., 2003; Schön & Rein, 1994; Yanow, 
2007). 
This study follows a somewhat different approach, as I understand documents (e.g. policy 
documents, programme evaluations) as ways to capture and analyse temporarily fixed 
meanings in interaction as well. Firstly, documents are never produced by a single person in 
a value vacuum. They represent the negotiated meaning at a certain moment in time within 
a certain context (e.g. policy formation, science funding, and science practice). Secondly, 
they enact time, because they are negotiated products. To some extent, documents are 
also a reaction to (or interaction with) the previous and future understandings that are fixed 
in documents. It is therefore possible to study shifting frames over a longer time period 
(see also Chapter 3 and 4).48 Following Fischer (2003), policy frames and their underlying 
appreciative system can be uncovered through an analysis of the various participants’ 
stories about policy situations. This “telling” can occur at various moments, which can all be 
studied by the analysts, for example, in research proposals, during parliamentary debates 
or the annual meetings of science programmes, in research calls, laws and regulations, 
etc.49 
Frames are not just “out there”, waiting to be discovered by the analysts. As researchers, 
we re-construct frames, not least of all by our own baseline of thought in understanding the 
situation. This is not a problem as such, as all forms of inquiry to some extent are shaped by 
our baseline beliefs, values, and assumptions, and frame analysis is no exception. It does, 
however, make clear that in order to reconstruct frames (rather than “discover” or “find”), 
we need to define the building blocks, or frame characteristics, that collectively shape the 
nature of a particular frame at a certain time in a specific context. Building on Scholten’s work 
on the framing of the problem of immigrant integration in policy and research (Scholten, 
48  This understanding is inspired by the work of scholars such as Dvora Yanow (e.g. Yanow, 2000b) and Pamela 
Brandwein (2006). Brandwein links the metaphor of a frame to science studies. Accordingly, she summarises 
the major steps “when investigating the career of a knowledge claim” to include the isolation of the underlying 
interpretive framework, an explanation of how it enables and contains meaning, an identification of the balance 
of credibility attached to the knowledge claim, the linking of the underlying framework to its sponsoring 
interpretive community, an identification of the resources and commitments of this sponsoring, following the 
balance of credibility over time and connecting it to shifting institutional arrangements, and explaining the 
significance of a win or loss at each stage of its career (p.235). 
49  Frame analyses have been criticised for their risk of a “relativist trap” by assuming that frames can be 
”discovered” from a frame-independent point, (e.g. Hajer & Laws, 2006; Wagenaar, 2011). This criticism may be 
relevant if frame analysis is positioned inside classical hermeneutics, and one looks for a particular meaning that 
is somehow “behind” the policy analysis. The experiences of policy actors are a convenient point of departure 
to discover these (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 71 onwards). However, the interactional approach to framing fits more 
with the discursive tradition, as it departs from the assumptions that experience, meaning, and our very notion 
of reality are determined by language (see also the previous sections). In this respect, the analytical distinction 
between a “baseline of thought” (Brandwein, 2006), or “cognitive representations” (Dewulf et al., 2009), and 
“interactional co-constructions” (idem) may be of relevance.
2007, 2011), I have identified four building blocks that resemble the different functions of 
frames and can be studied separately: issue identification, categorisation, attribution of 
responsibility, and causal story. 
Firstly, frames name an issue in terms of specific concepts and metaphors. Issue 
identification refers to the contextualisation of animal experimentation, including animal-
testing alternatives. It focuses on the discursive surroundings of a policy issue and on its 
relationship with other subjects and policy issues, such as safety, (animal) ethics, and health. 
As such, it also reveals its blind spots, or missing links. This contextualisation determines 
how the policy issue and the problem are defined. Secondly, categorisation reveals what 
is counted as relevant for the particular situation. Here, it refers to the inclusion and 
exclusion of certain (categories of) animals and methods in both the definition of research 
animals and animal-testing alternatives. As shown in Chapter 1, the boundaries of such 
categories play a major role in determining what is deemed relevant. Animals that are 
used for the breeding of research animals are not considered research animals themselves 
and are therefore excluded from the annual count. The exclusion of these animals also 
determines the scope of possible policy solutions. Thirdly, framing a policy issue in a certain 
way attributes responsibility on certain actors. For example, framing the issue in terms of 
conservatism and safety avoidance may place the responsibility on regulators, civilians or 
consumers. Contextualising animal research as a problem of shortage, by contrast, may 
place the responsibility on funding organisations, scientists or industries to develop animal-
testing alternatives. Finally, policy frames are also about combining aspects, gluing the 
problems, categories and actors into an intelligible, and convincing causal story to show 
how an issue can be explained and – more importantly – solved. As such, this building block 
encompasses all previous elements and nudges the policy issue in a particular direction. By 
analysing the different building blocks, or frame characteristics, it is possible to reconstruct 
the dominant policy frames at a particular time and visualise the frame shifts that occur 
within a particular discourse (e.g. policy discourse). 
Frames often build on the potential effects of policy measurements and technologies to 
construct a coherent narrative. Yet, there is still very little analysis about this aspect in the 
framing literature. The next section explores how the ‘sociology of expectations’ subfield of 
science and technology studies may provide a valuable contribution here. 
2.5 Expectations as guiding structures of the present 
Promises and expectations play a crucial role in the public legitimisation of policies, research 
programmes, and technology development regarding animal research. Carefully crafted 
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arguments and promises build on their potential effect (e.g. the increased relevance of test 
outcomes, the enhanced animal welfare, and the use of animal-testing alternatives) and 
aim to legitimise the investment at present. 
The functionality and study of such promises and expectations is core to the sociology of 
expectations as part of science and technology studies (STS). In short, STS has become 
on “interdisciplinary field that is creating an integrative understandings of the origins, 
dynamics, and consequences of science and technology” (Hackett, Amsterdamska, Lynch, 
& Wajcman, 2008, p. 1).50 The rising number of scholars and literature supports the growing 
interest in this dynamics of expectations and promises, including xenotransplantation 
(Brown & Michael, 2003), stem cells (Brown & Kraft, 2006), genetic technologies (Nelis, 
2000), and visionary images of nanotechnology (Lösch, 2006). The field is also expanding 
beyond the borders of medicine, as indicated by studies on metaphors of the Internet 
(Wyatt, 2000), Dutch biogas developments (Geels & Raven, 2006), hydrogen cars (Bakker, 
2011), and sustainable agro-food systems (Zwartkruis, 2013). Overall, these studies share 
their focus on the role of expectations in structuring futures, and expectations are therefore 
understood as guidance structures at the present time. 
2.5.1 How expectations ‘perform’ in the present 
There are expectations in all social and political actions, making it impossible to act 
without making assumptions about the consequences of that act, either explicitly or tacitly 
(Berkhout, 2006). Often, the future is presented as something we all want or fear and is 
clearly demarcated from the past. The past is represented as problematic, as something 
lacking, or something wrong, and the future is depicted as the moment or place where 
solutions are achieved and wrongs turned into rights. To unite the variety of individuals 
in one common future, multi-interpretable concepts such as ‘health’ and ‘safety’ are 
frequently used.51
In the edited volume Contested Futures (Brown, Rappert, & Webster, 2000), Mike Michael 
(2000) draws explicit attention to the performativity of the representation of the future: “we 
must ask how are such representations of the future so constructed that they ‘perform’ in 
such and such way” (p.22). In order to perform, expectations serve several roles (e.g. Borup, 
Brown, Konrad, & Van Lente, 2006). The first and perhaps most prominent function of 
50  The editors of the Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Hackett et al., 2008) describe the common 
ground of STS as a “multifaceted interest in the changing practices of knowledge production, concerns with 
connections among science, technologies, and various social institutions (the state, medicine, law, industry, 
and economics more generally), and the urgent attention to issues of public participation, power, democracy, 
governance and the evaluation scientific knowledge, technology, and expertise.” (p.3) 
51  Note that the function of expectations here closely relates to the gluing characteristic of frames. 
expectations is their guiding character. Harro van Lente succinctly summarises it as follows: 
“once technological promises are shared they demand action, and appear as a necessity 
for technologists to develop, and for others to support them” (Van Lente, 2000, p. 58).52 
The second function of expectations, achieved through guidance, is to provide structure to 
those action demanding activities (Borup et al., 2006). The represented future creates an 
ostensibly clear track structuring the activities that should be undertaken in order to reach 
that future. The third function is for expectations to attract interest of others, including 
colleagues (at the micro-level), related disciplines or organisations (meso-level) or society 
as a whole (macro-level). Expectations for animal-testing alternatives may come into play 
on all these levels, including the expectations raised in research programmes in reference 
to societal concerns on animal numbers (meso-level). The fourth function of expectations is 
their role in legitimising actions, projects, policies and research programmes.
The legitimising role of expectations is also perceptible in present debates around the 
societal relevance of research (See Hessels, 2010 for an excellent introduction). In short, 
scientists are increasingly asked to legitimise their research in terms of the concrete 
contributions to society as a whole, instead of their academic or economic relevance. The 
pressure for societal relevance may place scientists in difficult positions in their “struggle 
for relevance” (Hence the title of Hessels, 2010), while also requiring new impact indicators 
to measure this type of relevance (e.g. Drooge & Spaapen, 2011a; Drooge et al., 2011b). For 
example, the toxicogenomics53 programme in the Netherlands has claimed to serve both 
societal concerns regarding animal welfare and safety, and the (academic) understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms of toxic response, such as liver and renal failure (see also 
Chapter 5). 
2.5.2 The downside of overpromising
Promises and imaginative speculation are “indispensably central to the shaping of 
technology” (Brown, 2003), crucial to get emerging technologies on the agenda and 
stimulate action. And yet, at the same time, we want to stay away from overpromising, 
technological failure, and disillusionment.
Expectations may also shape the socio-political landscape surrounding these technologies. 
In Hope against Hype - Accountability in Biopasts, Presents and Futures, Nik Brown (2003) 
pays attention to the downsides of expectations. The performative actions of expectations 
take place in competitive environments where rival expectations vie for ascendance. In 
52  In earlier research, Van Lente (1993) found that expectati ons were less specifi c at the meso-level than at 
the micro-level. Rather than point to exact percentages, expectations were expressed as, for example, “great 
potential” (Van Lente, 1993). At the macro-level, expectations became even more broad and diffuse. 
53  Here understood as the application of genomic technologies in the field of toxicology.
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their struggle to be heard, expectations must compete with each other. It is likely that 
only the expectations of the most strident voices become the widely shared normative 
anticipation of the future (Brown, 2003), even though they do not necessarily express 
the general societal expectation regarding the development of technology, for example, a 
decrease in research animal numbers. 
At a particular moment in time, when the energy that was invested in order to maintain 
expectations no longer outweighs the benefits, the process collapses abruptly and starts all 
over again (Brown, 2003; Van Lente, 1993). In many cases, the present fails to measure up 
to the former expectations (Brown, 2003; Brown & Michael, 2003), which can have severe 
consequences for the reputation and credibility of professions, institutions, and industry 
(Brown & Michael, 2003).54 
2.5.3 Levels of promises and expectations
Representations of the future can be analysed on different levels. For example, Harro van 
Lente (1993) proposes a “promise-requirement cycle” to differentiate between different 
levels of expectations: “[W]hat starts as an option can be labelled as a technological 
promise, and may subsequently function as a requirement to be achieved, and a necessity for 
technologists to work on, and for others to support” (Van Lente, 2000, p. 60). An important 
aspect of the cycle is the niches, or protected spaces, in which any attempt to fulfil the 
promises is protected, and they provide the opportunity to continue the development of a 
technology.55 Such niches may be effective at the level of individual organisations (micro-
level) or techno-scientific fields (meso-level), or at the societal level of generic cultural 
orientations (macro-level). At the micro-level, expectations actually shape the local agenda, 
where promises’ “will be” changes into a “should be done” in practice (Van Lente, 1993). 
At all levels, actors will compete and be active in “expectation work”, which means “raising, 
maintaining and controlling expectations” (Bakker, 2011, p. 39). More specifically, the 
multi-level character of expectations can be linked to their fallibility. For example, specific 
expectations built on a local agenda have a higher rate of fallibility than generic expectations 
built on societal agendas (Bakker, 2011, p. 40). 
54  To soften the pain of these costs, Brown suggests looking into the “situatedness” of expectations by 
focusing on their temporal and spatial dimensions. A better understanding of how expectations change over 
time (temporal dimension) and how they are prone to differences in meaning among the many actors involved 
(spatial dimension) might lead to a “democratization of expectations” (Brown, 2003).
55  The idea of a promise-requirement cycle is interesting, especially if one considers that each step puts 
more pressure on the promising mechanism and provides the opportunity to continue the development of 
a technology. Promises not only raise resources and protection, but they also return as obligations: They are 
“mixed blessings” (Bakker, 2011, p. 39). A mandate, in terms of funding, once again comes with requirements 
that should be met, and so the cycle continuous, with expectations and promises leading to requirements. 
The classifications of Van Lente and Bakker focus on the specific phases of technology 
development and are therefore less appropriate for the study of expectations at various 
levels of policy arguments. The next section integrates the previous ones and shows how 
Fischer’s framework of analysing policy arguments (e.g. Fischer, 2003; Fischer, 2007a) may 
help with an analysis of expectations and frames at different levels of policy reflection. 
In short, his framework offers a logic of four interrelated discourses, each with its own 
questions and level of reflection. For example, the technical-analytical discourse focuses 
on the measurement of the efficiency of programme outcomes, whereas the ideological 
discourse is concerned with the fundamental ideals organising the accepted social order 
(see also §2.6.1 and Chapters 4, 5, and 7).
2.6 Putting theory to use: complementing discourse theory with framing theory and STS
The focus in this study is on how meaning is conveyed (Yanow, 1996) within and between 
discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995) and the way in which questions are “framed” (Schön & 
Rein, 1994) and argued (Fischer, 1995, 2003) in promises and expectations (Borup et al., 
2006) along the science-policy nexus of animal research. Complementing discourse theories 
with framing theories and science and technology studies require some work with regard to 
adjustment and (re-)conceptualisation.
Firstly, one of the difficulties in combining discourse theories and framing theories is their 
conflicting ontological and epistemological assumptions.56 In general, “the work on frames 
can be positioned on a continuum between an individualist ontology, in which ordering 
and sense-making is understood in terms of individual capacities, and a relational pole 
that describes ordering and making sense in terms of the patterns of social interaction 
that characterise a particular situation” (Van den Brink, 2009, p. 40).57 By focusing on 
strategic elements of frames, I follow Benford and Snow’s definition of framing processes 
as “deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed: frames are developed and deployed to 
achieve a specific purpose – to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire 
resources, and so forth” (2000, 624). In contrast to the framing account of Schön and 
Rein, Benford and Snow posit a certain distance between belief and frame (Hajer & Laws, 
56  This section closely follows Van den Brink’s (2009) argument on complementi ng discourse theories with 
framing theories. For a more elaborate discussion, see her work (especially p.39-44). 
57  The wide range of epistemological and ontological assumptions within the range of framing theories is valid 
in this study. While these assumptions are of some importance, further discussion would detract from the focus 
of the present research. It is worth noting, however, that the individualist ontology fits Dewulf’s interpretation 
of “cognitive representations” (2009)
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2006).58 However, this account of framing still does not automatically fit within a discourse-
theoretical framework, as the latter is built upon the idea that there is no other logic beyond 
the discursive one. As the framing perspective recognises other forms of logic, this theory 
has to be “adjusted to make them fit into the universe of discourse theory” (Van den Brink, 
2009, p. 43).59 Therefore, following Van den Brink (2009), I use the framing perspective to 
analyse the way in which meaning is (temporarily) fixed in structures, such as policies, laws, 
and regulations. I use the concept of “frame shift” to highlight the change from one (policy) 
frame to another (see also Chapter 3 and 4). 
Secondly, the notion of framing closely resembles the work on expectations with respect to 
the individual and the relational. Frans Berkhout (2006) argues that “collective expectations” 
have a specific set of functions in aligning interest and framing problems, have a common 
structure and take characteristic forms. Those collective visions influence the frames and 
interests of agents, but only insofar as they align with existing predispositions in privately 
held “schemata’s” and are consistent with privately interpreted experience. Future 
visions contain implicit (or explicit) ideological assumptions (e.g. over the way problems 
are framed), and these will colour their attractiveness to different audiences (idem). As a 
consequence, what starts as a discursive reality may end up as a technical one (Van Lente 
& Rip, 1998)
Thirdly, STS theories are more naturally combined with discourse theories as they are 
both grounded on comparable ontological and epistemological assumptions. While the 
focus of STS is on science and technology, both theories assume the existence of multiple 
socially constructed realities that are historically and culturally specific. In short, social 
constructivism provides three important assumptions, or “reminders” (Sismondo, 2004, p. 
57) for STS: Science and technology are inherently social, active and are not themselves 
natural.60 
Insights from STS in general, and from the sociology of expectations in particular, are thus a 
welcome theoretical addition to the discourse-theoretical approach. 
58  However, Henk Wagenaar (2011) points out that Rein and Schön, in their later work, seem to become more 
aware of the “relativist trap”, especially in relation to frame analyses (p.40). There is no frame-independent 
point from where it is possible to assess frames, a point that Rein and Schön seemed to imply in their earlier 
work regarding frames as constructs underpinning individuals’ stable and shared belief systems. 
59  “In general, it can be argued that whereas framing theories draw on an individualist ontology and on a 
relative weak and moderate form of social constructionism, post-structuralist discourse theory draws on a 
relational ontology and on a strong form of social constructionism” (Van den Brink, 2009, p. 43). 
60  While the assumptions have considerable force, they do not come with a single interpretation, and Sergio 
Sismondo speaks of many different “social constructions, each with their own implications”. 
In summary, a discourse is conceptualised in this research as “a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in 
a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social 
realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Each discourse holds different sets of narratives, or story 
lines, around which different stakeholders collide to form a discourse coalition. Frames are 
then sense-making devices through which meaning is (temporarily) fixed within a discourse 
(coalition), and which may change over time (i.e. “frame shifts”). Frames are part of a larger 
discourse, and frame shifts may occur inside the same discourse. Frames include both a 
problem definition and the presumed answer to this definition. Finally, discourse coalitions 
may create expectations functioning on different levels of (policy) reflection.
2.6.1 Levels of policy reflection 
To position the frames and expectations, I adopted Fischer’s framework on analysing policy 
arguments (e.g. Fischer, 2003; Fischer, 2007a), as well as additional work by Grin and Van 
de Graaf (1996a, 1996b). The framework offers a logic of four interrelated discourses, each 
with its own questions and level of reflection. Each of the different levels raises a different 
set of questions assembled in different discourses.61 For example, the goal of programme 
verification is “to produce a quantitative assessment of the degree to which a certain 
programme fulfils a particular objective (…) and a determination (…) of how efficiently 
the objective is fulfilled” (Fischer, 2003, p. 193). The framework clearly demonstrates the 
interrelatedness of all levels and treats each of them as equally important. 
Following Grin and Van de Graaf (1996a), I argue that the object of Fischer’s first-order 
discourse is analogous to the object of Schön and Rein’s first-order reflection in action (1993), 
and what Fischer calls second-order discourse corresponds to their second-order reflection. 
The adopted framework thus makes a distinction between a first-order policy reflection, 
which assumes animal-testing alternatives as a solution to the problems associated with 
animal research, and a second-order reflection that positions animal experimentation in 
the broader societal context driving these experiments. In the second order, neither the 
use of animal experiments nor the development of animal-testing alternatives is taken for 
granted. The framework through which this research should be analysed appears below.
61  Note that Fischer’s understanding of a discourse expands on Hajer’s definition of discourse (see also §2.3 
and §2.6), as Fischer’s (technical-analytical or contextual) interpretation may co-exist in one of Hajer’s (political, 
scientific) interpretations.
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Table 2-1: Analysing framework of frames, promises and expectations. It is based on Fischer’s 
framework on analysing policy arguments and additional work from Grin and Van de Graaf, 1996a.
Argumentation concerns Questions include
First-order reflection
Technical-analytical discourse:  
programme verification
Evaluations of solution, 
objectives, end and means
Does the programme fulfil it 
stated objective(s)?
Contextual discourse: 
situational validation
Problem definitions and 
the meaning of solution
Is the programme objective(s) 
relevant to the problem situation?
Second-order reflection
Systematic discourse:  
societal validation
Empirical and normative 
background theories
Does the policy goal have 
instrumental or contributive value 
for the society as a whole?
Ideological discourse:  
social choice
Normative ontological 
preferences
Do the fundamental ideals (or 
ideological principles) that organise 
the accepted social order provide 
a consistent base for a legitimate 
resolution of conflicting judgments?
2.6.2 Between promises, expectations, and societal values
This research studies how policy programmes on animal research have been implemented 
along the science-policy nexus (e.g. research programmes on animal-testing alternatives). 
It is therefore important that promises and expectations be conceptualised as distinct 
concepts that are nonetheless related.62 I understand their relationship as mutually 
exclusive but co-created through interaction: They need each other in order to mean 
something, and simultaneously they influence each other’s meaning. For example, the 
promise of an animal-free future is inadequate if nobody expects this to be genuine. Or, 
without an expectation of fewer animals, the promise of animal-testing alternatives would 
not be necessary in the first place. 
In this research, a promise is thus understood as the (deliberate) discursive production of 
a desired future by individuals, organisations, or a discourse coalition as a whole (i.e. the 
sender). An expectation is defined as a future image that is the result of the produced promise 
62  This is in contrast with the majority of the literature on the sociology of expectations (e.g. Brown, 2003; 
Brown & Michael, 2003; Van Lente, 1993), which regards the terms as interchangeable.
(i.e. the receiver).63 More specifically, I refer to technological promises as a representation 
of the future within the technical-analytical discourse of policy reflection. “Technical” thus 
refers to the level of policy reflection and not to the scientific and technical population as 
such (e.g. scientists, technologists). In other words, policy makers, funding organisations, 
industries, and scientists may all make promises on the technical-analytical level. 
This technical-analytical level of policy reflection is built on the premise that social problems, 
such as animal research, can have technical solutions that include scientific research and 
technical interventions. This firm belief in technology as having the capacity to provide the 
answers to social, political and economic problems has been identified as a “technological 
fix” (Rosner, 2004). In her research regarding the discursive strategies of stem cell scientists, 
Sarah Parry introduces the term “scientisation” as “the way in which scientists convert 
social and ethical issues into scientific or technical ones” (Parry, 2009, p. 95). Elaborating 
on Parry’s notion, I introduce the concept of technification as an ongoing process of the 
over-representation of technical/scientific futures as solutions to social problems, including 
a technology‑push approach to innovation (e.g. Coombs, Saviotti, & Walsh, 1987). In short, 
the core of the technology-push argument is that advances in scientific understanding 
determine the rate and direction of innovation (Nemet, 2009). The concept of technification 
thus underscores the importance of the adoption and imposition of technical/scientific 
methods, answers and solution to social, political and economic problems. This overall 
technification-process may thus entail one or more technological promises and activities 
(see Chapter 4 and to some extent Chapter 3).64 
Finally, I refer to societal or public values as wide-ranging, abstract values that are shared 
within the dominant societal discourse in Dutch society. These include health, nature 
protection, animal welfare, children’s safety, and scientific progress, among many others. 
With reference to the ontological normative preferences of society as a whole, societal 
values occur on Fischer’s level of social choice (“ideological discourse”; see also previous 
section). Note that the concept itself does not discriminate between or prioritise different 
values. Indeed, societal values may be in conflict with each other and not always easily 
united in a single practice, promise or expectation. 
63  It is not my intention to frame the receiver as passive, because the creation of an expectation may also 
require work; furthermore, it also shapes the production of new promises. 
64  The term technification in used in this research in a sociological manner, while acknowledging its proximity 
to a more philosophical understanding of technology (i.e. Philosophy of Technology, e.g. Böhme, 2012; Feenberg, 
1991, with its own journals, including Philosophy & Technology) (see also Chapter 7, and especially §7.5). 
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The classification of both promises and expectations on their level of policy reflection makes 
it possible to describe and capture the present incongruence between societal expectations 
and technological promises with respect to animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands.
2.7 The study of meaning along the science-policy nexus: case selection
Central to this study is an exploration of how policy regarding animal research conveys 
meaning along the science-policy nexus. How does the notion of an animal-testing alternative 
acquire meaning when it travels to different contexts, such as a science funding organisation 
or a research programme? I understand the science-policy nexus as a highly interactive 
and shaping nexus, where meaning is conveyed, constructed, and converted in alliance 
with - or between - numerous actors. These include the Dutch parliament and Cabinet, 
the European Parliament, individual scientists, programme leaders, science coordinators, 
several types of industries, policy makers, ministers, NGOs, health organisations, civil 
servants, science programmes, umbrella organisations (e.g. for the sciences in general, for 
medical institutions, for particular professionals), science funding organisations, the media, 
science departments, and the public at large.65 
Three case studies were selected from which the nexus was entered: Firstly, I selected the 
Dutch public policy on animal research to study the changing meaning of animal-testing 
alternatives in the policy discourse. By studying a wider time period (1970-2012), I was 
able to capture the changes in the contextualisation of both the problem and solution 
regarding animal research (i.e. “policy frames”). Such an evolving understanding is crucial 
to an understanding of the present incongruence. The table below summarises this study’s 
approach to analysing the science-policy nexus.
Secondly, I selected the ZonMw programmes on animal-testing alternatives. Inspired by 
the work of Wiebe Bijker, Roland Bal and Ruud Hendriks behind the influential Health 
Council (Bijker, Bal, & Hendriks, 2009), I attempted to gain access to the relevant ZonMw 
working committee to observe their work and discussions from within (i.e. “backstage”). 
Unfortunately, this request was turned down.66 The relevance of the ZonMw programmes, 
65  This study focuses on the science-policy nexus; yet I acknowledge that in the sense-making process of 
public policy programmes on animal research (i.e. implementation) many actors are involved (e.g. industry, 
NGOs, patient organisations). Their understanding will occasionally be included too, but remains largely outside 
the scope of this research.
66  I think that such a back stage picture would have resulted in relevant and interesting research data for this 
research and vivid discussions regarding the future of three-R programmes. I sure hope that this research can 
still have this function. 
however, remained beyond dispute. An analysis of programme reports, evaluations and 
programme texts made it possible to study the frontstage translation process of policy 
and societal values into the (daily) practice of an intermediary funding organisation.67 
Finally, I selected the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre (NTC), part of the larger 
Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI) consortium. The NTC programme developed around 
several emerging technologies (e.g. metabolomics, proteomics, genomics) and aimed to 
contribute to the development of animal-testing alternatives in the field of toxicology. 
The proximity of the NGI research-funding organisation, the national and network-like 
organisation of the programme, the exploring character regarding emerging technologies 
and the public legitimatisation of its research in terms of animal-testing alternatives made 
the NTC a very interesting case to study. The individual empirical chapters (3-6) will each 
present its theoretical framework, data selection, and method of analysis in more detail.
67  The distinction between frontstage and backstage processes refers to Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective 
(1959/1990), which was also use by Hilgartner (2000) in his analysis of the National Academy of Sciences (Bijker 
et al., 2009). Frontstage refers to the way in which research producers and users openly present their work and 
work processes, which suit a more rational way of policy making. Backstage refers to the practical, yet often 
invisible, coordination work that needs to be done to make research evidence fit the policy perceptions and 
requirements (Bekker, Van Egmond, Wehrens, Putters, & Bal, 2010).
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Table 2-2: Summary of the empirical part of this research; studying the science-policy nexus
Chapter
3 
part II
4 
part II
5
part II
6
part III
Short title
Shifting discourse 
on animal  
research
Technification of 
public values
Conflicting public 
values in research 
practice
Vulnerable new 
discourse  
coalition
Position 
on nexus
public policy
science-policy 
intermediaries
science 
programmes
all of the 
previous
Main focus
public policy on 
animal research, in 
the Netherlands
science funding 
organisations
research 
activities within 
larger research 
programme
discourse
Case
public policy on 
animal research, 
including animal 
testing-alterna-
tives, since the 
introduction of the 
draft in 1970
ZonMw pro-
grammes on 
animal-testing 
alternatives 
between 2000  
and 2010
the Netherlands 
Toxicogenomics 
Centre, part of the 
larger 
Netherlands 
Genomics 
Initiative
synthesis of the 
previous three 
chapters  
(hence part III)
Focus of 
interpretive 
analysis
policy frames policy frames policy frames discourse
Empirical 
data
documents, 
including laws and 
regulations, drafts, 
and reports
in-depth 
interviews, 
documents, 
including reports, 
evaluations, and 
programme texts
in-depth inter-
views, documents, 
including reports, 
evaluations, 
programme texts, 
observations of 
meetings, and 
academic literature 
on toxicogenomics
all of the 
previous
Part II 
Empirical chapters
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Studying policy frames
The shifting interpretation of animal-testing 
alternatives in Dutch policy discourse
3
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3 Studying policy frames
Animal experimentation has been a major topic of public debate for decades. The diversity of players, the numerous fields of application and (end) products, and different 
arguments yield a very complicated debate. Policy domains overlap with each other, and 
decisions from one may have direct consequences for the others. In this contested debate, 
the search for and stimulation of animal-testing alternatives have therefore welcomed with 
great enthusiasm by many, including pharmaceuticals companies, animal welfare NGOs, 
members of parliament and knowledge institutes. 
However, the question remains how animal-testing alternatives have become an answer 
to the problems of animal research, and what the requirements were to reach this goal. 
For one, the interpretation of animal-testing alternatives has changed quite radically since 
the publication of the draft of the Animal Experimentation Act in 1970. In 1970, such 
alternatives where understood as methods to replace previous animal experiments: 
(…) animal experiments are a necessary evil. They cannot be missed as yet, 
but there are many reasons not to use animal experiments when these 
experiments can be replaced by different experiments that do not use animals. 
(…) Such replacement methods, including the use of tissue and cell cultures, 
already exist and continue to be developed. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 
1970b, p. 8. Emphasis added)
Four decades later, the scope of animal-testing alternatives has expanded greatly. Methods 
aiming to understand the underlying mechanisms of disease or toxicological pathways and 
can replace, reduce, refine or avoid animal experiments are now also being regarded as 
animal-testing alternatives. 
The search for animal-testing alternatives is the search for underlying 
mechanisms and an understanding of complex processes. The new direction 
in scientific research is not the observation of effects in research animals but 
an understanding of why these effects occur. (….) The replacement of animal 
experimentation is not about specific research that aims to replace one test 
with another. It is about deploying recent scientific insights in such a way that 
they will eventually lead to the abolition of, or at least significant reductions 
in, animal experiments (my translation) (VWS, 2011b, p. 5&6) 
This chapter analyses how the interpretation of “alternatives” in the context of animal 
experimentation has evolved in public policy discourse in the Netherlands since the draft of 
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the Animal Experimentation Act (hereafter: the Act) was passed in 1970.68 By contextualising 
the debate, we seek to improve our understanding of the current interpretation of animal-
testing alternatives in the Netherlands. The research question addressed in this chapter is: 
Which crucial shifts in the interpretation of animal-testing alternatives can be identified 
through an analysis of the various policy frames that have emerged from policy documents 
since the draft of the Dutch Animal Experimentation Act in 1970?
The next section describes the theoretical framework and methodology of this chapter, 
including an introduction into the use of frame characteristics as building blocks for 
frame analysis. Section 3.2 shows the rise and fall of several policy frames (i.e. “frame 
punctuations”) in Dutch policy discourse on animal research, including animal-testing 
alternatives. Section 3.3 describes which crucial elements within the policy discourse on 
animal research gradually changed over the years. Finally, section 3.4 concludes with the 
implications of these frame shifts for the current and future policy situation on animal-
testing alternatives.
3.1 Policy frames, frame shifts and frame characteristics
This chapter draws primarily on framing literature to capture the understanding of 
animal-testing alternatives in Dutch policy discourse. Framing theory generally states 
that individuals make sense of their world through frameworks of interpretation, “which 
select raw experiential data, thereby making it meaningful” (Brandwein, 2006, p. 231). 
The interpretive strand of framing theory starts from the premise that interpretation and 
meaning are created through interaction (Dewulf et al., 2009; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 
2000a). Naturally, the creation of meaning in interaction is also influenced by the “baseline 
categories of thought” (Brandwein, 2006, p. 231), such as taken-for-granted values and 
beliefs. 
It is hard to talk about the political discourse, considering the many interpretations that 
may co-exist alongside each other. As meaning is co-created in interaction with various 
actors, including ministers, members of Parliament, and societal organisations, the specific 
understanding of animal-testing alternatives is rather context- and time-specific. However, 
it is possible to study policy frames as temporarily fixed meanings in a particular discourse. 
Such policy frames may help to identify the policy problem or legitimise policy actions 
(Benford & Snow, 2000; Rein & Schön, 1996: See also Chapter 2). 
68  In the Netherlands, this Act is known as the Wet op de dierproeven (Wod).
In this chapter, a policy frame is understood as the inferred understanding of animal research 
between 1970 and 2012. The policy frames are constructed from frame characteristics 
that can be identified in public policy documents: issue naming, categorisation, attribution 
of responsibility, and causal story. These characteristics are adapted from Scholten’s 
work on the problem framing of immigrant integration in policy and research (Scholten, 
2007, 2011)69. Firstly, frames label (or name) an issue in terms of specific concepts and 
metaphors. Issue naming thus refers to the textualisation of animal experimentation, 
including animal-testing alternatives, and it determines how the policy issue is defined. 
Secondly, categorisation refers to the classification of research animals and animal-testing 
alternatives. Thirdly, policy definitions attribute responsibility to particular actors to solve 
the policy problem. Finally, policy frames are also about combining aspects and gluing the 
problems, categories and actors into an intelligible and convincing causal story that helps 
to explain and understand a particular issue. 
As policy frames are understood as temporarily fixed meanings, we may say that the frames 
interrupt, or punctuate, Dutch policy discourse. Therefore, I call the collective of these 
interruptions frame punctuations. A frame shift occurs when the inferred policy frame 
changes drastically over time. Such shifts can only be made visible if specific frames are 
studied in a particular order over time. 
3.1.1 Frame analysis
The frame analysis is based on Dutch policy documents between 1970, when the proposal 
of the Act was sent to Parliament, and 2012. The search engines of the Dutch government70 
were used to retrieve the relevant documents from this period, including ministerial letters, 
memoranda, reports from the Standing Committee, and minutes from parliamentary 
debates. Based on several interviews with key players and publications on this topic 
(e.g. Dol et al., 1999; Smid, 1989; Smit, 1989; Swart, Groothuis, Horbach, & Van der Valk, 
2006; Swart, Jonker, & Tramper, 2000; Swart, Wolters, & Van der Valk, 2004), I identified a 
69  Scholten studied the relation between the research-policy nexus and the framing of immigrant integration 
in policy and research. He distinguished several facets of how problem situations are understood in problem 
framing: the use of specific language to name the problem situation (terminology), the definition of groups 
or categories that are involved (social classification), a causal story to explain the problem (causal story), 
and a normative perspective for suggesting what could and should be done about it (normative perspective) 
(Scholten, 2007; p. 27).
70  The search engine Statengeneraaldigitaal.nl was used to search for Dutch policy documents in the period 
from 1970 until 1995, and Zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl was used to search for documents from 1995 to 
2012, the end of the designated time period.
The Dutch political system is divided into the Cabinet (the prime minister, the other ministers, and the state 
secretaries), the House of Representatives (150 chosen representatives from the various political parties), and 
the Senate (75 indirectly chosen representatives). If the ministers agree on a draft bill, it is submitted for advice 
to the Council of State. The bill and accompanying advice are first examined by a Standing Committee of the 
House of Representatives, in which all political parties are represented.
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number of crucial episodes to filter the massive amount of data: The introduction of the 
Experiments on Animal Act in 1977, the first policy on animal experimentation in 1984, the 
legal anchoring of the three Rs within the revision of the Act in 1996, and more recently the 
paradigm shift in scientific thinking in the Cabinet’s Vision of 2008 and Action Plan of 2011. 
Collectively, the documents dating to within one episode reveal the creation of meaning in 
interaction. The documents were scanned for topics related to animal-testing alternatives, 
including responsibility and the stimulation of research regarding alternatives. The content 
of the selected documents was manually labelled according to the following four framing 
characteristics: issue naming, categorisation, attribution of responsibility, and causal story. 
Together, these characteristics constitute several different policy frames. 
3.2 Frame punctuations in Dutch policy discourse 
This section describes the different policy frames as inferred from the frame characteristics 
issue naming, categorisation, attribution of responsibility and causal story between 1970 
and 2012. To contextualise the first shift, the following subsection opens with a short 
description of the period prior to 1970.
3.2.1  Absence of legislation
At the beginning of the 20th century, the maltreatment of animals developed as a separate 
policy issue in the Netherlands (e.g. Bordes, 2005; F. Brom, 1997; Brom, 1999).71 Yet, 
research animals were treated differently than other animals because of their perceived 
significance for the benefit of mankind. Their different status became even more apparent 
when research animals were excluded from the draft of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 
[‘Wet op de dierenbescherming’] in 1955 (Bordes, 2010; Tweede Kamer, 1955). 
Members of Parliament kept the topic of animal research on the political agenda after this 
AHWA draft, but protests from the scientific community prevented the Dutch government 
from taking action for a long time: the draft of a law regulating animal research was not sent 
to Parliament until 1970 (Brom, 1999; Tweede Kamer, 1970b; Van den Bos, 2006).72 
71  The first chapter of Brom (1997) reconstructs the policy process on animal biotechnology in the Netherlands, 
based on developments in animal welfare and animal experimentation. Brom (1999) provides a historical 
overview of animal welfare and the use of the term “intrinsic value” in Dutch legislation. Bordes (2005) focuses 
on the changing human-animal relationship from the angle of animal rights legislation in the Netherlands. In 
2010, she finished her dissertation on the legal history of the prohibition of maltreatment of animals in the 
Netherlands. 
72  The recommendati on of the 1970 State Committ ee to introduce a licensing system led to vigorous oppositi on 
from medical scientists, who viewed the recommendation as a criticism of their work. Moreover, they argued 
that such regulations would send research to other countries (Tweede Kamer, 1970b).
3.2.2 “Regulating animal research” 
The first frame shift occurred with the establishment of the Animal Experimentation Act in 
1977.73 In 1970, a proposal for the Act was sent to the Standing Committee of the House 
of Representatives (Tweede Kamer, 1970a). Although it took around seven years before 
political consensus was reached, animal experiments eventually did become subject to 
special legislation in the Netherlands.74 This section pieces together the dominant policy 
frame as inferred from the 1970 bill (Tweede Kamer, 1970a), the explanatory memorandum 
(Tweede Kamer, 1970b), and the content of the published act in 1977 (Stb., 1977).
3.2.2.1 Issue naming: rules and regulations
The Act was introduced to regulate animal experimentation and thus protect research 
animals.
(...) it is desirable, keeping in mind the protection of the animal, to provide 
rules for performing experiments on animals. (my translation) (Stb., 1977)
The new rules had some serious implications in practice. For example, a licensing system was 
introduced, and only licensed institutions (e.g. universities, hospitals, and pharmaceutical 
industries) were allowed to perform animal experiments. The licensees carried out their 
experiments and had to report back regularly. Animals were to be obtained from authorised 
breeders, and the Act introduced a certification system for both caretakers and feeders of 
the animals. The existing national veterinary inspection had to enforce the law. It is clear 
that the practice of animal experimentation significantly changed thanks to the introduction 
of the Act. 
The introduction of the Act also marked a general change in attitude towards animal 
experiments. The draft’s memorandum clearly stated that non-animal models were 
favoured over animal models. 
(…) animal experiments are a necessary evil. They cannot be missed as yet, 
but there are many reasons not to use animal experiments when these 
experiments can be replaced by different experiments that do not use 
animals. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 1970b, p. 8. Emphasis added) 
73  The Act (Wod) is a lex specialis with respect to the Animal Health and Welfare Act (AHWA), which is a 
lex generalis. If a situation is described in Wod, the AHWA does not come into force. If there is a discrepancy 
between the AHWA and Wod, Wod takes precedence. If the situation is not described in Wod, the AHWA comes 
into force (For a discussion on this topic: Tweede Kamer, 1995a, p.5031)
74  Most of the articles went into effect in September 1980 (Stb., 1980).
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However, the draft itself stated nothing about such “non-animal experiments”. Under 
pressure from the Standing Committee and Parliament, Article 10 was amended (Tweede 
Kamer, 1975a, 1975b) as follows: 
It is forbidden to perform an animal experiment for a goal that, according 
to the view generally held by experts, can be achieved in a way other than 
by means of an animal experiment. (my translation) (Stb., 1977. Emphasis 
added)
The promising words of the memorandum were thus put into action, and Dutch law 
prohibited an animal experiment from being performed if a non-animal method was 
available. 
3.2.2.2 Categorisation: the non-animal method and ranking of animals
The 1977 Act only applied to living vertebrates and did not protect invertebrates used 
for research purposes (Article 1). In other words, invertebrates escaped the obligatory 
registration of research animals. Moreover, the Act ranked animals according to their 
status: So-called “lower” research animals were preferred over “higher” research animals. 
(…) in designing the experiment, one should determine the species for which 
the experiment is the least harmful; therefore the “lowest” animal should be 
chosen. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 1970b, p. 9) 
To reinforce this ranking, some higher-class research animals gained a special status. 
Research on horses, monkeys, dogs, and cats was prohibited, unless the same results could 
not be obtained with another, lower animal (Stb., 1977, Art. 10.2). 
The memorandum thus created a strict outer boundary between a research animal and 
a non-research animal, and an inner boundary between horses, monkeys, dogs, cats, and 
other research animals. Thus, the context determined whether or not a specific animal 
species was favoured or not. For example, a lobster was preferred over a rat in scientific 
experiments, as the lobster was not regarded a (legal) research animal. However, the use 
of rats was preferred over dogs, as the latter were considered relatively “higher” animals. 
The Act forbade the use of research animals when an “other-than-animal-method” was 
available (Stb., 1977). The memorandum elaborated on such “replacement methods” as 
“tissue and cell cultures” (Tweede Kamer, 1970b, p. 8). Such methods aimed to replace the 
common practice of animal research on whole and living research animals.
3.2.2.3 Attributing responsibility: the individual researcher
While the Act was introduced to protect the welfare of the research animals through the 
regulation of the practice of animal experimentation, it was never intended to prohibit 
animal research entirely. The law was based on the idea of proportionality, in that animal 
experimentation was accepted for the benefit of mankind. The consequent suffering of 
animals was considered “reasonable” in this respect (Brom, 1999).
The point of departure of the designed licensing system is that animal 
experiments are legal if the experiments focus on specific benefits for humans 
and animals, namely health and food. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 
1970b, p. 7)
These benefits were specified in a few goals, such as “toxicological and pharmacological 
research” or “answers to scientific questions” (Article 1), which meant that, within the 
broadly defined legal restrictions, researchers were still able to perform their experiments. 
Moreover, the legal registration of experiments was never intended to place administrative 
burdens on researchers (Tweede Kamer, 1970b, p. 7). The members of the political party 
K.V.P. summarised the notion of instituting some form of animal protection - but not at any 
cost - as follows: 
(...) the draft is considered a good compromise, in which the interests of the 
research animal are generally protected, and where the animal research is 
not unnecessarily hindered (...). (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 1970c, p. 1)
Just as they were before the introduction of the Act, the individual researchers remained 
responsible for judging the necessity of the experiment. As long as the animal experiments 
were defined within the legal restrictions, their performance was authorised.
The researchers were also responsible for the decision whether or not to use “other” 
or “replacement non-animal” models for their experiments. In the memorandum, the 
Dutch government had already highlighted the importance of these replacement models, 
but it was only after Parliamentary pressure that this was also legally paraphrased in the 
accepted act of 1977. However, the Act’s reference to the “view generally held by experts” 
did not contain a legal check system with such experts. Pressure from within the scientific 
community would have to prevent misinformed decisions by individual researchers. 
Ultimately, however, the decision to perform animal experiments or to use “replacements” 
or “other-than-animal methods” was left up to the researcher (Tweede Kamer, 1970b). 
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Likewise, the researcher was once again responsible for the actual development replacement 
models, too. Around the mid-1970s, however, this mindset changed slightly, and the Dutch 
government financed small-scale projects that could encourage the use of replacement 
methods, such as an information centre and research on the use of cell cultures (Tweede 
Kamer, 1975a, p. 10). Nevertheless, the researchers were more or less the only ones 
responsible for the development and use of replacement models.
3.2.2.4 Causal story: regulation and unstructured development of replacement models
The main function of the Act was to regulate and control animal experimentation after 
decades of non-regulation. It had to prevent a repetition of past excesses in the laboratories 
and improve the average research animal’s welfare in the Netherlands. Public concerns 
regarding the use of horses, monkeys, cats, and dogs in experiments were reflected in the 
Act’s preferences for the use of the “lowest” possible animal. 
Within this frame, the use of replacement models was thought to increase the net animal 
welfare in experimental practices, as these animals were to be replaced by non-animal 
models. Researchers themselves were believed to be capable of deciding whether or not to 
perform an animal experiment and whether relevant replacement models were available. 
The development of such models was thus left to the researchers, without further 
interference or aid from the government. 
3.2.3 “Stimulating the three Rs”
The second shift occurred with the explicit formulation of a policy on animal experimentation. 
During the parliamentary debate on the budget of the Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and 
Culture75 in 1984, several members of Parliament raised questions about the Dutch policy 
on animal experimentation. In reaction, State Secretary of the Ministry of Welfare, Public 
Health and Culture Van der Reijden promised a policy document on animal experimentation. 
In June 1984, the first policy document on animal experimentation was produced in the 
Netherlands (Tweede Kamer, 1984). This subsection is based on this first policy document, 
as well as the subsequent Parliamentary debate in June 1985 (Tweede Kamer, 1985a), and 
an additional document from September 1985 (Van der Reijden, 1985). 
75  In earlier years, the policy issue fell under the Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture [‘Ministerie 
van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, WVC’]. Later, the policy issue on animal experimentation became 
part of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport [‘Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, VWS’]. 
Since 2013, the policy issue on animal experimentation, including animal-testing alternatives, has moved to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs [‘Ministerie voor Economische Zaken, EZ’]
3.2.3.1 Issue naming: trade-off between animal welfare and human health
Within this policy frame, animal experimentation was increasingly presented as a conflict 
between public health and animal welfare. 
Per definition, animal experiments imply a reduction in the animal’s welfare. 
Therefore, everything needs to be done to protect its welfare as much as 
possible. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 9)
Public health and animal welfare were thus inconsistent with each other. Animal research 
was viewed as necessary to improve the public health, but since the particular experiments 
harmed the welfare of animals, public health and animal welfare could not be reconciled. In 
other words, animal experimentation became presented as a trade-off between improving 
public health and protecting animal welfare.
With the focus on this trade-off, the notion of “reasonableness” gained traction and 
frequently appeared in policy documents (e.g. Van der Reijden, 1985). The contexts in 
which animal experimentation was performed became more relevant, as did the financial 
aspect of the research. This notion of “reasonableness” was also applied in the context of 
alternatives to the practice of animal experiments. During the parliamentary discussions, 
important questions were raised about such alternatives. The written response of the 
Secretary of State Joop van der Reijden was firm but ambiguous:
When a high degree of accuracy is required, scientific reliability should be 
leading the way. Saving some animals at a high cost may also be objectionable. 
(...) We should not – to borrow another term from the Act – lose sight of 
reasonableness. Hence, it is not possible to lay down any general rules on 
this issue, but decisions have to be taken in context. (my translation) (Van der 
Reijden, 1985, p. 6)
3.2.3.2 Categorisation: the three Rs
With regard to alternatives to animal experiments, the concept of “the three Rs” gained 
political momentum during this period.76
In fact, this term encloses more than just the replacement of animal 
experiments. Methods that lead to the reduction of animals per experiment, 
76  The three Rs stand for the replacement, reduction and refinement of animal experimentations and is 
derived from William Russell and Rex Burch’s book Principles of humane experimental techniques (Russell & 
Burch, 1959). 
68  │  Part II - Empirical chapters Chapter 3 - Studying policy frames   │  69
or the refinement of research such that the experiments can be performed in 
better animal circumstances, should also be included. In this respect, reference 
is often made to the three Rs (Reduction, Replacement and Refinement) of 
Russell and Burch, the authors who first defined the term alternatives. (my 
translation) (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 12. Emphasis added) 
The definition of “alternatives” was thus broadened with the inclusion of the three-R 
concept. Besides the “cell and tissue cultures” (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 6: i.e. “replacement-
alternatives”), new methods and situations, such as reducing the number of animals per 
experiments by “improving the experimental design”, “performing pre-studies with slaughter 
material” (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 7: i.e. “reduction alternatives”), and “improving housing 
conditions” (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 15: “refinement alternatives”) fell under the umbrella 
of the ‘new alternatives’ (i.e. “second-generation alternatives”).
The introduction of the three Rs did not make it easier to qualify alternatives. Often, 
the quality of alternatives was measured according to the absolute decrease in research 
animals on an annual basis (E.g. Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 6; Van der Reijden, 1985, p. 14). 
At other times, however, the relative decrease in animals per experiment was taken as a 
criterion (E.g. Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 7 (“reduction”). In the latter case, the total number 
of research animals was not particularly important. Such an understanding could lead to 
different expectations about the results or the use of such animal-testing alternatives.77
3.2.3.3 Attributing responsibility:  co-responsibility of researchers and government
The Dutch government obviously struggled with the balance of safeguarding animal 
welfare and protecting public health at the same time. The problem of reducing animal 
research was illustrated as follows and supported by a report on animal experimentation 
for cosmetic products:78 
(…) there is no room for animal experiments to test the cosmetic action of 
certain substances and products. On the other hand, the commission points 
out that governmental policy (…) should be aimed at the protection of its 
consumers, and therefore it is not proper to expose the user of cosmetic 
products to unknown side effects. (…) With this example, it is clear that 
77  The use of fewer animals per experiment does not necessarily lead to an overall reduction in research 
animals, as the number of experiment may have increased. For that reason, the qualifying adverb “potentially” 
is used in this statement. See also Chapter 5 for a shifting understanding in this respect. 
78  This report was writt en by the Commissie van advies voor de dierproeven [‘Committee for Advice on Animal 
Experimentation’] as based on Article 18 of the Act. The committee was mandated to give advice - both upon 
request and its own initiative - to the minister. 
the last word on the acceptability of animal experimentation has not been 
uttered. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 9)
It thus became more important to assess the experiment’s relevance. The Dutch government 
acknowledged the need for general “ethical criteria” and the possible desirability of an 
“animal ethics committee” (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 11).79 
Although these discussions indicated a shift towards more delegated responsibility, the 
researcher remained responsible for the assessment of relevance within this frame. The 
government saw the Act, with its licensing system, housing requirements and caretaking, 
as one of the instruments to achieve animal protection. The researchers themselves were 
expected to be “responsible” scientists when making the decision whether or not to use 
research animals.
3.2.3.4 Causal story: Stimulating animal-testing alternatives
In the light of the struggle between animal welfare and benefits for mankind, it became 
important to search for alternative ways to gain scientific knowledge. Animal-testing 
alternatives were presented as a way to resolve this struggle. 
The most effective way to reduce the number of animal experiments is the 
development and application of alternatives. (my translation) (Tweede 
Kamer, 1984, p. 12)
However, it also became clear that alternatives had their limitations, both functionally and 
reasonably, with regard to financial investment. Animal-testing alternatives would have 
a hard time imitating the “complexity of an intact functional body”, and the government 
warned of “exaggerated promises” (Tweede Kamer, 1984, p. 15). 
Nevertheless, the firm belief in animal-testing alternatives underscored the importance of 
the development of such methods. 
The application of newly developed alternatives saves thousands of research 
animals per year. The results thus far were mainly side effects – albeit welcome 
side effects - of other research. To achieve more, it is necessary to actively stimulate 
the research on alternatives (and) aim to reduce the use of research animals by 
30% in the coming five years. (my translation) (Van der Reijden, 1985, p. 14)
79  At the stage when these documents appeared, the issue of “animal ethics committees” was under advisory 
at the Commission for Advice on Animal Experimentation.
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To this end, the Secretary of State of Welfare, Public health and Culture Joop van der Reijden 
allocated ƒ70 000 (≈ €30 000) for an “inventorying literature study” (p.15) on existing 
alternatives within vaccine research, which were meant to replace and reduce animal 
research in the field of vaccine production. Other ministries invested in animal-testing 
alternatives as well: For example, the Ministry of Education and Science earmarked ƒ450 000 
(≈ €200 000) for the development of audio-visual equipment to be used for educational 
purposes; the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment allocated 
a total of ƒ350 000 (≈ €160 000) for the development of in vitro teratogenic tests80; and 
the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management invested approximately 
ƒ100 000 (≈ €45 000) to reduce the number of fish used to monitor the contamination of 
surface water (Van der Reijden, 1985, p. 4-6). The government also welcomed research 
focused on the ethical and societal backgrounds of animal experimentation (Tweede Kamer, 
1984, p. 15).
Based on the premise that an investment in animal-testing alternatives would causally lead 
to a decrease in research animal numbers, the policy rationale followed that of a linear 
“technology-push” (e.g. Coombs et al., 1987) model to innovation: A linear model according 
to which innovation is a sequence of stages starting from scientific research (Saad, 2000: 
See also Chapter 4, especially § 4.4.2).
3.2.4 “Growing public discontent” 
The third shift occurred around the revision of the 1977 Act. In January 1992, State Secretary 
of Welfare, Public Health and Culture Hans Simons proposed a change to the Act (Tweede 
Kamer, 1992a). On-going discussions over the ethical judgment of animal experiments were 
said to be the main reason for the proposed change (Tweede Kamer, 1992b). In addition, 
policy developments in Europe also required an updated version of the national act. In 1985, 
the Council of Europe had finished its draft of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Vertebrate Animals used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes (Council of Europe, 
1985). Meanwhile, the European Economic Community (EEC) had also proposed uniform 
European legislation. In November 1986, the EEC adopted Directive 86/609/EEC to protect 
animals in experiments (Council of Europe, 1986). From that moment on, member states 
of the EEC had three years to incorporate the directives into their national legislation.81 
Finally, the origins of research animals were subject to on-going debates, and the Dutch 
80  Teratology is the study of abnormaliti es of physiological development and studies various stages of life, 
including birth and puberty. In vitro literally means, in glass, and is used to indicate experiments that are 
performed outside the human/animal body in a test tube or other glass material. 
81  The State Secretary of Welfare, Public Health and Culture at that ti me, Hans Simons, explained that the 
delay of incorporating the directive into the Wod took more time than had been anticipated, because of the late 
advice of the Advisory Committee and possible interference from other regulations. 
government wanted to regulate this part as well.
This section is based on the first proposal of the new act (Tweede Kamer, 1992a), the 
memorandum from 1992 (Tweede Kamer, 1992b), the final report of the Standing 
Committee of 1993 (Tweede Kamer, 1993) and the response of the minister of Welfare, 
Public Health and Culture (d’Ancona, 1993), the updated proposal of 1994 (Tweede Kamer, 
1994), and the transcript of the Parliamentary debate in 1995 (Tweede Kamer, 1995a). 
3.2.4.1 Issue naming: Increased public awareness and policy change
The trade-off between public health and animal welfare was challenged by the introduction 
of the concept of “intrinsic value” in the revised draft of the Act. Already in 1981, the Dutch 
government acknowledged that animals had an intrinsic value and that this value was an 
explicit point of departure in animal protection legislation (Tweede Kamer, 1981). The 
Dutch government, however, did not find it necessary to include the term in the Act itself.
[T]he law itself is an expression of the recognition of the intrinsic value of 
animals. (....) Inclusion of the term intrinsic value (…) results to my opinion in a 
tautology that does not add something essential to the law. (my translation) 
(d’Ancona, 1993)
Neither the Standing Committee nor the members of Parliament agreed with this line of 
reasoning, and in the end, Section 1a of the Act read as follows: 
Any right accorded by or pursuant to this Act shall be exercised in recognition 
of the intrinsic value of the animal life. (my translation) (Stb., 1996, art. 1a)
The explicit recognition of the intrinsic value of (research) animals marked an important 
discursive departure from the original trade-off. Animal welfare shifted from an 
understanding of pain and discomfort to a larger notion of animal integrity. Human benefits 
were no longer sufficient to outweigh the animal’s suffering in the research practice.82 
82  Many scholars have studied the concept and (policy) implications of the intrinsic value, especially in 
relation to the genetic modification of (research) animals. Refer to the work of Frans Brom on animal welfare 
and intrinsic value in relation to public policy (e.g. 1999; 1999; 1997), as well as Ellen ter Gast’s (2007) work 
on a philosophical inquiry concerning genetically engineered animals, and Rob de Vries’ (2009) work on the 
concept of intrinsic value and animal integrity in relation to our duties to laboratory animals. Additionally, 
the genetic modification of animals was (and is) subject to specific regulations, including the 1997 resolution 
on biotechnology on animals [‘Besluit biotechnologie bij Dieren’]. It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to 
describe the development on this matter, as the development and debate exceed the research practice alone. 
Nevertheless, it is important to ‘read’ the frame shifts as part of a larger discourse on animal welfare, animal 
integrity, and intrinsic value in the Netherlands. In line with the interactional interpretation of frames, this 
development once more highlights that frames do not rise from a vacuum but are indeed relational. 
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Furthermore, Dutch society increasingly challenged the original trade-off by condemning 
some animal experiments, including the LC/LD50 tests83, and animal testing for cosmetic 
products. While not part of the 1992 draft, both types of testing were eventually banned in 
the Netherlands from 1996 onwards. LC/LD50 tests were forbidden, unless no alternative 
was available (Stb., 1996, art. 10.2 and 10.3); experiments for cosmetic (end) products were 
also prohibited (Stb., 1996, art. 10.2 and 10.3). We see that, while the original trade-off was 
largely maintained, little cracks started to appear as a result of public pressure. 
3.2.4.2 Categorisation: alternative methods as one-on-one surrogates
The changing legal definition of research animals and animal experimentation implied that 
some former alternatives might not be excluded in the future (i.e. living invertebrates). Under 
pressure from the public, there was a shift in the definitions of both an “animal experiment” 
and a “research animal”. For example, actions leading to the birth of an animal that could 
suffer were included in the definition of an animal experiment in the revised act (Stb., 1996, 
Article 1, Section 1e; Tweede Kamer, 1992b, p. 7 & 10). Moreover, the special status of 
horses, monkeys, cats, and dogs was regarded superfluous, since expansion of Article 10 
already covered this topic (Tweede Kamer, 1992b, p. 12). Finally, the possibility that (some) 
invertebrates could suffer was a topic of parliamentary debate and notified in the revised act: 
(...) vertebrate, or a living invertebrate of a species indicated by a council 
order. (my translation) (Stb., 1996, art. 1.1)
By contrast, the legal anchoring of the three Rs made room for new types of alternatives: 
It is forbidden to perform an animal experiment, which can (…) also be 
achieved with something other than an animal experiment, or an animal 
experiment that uses fewer animals or with less discomfort than the original 
experiment. (my translation) (Stb., 1996, article 10.1. Emphasis added)
Furthermore, the criteria for the “good alternative” were specified in that an alternative 
should completely replace the old model and that it should generate the exact same results 
as the original animal model (Stb., 1996). 
First of all, I note that only a method that produces the exact same results as 
the method it replaces can be called an alternative method. (my translation) 
(Eerste Kamer, 1995)
83  The abbreviation LD50/LC50 stands for the Lethal Dose or Lethal Concentrati on of a compound at which 
50% of the research animals die. 
Alternative methods within this policy frame were thus regarded as a one-on-one 
replacement of the animal model (i.e. “first-generation animal-testing alternatives”; See 
also Chapter 4, especially §4.3). This understanding of animal-testing alternatives was 
reflected in the financed projects by the Platform Alternatives for Animal Testing: pig ears 
from slaughter houses to measure skin penetration, the growing of human tumours in 
bovine eyes to replace the naked mouse model, and the use of eyes from slaughter houses 
to replace the eye irritation test with rabbits (Simons, 1993, p. 27).
3.2.4.3 Attributing responsibility: animal ethics committees weigh the relevance
Along with the shift from the voluntarily to the legally mandated establishment of animal 
ethics committees (hereafter: AECs), the responsibility shifted from the individual to 
an institution; responsibility thus became delegated. Many institutions had already 
installed these committees voluntarily, following the Advisory Commission for Animal 
Experimentation in 1985. The original idea behind the AECs was self-regulation; the moral 
values had to be internalised by the researcher performing the experiments (Brom, 1999; 
Tweede Kamer, 1992b). However, this form of self-regulation raised questions over the 
years.
In the past few years, the opinion has emerged that it is not sufficient to have 
the assessment made solely by the one performing the animal experiment. 
(my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 1992b, p. 3)
In 1996, Article 10 was expanded to state that it is forbidden to perform an animal 
experiment without consulting with an AEC (Stb., 1996, art. 18a). While the change in the 
text was small, the impact on the responsibility of the researcher was significant. As the 
judgment of an AEC (or Advisory Commission for Animal Experimentation, the CCD) was 
decisive, the final responsibility shifted away from the individual researcher towards the 
committees.
In the context of using animal-testing alternatives, however, the researchers remained 
primarily responsible. 
(…) illusion that some people can supervise the entire area of alternatives 
(…). The Article 14 official, considering his or her task, is expected to have 
sufficient knowledge of alternatives for the experiments that are performed 
at the relevant institution. (…) – with regard to the possible application of 
alternatives – the researchers in particular are informed of the possibilities. 
(my translation) (d’Ancona, 1993, p. 13),
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Thus while the responsibility shifted towards the AECs, the researchers were still seen as 
a crucial link to the knowledge on alternatives that were available for their tests. With 
the growing importance of expertise of alternatives, animal experimentation slowly shifted 
from an ethical to a cognitive problem.
3.2.4.4 Causal story: increased technology push of alternatives
The upcoming technology-push approach from the previous frame was strengthened 
further. The stimulation of animal-testing alternatives was still seen as an important way 
to reduce the number of research animals, and as such, the research animal numbers 
increasingly became positioned as a strong and reliable policy indicator (See also §1.2 on 
categorising and counting research animals). 
An important aspect of the existing policy is the stimulation of so-called 
alternatives for animal experiments. (...). If the question is raised whether 
this policy was successful, reference can be made to the course of the annual 
animal usage. Since the beginning of registration in 1978, this number has 
decreased by 32.4%. (...) The conclusion, therefore, is that the current policy 
should be continued in a forceful manner. (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 
1992b, p. 2)
Despite the overall consensus on the importance of stimulating animal-testing alternatives, 
the question remained how much money was to be invested. Following the proposal of the 
Dutch NGO Proefdiervrij, some MPs asked the minister of Health, Welfare and Sports Erica 
Terpstra to allocate 2% of the total budget to animal research on alternatives.84 
(...) the current imbalance between the budgets for alternatives and for animal 
experiments bears no relation to the importance we attached to them. (my 
translation) (Green Party MP Marijke Vos, Tweede Kamer, 1995a, p. 5035)
Let’s be realistic. The jump from the existing budget and the 2% is big. I don’t 
want to create illusions. I don’t think you should directly count on the 2%. (my 
translation) (Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports Erica Terpstra, Tweede 
Kamer, 1995a, p. 5035)
While two amendments on increasing the budget were rejected by Parliament, a more 
general one requesting the government to set aside “substantial financial means” to 
stimulate the development of alternatives managed to pass (Tweede Kamer, 1995b). It 
84  According to Green Party MP Marijke Vos, 2% was the equivalent of approximately ƒ10 million (≈ €4.5 million).
seems the conflicting underlying values needed to be resolved in order to proceed along 
the promising route of stimulating animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands; the policy 
issue became de-sensitised. 
3.2.5 “Integrating science, innovation, and animal welfare”
Twenty-five years after its passage, the Act was evaluated in a process that led to the 
“Necessary Evil” report (Freriks et al., 2005). The authors were fairly critical about certain 
aspects of the Act, especially the absence of the “animal’s voice” and the lack of a framework 
for ethical judgment for the AECs. The report led to much commotion in the field of animal 
experimentation. In reaction, the Dutch government started a bottom-up process by which 
Dutch organisations were asked for their responses to the evaluation (Tweede Kamer, 
2007). The debate followed the three central themes of the report: openness and publicity, 
ethical test, and inspection. Meanwhile, animal welfare increasingly gathered political 
momentum. In 2006, the Party for the Animals (PvdD) won two seats in Dutch Parliament.85 
In October 2007, both the minister of Health, Welfare and Sport Ab Klink and the minister 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality Gerda Verburg wrote a letter to Parliament 
that included the findings of the bottom-up process and the ministers’ respective policy 
intentions. 86 In short, AECs had to make their annual reports publicly available, and the 
licensees had to be more open about the animal experiments they perform. The obligatory 
ethical tests for animal experimentation and biotechnological treatments with animals were 
also merged into one test. Furthermore, the national umbrella organisation NVDEC was 
asked to harmonise and structure the expertise of AEC members, the inspection instruments 
were be strengthened, and the legal status of Art. 14 officials would be evaluated (Tweede 
Kamer, 2007). Finally, an “interdepartmental vision on animal-testing alternatives” (p.5) 
was promised. In June 2008, this document was sent to Parliament (Klink, 2008). Another 
document, containing the policy intentions, followed in 2011 (VWS, 2011a, 2011b). 
This subsection is based on the 2008 document “Cabinet’s vision on animal-testing 
alternatives” (Klink, 2008), the 2011 “Action Plan Animal Experimentation and alternatives, 
2011-2021” (VWS, 2011b), and its accompanying Ministerial Letter (VWS, 2011a). 
85  The Party for the Animals was established in October 2002. The elections in 2003 did not result in enough 
votes for a parliamentary seat. However, in the 2006 elections, the PvdD received 1.8% of all votes, leading to 
two of the 150 seats in Parliament. Sources: www.parlement.com: Tweede Kamer – verkiezingen Tweede Kamer 
1918-2010 and www.partijvoordedieren.nl: de partij – organisatie. Both websites retrieved on 5 August 2012. 
86  The minister of Public Health, Welfare and Sports [‘Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport’] used to be the 
spokesmen on the policy dossier animal experimentation, including animal-testing alternatives. The minister 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality [‘Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, LNV’] was spokesmen for the 
Animal Health and Welfare Act and biotechnology on animals. Since 2013, all aspects are the responsibility of 
the State Secretary for Economic Affairs. 
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3.2.5.1 Issue naming: from problem to solutions
This frame marked the start of changing drivers behind animal-testing alternatives. Scientific 
and economic rationales started to gain ground at the expense of ethical and animal welfare 
concerns. As formulated in the Cabinet’s vision, balancing animal experimentation was also 
about: 
(…) the desire of continuing innovative scientific developments, strengthening 
of the economic position and preservation of consumer safety. (my translation) 
(Klink, 2008, p. 6)
The relation between animal experimentations, safety and risk avoidance behavior also 
became more evident in this frame. At first, this relation was presented as problematic: The 
risk-aversive behaviour of society as a whole, and especially of regulators, was said to align 
difficulty with innovation and improvement. 
The conservative method (with animal research) still seems to function well 
as basis for conservative decisions, especially in situations where safety and 
risk avoidance show a rising trend (like permitting the addition of chemical 
substances to our food and medicine). However, in a society striving for 
progress and renewal, there is little sympathy for too much risk avoidance: 
those who never cross the street hardly risk the chance of being hit by a car, 
but they will never reach the other side of the street, either. (my translation) 
(VWS, 2011b,p.5)
It seemed that animal experimentation’s trade-off between animal welfare and public 
health was replaced by one between innovation and risk avoidance: one at the expense of 
the other. Interestingly, the three Rs became the solution to this ostensibly new trade-off. 
Replacing animal research does not mean performing research that will 
replace one test by another. It is about using emerging technologies in such a 
way that it eventually leads to the abolishment of, or at least a sharp decrease 
in, animal experiments. (my translation) (VWS, 2011b, p. 6)
The three Rs lead to more insights and a better predictive value for humans, 
are ethically acceptable and eventually cost-saving, as well. (my translation) 
(VWS, 2011b, p. 6)
Animal-testing alternatives - at that time generally associated with the three Rs in political 
discourse - thus became bigger than a solution to the animal welfare problems of animal 
research alone. In this policy frame, the three Rs were positioned as a means to overcome 
the social (or ethical), scientific and economic problems associated with animal research: in 
other words, a win-win situation. Supported by the term “paradigm shift” (VWS, 2011b, p. 
6), a new way of thinking was introduced: To search and use the method that would yield 
the best possible results for mankind.87 The three-R alternatives were presented as crucial 
links in the transition towards this new way of thinking in science. Overall, this policy frame 
marked a shift towards solutions through innovation rather than problems through animal 
experimentation. 
3.2.5.2 Categorisation: no new pieces, but a new puzzle
This new issue naming also had its repercussion on the category of animal-testing 
alternatives itself. As alternatives were no longer regarded as replacing the former test, the 
criteria moved towards a chain approach. 
(…) alternatives will not replace animal experiments one by one: the vision for 
the future is not that new pieces from the old puzzle replace the old pieces, 
but that there be a completely new puzzle, one that is possibly also three‑
dimensional. (my translation) (VWS, 2011b, p.6)
By means of this shift, the boundaries of what was regarded as an alternative also changed. 
Methods that lowered animal experimentation’s dependence during the early phase of 
development also became animal-testing alternatives: kinetics, gene technology, genomics, 
and systematic reviews88 (VWS, 2011b, p. 7, 9, 14 &25 respectively). Interestingly, much of 
these “new alternatives” focused on the possibilities to detect certain toxicological effects 
prior to animal experiments (“screening”; see also Chapter 5 on toxicogenomics). 
In terms of categorisation, alternatives were no longer viewed as one-to-one surrogates for 
the former animal model but as part of a new trajectory. Methods that could avoid animal 
research, as well as methods that focused on screening, also became part of the category. 
A significant number of the animal-testing alternatives thus focused on the understanding 
87  While the term “paradigm shift” is obviously borrowed from Thomas Kuhn’s seminal book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, the use of the term here has a more directly link to the National Academy’s report from 
2007, “Toxicity Testing in the 21st century: A Vision and a Strategy”. 
88  Systematic reviews (SRs) were already offered as an example in the 2008 Cabinet’s vision on animal-testing 
alternatives. This method is somewhat different than the other examples, as SRs are part of the phase prior to 
the decision of performing animal research at all. In short, SRs could help to find the best species for a particular 
research question, or it could find that previous animal experiments have already yielded the required data and 
that additional animal research would be useless. For more on this point, see the important work of Ritskes-
Hoitinga and colleagues (e.g. 2014).
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of underlying mechanisms of disease, toxic (side) effects and overall response (i.e. “third-
generations alternatives”)
3.2.5.3 Attributing responsibility: chain responsibility 
The Dutch Cabinet was convinced that “the development of three-R alternatives provides 
more possibilities to meet the changing social, scientific and economic developments 
in society” (my translation) (VWS, 2008, p. 4). The 2011 action plan listed the (planned) 
activities regarding animal-testing alternatives by numerous organisations, both public and 
private. The (potential) governmental cooperation with industries became more evident in 
this frame as well.
Wherever possible, and when there are overlapping stakes, cooperation with 
industry will be sought to reach a bundling of the powers. (my translation) 
(VWS, 2011b, p. 10)
The cooperation with industries fit well within the larger plan to incorporate the entire 
chain into the development of animal-testing alternatives. 
To create success, it is of crucial importance to involve the entire chain (...) in 
the development. When this does not happen, the chances are big that an 
obstacle will appear inside the chain. (my translation) (VWS, 2011b, p. 4)
In this policy frame, the responsibility regarding animal-testing alternatives shifted from 
the government’s stimulation of development and the AECs’ evaluation of the availability 
of alternatives within a specific domain, to include the entire chain: from producer to user. 
The development, use, and success of animal-testing alternatives thus became a shared 
responsibility among all stakeholders.
3.2.5.4 Causal story: increased coordination of the three Rs 
Within this policy frame, the issue is defined differently than in earlier frames. The three 
Rs remained the main solution to the problems associated with animal research, but it was 
thought that more coordination was needed to overcome the “fragmented character” of 
what at the time was the leading policy. 
The current policy on the three-R alternatives comes up short because of its 
fragmented character and minimal effective support. There is insufficient 
transfer of knowledge and information between the different research parts 
and research institutions. Therefore, knowledge often remains in one spot, or 
research is duplicated (my translation) (Tweede Kamer, 2008a #393, p. 10)
A change in structure was announced to create more coordination on the three-R initiatives 
in the Netherlands. These changes included the establishment of the Netherlands 
Knowledge Centre on Alternatives to Animal Use [‘Nationaal Kenniscentrum Alternatieven 
voor dierproeven (NKCA)’], the creation of an Interdepartmental Steering and Working 
Group on animal-testing alternatives, and a Societal Sounding Board [‘Maatschappelijke 
klankbordgroep’], which supported the expertise from a societal and business perspective 
(Klink, 2008, p. 12). The 2011 Action Plan contained an overview of the numerous public 
and private initiatives that “could help to reduce the number of animal experiments” (p. 
10). 
In additional to more coordination on overall activities, the Dutch Cabinet also wanted to 
increase the use of the three-R alternatives. Therefore, the minister of Health, Welfare and 
Sports allocated additional funding for “validation, acceptation and implementation” (VWS, 
2011a)89. This step reflected the increased orientation towards “chains” (VWS, 2011b, p. 4. 
See also Chapter 4).
3.3 Shifting interpretations
The previous section described four policy frames that were found in Dutch policy discourse 
between 1970 and 2011. This section uses the previous one to identify crucial shifts in the 
positioning and interpretation of animal-testing alternatives, thus providing an answer to 
the question how animal-testing alternatives became the leading solution to the problems 
associated with animal research. 
It shows that what counts as a research animal has changed over the years and affected 
the category of animal-testing alternatives. Whereas the term “alternatives” was originally 
used for testing methods that did not use animals, it now also covers technologies and 
methods that do use animals, as well as methods that aim to screen new substances for 
their therapeutic or toxic characteristics. With this expanding meaning, the positioning 
of alternatives became broader as well. Animal-testing alternatives moved from a single 
policy issue of animal welfare to a bridge between various policy issues, including public 
health, animal welfare, innovation, and economic progress (win-win situation). Moreover, 
89  Animal-testing alternatives are thought to follow a fixed pattern of development (proof of principle)  
(pre-)validation (reliability and relevance is established)  (regulatory) acceptation (formal acceptance by 
regulatory authorities). Often, a final stage of implementation is added to emphasise the use of the alternative. 
See also https://eurl-ecvam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/validation-regulatory-acceptance (accessed on 28 November 
2014), and the work on barriers to regulatory acceptance, for example (Ahr et al., 2008; Schiffelers et al., 2007; 
Schiffelers, 2016 (expected)). 
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the responsibility for animal research in general and the development of animal-testing 
alternatives gradually became part of bigger chain(s) in which an increasing number of 
stakeholders were responsible for the situation. 
1970 - 1977 
“regulating animal research” 
• rules and regulation 
• replacing animal tests, and use of lower class animals 
• researcher is authority  
• unstructured development of animal testing alternatives 
1984 - 1985 
“Stimulating the 3Rs” 
• trade-off between animal welfare and public health 
• Replacing, reducing and refining (3Rs) animal experiments 
• co-responsibility of researcher & government 
• research programme on stimulating animal testing 
alternatives by government 
1992 - 1995 
“Growing public discontent” 
• animal research increasingly problematic 
• animal testing alternatives as one-on-one surrogate for 
animal model 
• delegated responsibility to animal ethics committees  
•  stimulating development of animal testing alternatives 
(‘technology push’) 
2008 - 2011 
“Integrating science, innovation & animal 
welfare” 
• 3R-alternatives create win-win situation 
• solution to a new puzzle 
• chain responsibility  
• coordination of 3Rs initiatives and chain development 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
an
 ‘a
n
im
al
 t
e
st
in
g 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e’
 
 
Figure 3-1: Overview of the frame shifts in Dutch policy discourse between 1970 and 2011. The frames 
also represent an increasingly multi-interpretable definition of an “animal-testing alternative”
3.3.1 Changing interpretation of research animals
The category of research animals has changed steadily over the past few decades. This 
change is also of importance for the notion of animal-testing alternatives, as non-research 
animals are also understood as animal-testing alternatives. The changing category of 
research animals thus directly affects the category of animal-testing alternatives. 
Over the years of regulation, vertebrates’ offspring produced during experiments were 
included in the category of research animals and received protection under the Act as well. 
With the revision of the EU Directive, mammalian foetuses, cyclostomes (i.e. lampreys and 
hagfishes), live cephalopods (e.g. octopuses, squids, and cuttlefish) and independently 
feeding larvae will soon be protected under the Act as well (European Parliament & Council 
of Europe, 2010, Art. 3).90 
Other animals, by contrast, have lost their special status within the category. Horses, cats, 
and dogs, lost the special status they enjoyed during the early years of the Act and have 
become equal to the other research animals within the group. 
In the end, some animals received additional protection by being banned completely from 
testing. For example, some non-human primates were banned under the Act in 1996, giving 
them the highest form of protection in the Netherlands. It is clear that the definition of 
research animals has been dynamic; some animals have become research animals, and 
some research animals ascended while others descended the hierarchical ladder. 
3.3.2 Expanding definition of animal-testing alternatives
Besides the changing definition of a research animal, the interpretation of animal-testing 
alternatives in Dutch policy documents also shifted over the years. At first, alternatives were 
interpreted as methods “other than by means of an animal experiment” (Stb., 1977: i.e. 
“first-generation alternatives”. See also §3.2.2.1). This understanding became broader with 
the introduction of the three Rs in the 1980s. Methods that used fewer animals (reduction), 
were more animal-friendly (refinement) or did not use animals at all (replacement) were 
all regarded as alternatives to animal experiments (i.e. “second-generation alternatives”). 
More recently, methods or technologies that – in combination with others – function at 
some point along the experimental chain are also regarded as animal-testing alternatives 
(i.e. “third-generation alternatives”).
90  National authorities have to adopt their laws to meet the goals of EU directives, but are free to decide how 
to do so. As stated in Article 61 of the 2012 Directive: “Member States shall adopt and publish, by 10 November 
2012, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive.” After months 
of debate, the revision passed the Dutch Upper Chamber in November 2014. 
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The criteria for what was considered a good alternative changed with the shift in 
understanding of alternatives. In the early years, only those methods that acted as one-on-
one surrogates for the original animal models were classified as animal-testing alternatives. 
The third-generation alternatives also encompasses methods that - together with other 
methods – either replace, reduce, refine or avoid animal experiments. 
The expanding understanding of animal-testing alternatives was also visible during their 
development (i.e. “three-R research”). In the earlier years, the development of a three-R 
alternative started with the animal model that was to be replaced (“second-generation 
three-R research”91). Over the years, not only the animal model but also the scientific 
approach was questioned. The human relevance or knowledge question turned into the 
starting point for an alternative’s development. These “third-generation alternatives” were 
aimed at an understanding of the underlying mechanisms of disease and toxicological 
pathways (see also Chapter 5) rather than to observe the physiological changes of the “first- 
and second generation alternatives”. Animal-testing alternatives became more and more 
associated with understanding the mechanisms of disease and (toxic) response. 
3.3.3 From trade-off dilemma to glorious win-win situation with three Rs
Also of interest for animal-testing alternatives is their positioning in the political debate. 
Around the introduction of the Act in 1977, animal experimentation was framed as a trade-
off between public health and animal welfare. Stimulating public health would inevitably 
harm the welfare of research animals, but without harming the welfare of research 
animals, progress in public health was unattainable. The introduction of the concept of 
animal-testing alternatives made it possible to overcome this zero-sum game by ostensibly 
satisfying both societal values. 
Recently, scientific and economic motives were also attached to the concept of animal-
testing alternatives, as the latter became regarded as cheaper and more relevant than 
animal experiments. Animal-testing alternatives could stimulate innovation on various 
levels in various domains, and the so-called industry of animal-testing alternatives would 
support economic growth. Alternatives thus became important artefacts serving to bridge 
and combine different contexts, both within and outside the scientific discourse. Like other 
“boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989; see also Chapter 2), the concept was able 
to connect different contexts and arguments into one common future (“robust”) without 
specifying its exact understanding in each of these contexts (“flexibility”). 
91  The first-generation animal-testing alternatives comprised of models that replaced the animal model for 
non-animal model. This type of research may be referred to as “first-generation research on animal-testing 
alternatives”. 
The function of alternatives was thus no longer limited to decreasing the number of animals 
but seen as a crucial element to achieve the “paradigm shift”. The policy issue of animal 
experimentation was successfully reframed from a trade-off dilemma to a glorious win-win 
situation through the introduction of the concept of animal-testing alternatives.
3.3.4 Increased shared responsibilities
Along with the changing positioning of animal-testing alternatives, the view also changed 
regarding who was responsible for developing such alternatives. At first, the problem of 
animal research and animal-testing alternatives was rather technically and cognitively 
orientated. As a response, the granting of subsidies to develop animal-testing alternatives 
was seen as the solution to overcome this problem.
The focus on technical solutions for the policy problem of animal experimentation changed 
slightly over the years. People realised that the use of alternatives was not only a matter 
of availability but also of convincing the (in)direct users of animal experiments, such as 
regulators, scientists, and industries. The policy intentions in policy documents shifted 
from a technology push to a co-creation approach to alternatives, in which end-users 
were increasingly involved in the development of alternatives. Public-private partnerships 
were established with the help of the Dutch government to stimulate the development of 
animal-testing alternatives in specific scientific domains (See also Chapter 4 and 5), and the 
development and implementation of animal-testing alternatives have become an issue of 
shared responsibility over the past few years.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter showed how the issues of animal experimentation and animal-testing 
alternatives have been presented in Dutch policy discourse since the introduction of 
the Act in 1977. By describing four policy frames, I was able to identify crucial shifts in 
the understanding of the two issues. These shifts may be helpful to understand the 
incongruence between societal expectations regarding animal research and technological 
promises around animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands. 
The issue of animal experimentation became framed as a technical problem, a journey that 
paved the way for technical solutions. Animal-testing alternatives provided a perfect answer 
to the technically made problem of animal research; it was assumed that such alternatives 
would lower the dependency of animal experiments and thus directly lower the number 
of research animals. In other words, the policy aimed to stimulate the development of 
animal-testing alternatives with the assumption that availability would stimulate use as 
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well (parallel to the “technology-push” approach in innovation literature).
The policy discourse on animal experimentation was long dominated by the problematic 
trade-off between animal welfare and public health. Gradually, the idea of animal-testing 
alternatives managed to eliminate this trade-off by creating an attractive win-win situation 
for animal welfare, human benefits, scientific innovations, and economic growth. Thus, the 
concept was able to bridge different socials worlds, including their different expectations, 
values, and norms. Animal-testing alternatives created a situation in which actors with 
diverging values and expectations could work together and have the same goal, namely to 
work towards alternatives. 
To produce the win-win discourse, it was crucial that the concept of animal-testing 
alternatives not be defined too narrowly. Over the years, the inclusion of new criteria 
broadened the category of alternatives. The arrival of the three Rs in Dutch policy discourse 
in the 1980, for example, also expanded its boundaries towards refinement and reduction 
alternatives. In more recent years, alternatives no longer had to replace a complete animal 
model but could also be part of an integrated testing system. 
However, along with the development of this new understanding of animal-testing 
alternatives (or “second- and third-generation alternatives”), the individual contributions 
of such alternatives in reducing animal numbers became less visible. Furthermore, because 
the third-generation alternatives do not necessarily replace the animal model, their overall 
effect on animal numbers remains to be seen. Finally, the more fundamental questions 
driving animal research likely will not be solved with a narrow focus on animal-testing 
alternatives. It may well be possible that the newly established win-win situation in Dutch 
policy discourse has only a temporarily effect and contributes to the growing gap between 
societal expectation and political promises.
Questions remain as to how actors along the science-policy nexus work with the shifts as 
presented in this chapter, how they translate the various and diverging societal values into 
their daily practice, how they function as intermediaries between the concrete and the 
expected, and which choices they make within the process to re-shape the understanding 
of animal-testing alternatives in other discourses. The following chapter examines how the 
research council ZonMw re-interpreted the understanding of animal-testing alternatives 
during policy implementation. 
Technication of policy issues
The re-interpretation of animal research policy
at the Netherlands Organisation for Health 
Research and Development
4
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4 Technification of policy issues
In92 recent years, the stimulation of three-R alternatives became an important policy instrument to reduce animal experiments in the Netherlands and elsewhere (e.g. Horizon 
2020 calls for new approaches to improve predictive human safety and EURL-ECVAM, 
2015a).93 In 2008, the Dutch Cabinet presented its policy on animal-testing alternatives 
(Klink, 2008), of which the development of three-R alternatives was the main component. 
The expectation was that the knowledge resulting from the Netherlands Organisation for 
Health Research and Development’s (hereafter: the Dutch acronym “ZonMw”) and other 
research programmes would reduce the number of research animals and experiments in 
the long run.
This policy is primarily aimed at the stimulation of animal-testing alternatives. 
The starting point is the three Rs: replacement, reduction, and refinement. 
The ultimate goal is to reduce the number of animal experiments and is 
therefore also based on societal and economic arguments. (…) The Cabinet 
supports the development of Three Rs alternatives in both regulatory and 
fundamental research. In this respect, the ZonMw programme <<Dierproeven 
Begrensd>>94 is the only funding source available to all research organisations 
in the Netherlands. (my translation) (Klink, 2008).
The Cabinet’s vision clearly presents the development of animal-testing alternatives as 
the promised technical solution to the societal and economic arguments against animal 
research (see also the changing policy frames in Chapter 3). However, the policy seems 
ambiguous as to how it should be implemented and does not clarify what counts as good 
and relevant animal-testing alternatives. 
This chapter examines how the research council ZonMw translated the governments’ policy 
on animal research including animal-testing alternatives into research programmes and 
calls. Research councils such as ZonMw are positioned along the science-policy nexus, and 
as such need to live up to the (scientific) policy promises to society, while at the same time 
making policy ambitions feasible for divergent scientific practices. They depend on scientists 
for knowledge development, just as scientists depend on them for research funding.95 
92 This chapter went through a peer review by the director of the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research 
and Development (ZonMw), Henk Smid. The analysis and conclusion are my sole responsibility.
93  Three-R alternatives stand for the replacement, reduction, and refinement of animal experiments (Russell & Burch, 1959).
94  In English, this programme may be translated as “Limiting animal experimentation”.
95  Because of a structural shortage in research budgets, this relationship may not be as equal as presented.
92
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Moreover, research councils operate in a particular “scene-setting vacuum” (Colebatch, 
2009) that is not always recognised as such. This dimension entails the societal and time-
specific values that influence the scope of policy in general, such as values about the 
position of science and the level of progress wanted. 
This chapter describes how ZonMw implemented policies on animal research in its research 
programmes between 2000 and 2011. By making underlying assumptions explicit, this 
chapter shows the choices made during implementation.96 It also provides insight into the 
mechanisms that influence the relationship between societal values and technological 
promises about animal-testing alternatives. The research question addressed in this chapter 
is the following: How was the public policy on animal research implemented in ZonMw’s 
research programmes on animal-testing alternatives between 2000 and 2011? 
The next section outlines the theoretical framework of this chapter. Section 4.2 describes 
how the interpretation of animal research as a policy issue gradually shifted, followed by a 
section on the shifting interpretation of three-R research in ZonMw’s research programmes 
on animal-testing alternatives (§4.3). Section 4.4 continues with a description of the factors 
that may have contributed to this shifting interpretation. Finally, section 4.5 provides an 
overview of the possible implications of these shifts.
4.1 Frames, policy reflection and technification
This chapter draws on the literature on ‘framing’ to study how the intermediary organisation 
ZonMw implements animal research policies in its programmes on animal-testing 
alternatives within the governance infrastructure for research policy. The implementation 
of policy programmes is understood as a process and achievement of collective action (i.e. 
“structured account” Colebatch, 2009).97 It is the stage of the policy process where the 
underlying theories of policy decisions, the choice of policy instruments and the resources 
allocated during the formulation process are tested against reality (Dewulf et al., 2009; 
Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 2001: See also Section 1.2.4; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 2000a). 
The framing theory starts from the premise that interpretation and meaning are created 
in interaction. The theory thus suggests that the concept of animal-testing alternatives is 
shaped in interaction during the implementation process and may be captured in various 
frames.
96  Choices are understood as actions that either include or exclude other actions and interpretations. 
97  This starting point differs from the “authoritative choice” of policy which understands implementation as an 
execution of policy programmes with clear policy objectives (Colebatch, 2009)). See also Chapter 1.
Frames determine what the actors will consider ‘the facts’ to be and how these lead 
to normative prescriptions for action.98 A different frame will also change the social 
construction of the problem and which facts then may be considered relevant. In other 
words, frames are not just different perspectives on the ‘same problem’; with a different 
frame the problem itself has changed (Fischer, 2003; Rein & Schön, 1993).99 
Frames are considered “sense-making devices” (Hajer & Laws, 2006) that are part of a larger 
discourse, which is defined as: “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations 
that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Here, the 
framing literature intersects with Colebatch’s social construction account of policy making 
(i.e. “scene-setting dimension”), meaning that widely shared understandings and values 
about a specific problem and appropriate actions set the scene for a specific discourse 
(Colebatch, 2009, p. 29 onwards). This dimension determines to a large extent the policy 
frames (and therefore the policy solutions) that are viable, and those that are not. It is for 
this reason that Colebatch (2009) talks of this dimension as “policy making as collective 
puzzling” (p. 29). Yet, it is often difficult to discern this dimension, because it is concerned 
with taken-for-granted aspects or matters, usually tacit and exempt from conscious 
attention and reflection. Frames only make sense against the background of a dominant 
social discourse within a particular period (See also Chapter 2, especially §2.6 about the 
theoretical relationship between frames and discourses). 
The position of a frame provides insight into the level of (policy) reflection. For example, 
frames can operate on a technical-analytical level with a preoccupation with research 
results. Or they may function on a more general and societal level and deal with fundamental 
questions regarding, for example, animal research and health. This chapter uses Fischer’s 
framework on analysing policy arguments (e.g. Fischer, 2003; Fischer, 2007a) and Grin and 
Van de Graaf’s additional work on this (Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996a, 1996b) to position 
the research programmes’ frames during implementation (see also §2.6.1). Frank Fischer 
differentiates between a first-order policy discourse (e.g. focusing on the specific actions of 
a policy initiative) and a second‑order discourse (e.g. concerned with the societal context of 
the policy initiative).100 
98  Benford and Snow (2000) refer to their earlier work on the core framing tasks as “diagnostic framing” 
(problem identification and attributions), “prognostic framing” (articulation of a proposed solution to the 
problem) and “motivational framing” (rationale for engaging in action). 
99  For a more elaborate overview of the framing literature and a description of the different frame 
characteristics, see chapter 2 and 3, as well as section 4.1.1.
100  Note that Fischer’s understanding of discourse is more specific than Hajer’s definition (see also §2.3 and §2.6).
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First-order discourse comprises the level of programme verification (i.e. technical-analytical 
discourse), which focuses on the programme’s content, and its stated objectives, and 
situational validation (i.e. contextual discourse) that is concerned with the extent to which 
particular programme objectives are relevant to the particular situation. This level includes 
the problem definition and how the programme contributes to the solution. Second-order 
discourse, societal vindication (i.e. systemic discourse), gives insight into the empirical 
and normative theories of a programme. Finally, the level of social choice (i.e. ideological 
discourse) deals with ideological and values questions (Fischer, 1995, 2003; Fischer, 2007a). 
The object of Fischer’ first-order and a second-order discourse correspond with Schön and 
Rein’s (1994) “first-order” and “second-order reflection” in action (Grin & Van de Graaf, 
1996a). 
This chapter uses an integrated framework based on both Fischer’s level of policy evaluation 
and Schön and Rein’s order of policy reflection, to distinguish between the different levels 
in the debate on animal research in the Netherlands. The first-order policy reflection, views 
animal-testing alternatives as a (technical) solution to the problems of animal research, 
whereas the second-order reflection positions animal experimentation in a broader societal 
context driving these experiments. Within the second order, neither the use of animal 
experiments nor the development of animal-testing alternatives is taken for granted. 
4.1.1 Frame analysis 
The frame analysis in this study is primarily carried out on the documents from ZonMw’s 
research programmes on animal-testing alternatives between 2000 and 2011, including 
programme texts, evaluations, assignment letters, and annual reports (see Table 4.1 for 
the individual resources). These documents are considered a product of the negotiated 
implementation of public policy in research programmes and are understood as the temporal 
fixation of meaning in interaction between multiple players involved (i.e. the organisation 
itself, programme committee, researchers, and civil servants).101 In addition, five semi-
structured interviews were conducted with actors involved in the programme, including 
ZonMw employees, and former and current members of the programme committee.102 The 
qualitative data of the interviews was used to validate the findings of the frame analysis and 
explanatory mechanisms. 
101  Because this chapter focuses primarily on the implementation of animal research policy into research 
programmes, the individual scientific projects within the programmes will only be addressed in passing.
102  This committee is involved in the writing of the research programme, the description of the research calls, 
and the selection of research projects. It comprises a changing group of experts from industry, the sciences (e.g. 
natural sciences, ethics), patient organisations, health organisations, and animal welfare organisations. 
For the purpose of this study, a frame is understood as the inferred understanding of animal 
research and animal-testing alternatives by ZonMw’s research programmes and calls. 
Such frames can be constructed from frame characteristics subtracted from documents in 
which the meaning is temporarily fixed (e.g. programme texts, and research calls). These 
characteristics include: issue naming, categorisation, attribution of responsibility, and 
causal story (See also Chapter 2, especially §2.4.3). Issue naming refers to the textualisation 
of animal experimentation, including animal-testing alternatives, and determines how the 
issue is defined. Categorisation refers to the classification of research animals and animal-
testing alternatives to answer the question as to what can be considered a good alternative. 
Attribution of responsibility focuses on the role of particular players in solving the policy 
issue. Causal story refers to the combining of aspects, and gluing of the problems, categories, 
and actors into an intelligible and convincing narrative about how an issue can be explained 
and should be understood. Consequently, shifts within each of the separate characteristics 
over time provide insight into the changing implementation of public policies into research 
programmes on animal-testing alternatives (i.e. frame shift)
4.2 Policy development: the construction of a technical policy problem
This paragraph focuses on the formation of animal research policies over the past three 
decades, as it is vital for the understanding of the implementation process into ZonMw’s 
research programmes on animal-testing alternatives. After all, research councils do not 
operate in a societal vacuum but function in the light of a continuously changing “contract” 
(e.g. Gibbons, 1994; Hessels, Van Lente, & Smits, 2009) between science and society (e.g. 
Van der Meulen, 2003). The present section describes the construction of animal research as 
a technical policy problem as part of the “scene-setting” dimension of policy development.
In the 1970s, animal research entered the political arena as a controversial topic. While 
opponents of animal research focused on the pain and distress involved in the experiments 
carried out in the field, proponents touted the many (medical) successes thanks to those 
experiments. The policy topic was framed as a trade-off between human health and the use 
of research animals. The introduction of the term “animal-testing alternatives” reframed 
the former trade-off. Gradually, the policy frame in the Netherlands shifted towards being 
one in which animal-testing alternatives were presented as the solution to the problems 
associated with animal research (see also Chapter 3).103 The quote below from former 
103  Consequently, other policy frames (including problem definitions and corresponding actions) slowly 
disappeared from policy discourse as well. Imagine for example the framing of animal experiments as a crime 
(legal frame; punishment for offenders), as morally unjust (animal protection frame; full protection for all 
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Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport Hans Hoogervorst in a policy letter on animal research 
emphasis the orientation towards animal-testing alternatives as a policy solution:
One of the most constructive tools to restrain the number of animal 
experiments (...) is the development and application of research methods 
using no or fewer animal experiments, or lowering the suffering of research 
animals. (my translation) (Hoogervorst, 2005)
The shifting orientation towards animal-testing alternatives can be understood as a 
technological answer to a societal problem (i.e. “technological fix” (Rosner, 2004)). Based on 
Sarah Parry’s notion of “scientisation” for scientists’ discursive reframing process to obtain 
cognitive authority by converting ethical and social issues into scientific and technical ones 
(2009), I introduce the concept of technification to emphasise the process (i.e. a collection 
of activities) that keeps the level of policy reflection at the first-order. The technification 
process may include (deliberative) discursive strategies of scientists, policy makers and 
others in order to gain cognitive authority and tacit choices against the background of the 
larger societal discourse of that moment.104 
During policy development, the issue of animal research seemed thus reframed in terms 
of an animal-testing alternatives’ dearth: More animal-testing alternatives were to be 
developed in order to restrain and lower the number of research animals. In other words, 
animal research became a technical policy problem. 
The next section describes the frame shifts in ZonMw’s research programmes on animal-
testing alternatives upon implementation of policy programmes on animal research.
4.3 Frame shifts in ZonMw’s programmes on animal-testing alternatives
The first ZON-programme on animal-testing alternatives marked the start of a new era 
that – for the first time since the establishment of the Platform Animal-testing alternatives 
(PAD) in 1987 – would seek to promote animal-testing alternatives.105 The policy goal 
animals), or as an absolute necessity for human’s health (human progress frame; complete acceptance of 
animal research). 
104  I follow Parry (2009) in her use of the concept in relation to the construction of particular frames rather 
than analysing the role of scientists as advisors to policy (e.g. Jasonoff, 1990; Weingart, 1999). Technification 
may also attract new players (i.e. the formation of a new “discourse coalition” Hajer, 1995: see also §2.3.2)
105  The evaluation of the Platform in 1995 concluded that the Platform had been mainly oriented towards 
the financing and stimulation of research. Other tasks, such as the coordination of research, the inventory of 
alternatives and advising researchers, were evaluated as less successful. A suggestion was made to appoint 
of this programme was the “inventory, stimulation, initiation and coordination of the 
development and application of animal-testing alternatives” (VWS, 1999, p. 3). The policy 
programme seemed committed to the idea of supporting the development of animal-
testing alternatives. Yet, the questions how to translate the political discourse on animal 
research and animal-testing alternatives into a research programme, with whom, and what 
to prioritise, were all questions yet to be answered during implementation at research 
council ZonMw.106 
These (tacit) questions included the interpretation of the specific fields and aspects that 
had to be addressed within the programme (i.e. “issue identification”), what was counted 
as an animal-testing alternative and what was not (i.e. “categorisation”), who was held 
responsible for which aspect of the innovation chain (i.e. “attributing responsibility”), and 
how the programme rationale was glued together in a coherent story on how to contribute 
to the societal expectation of reducing research animal numbers (i.e. “causal story”). What 
seemed an apparent straightforward goal in the policy programme required many more 
decisions upon implementation.
This section starts with a brief introduction to research council ZonMw and its programmes 
on animal-testing alternatives, after which it continues with a description of the frame 
shifts in ZonMw’s understanding of animal-testing alternatives upon implementation.
4.3.1 Research council ZonMw
ZonMw has an important position in the governance infrastructure for research policy, 
especially on healthcare research. It mediates between research and policy (i.e. “boundary 
organization” e.g. Guston, 2001) to enhance evidence-based policies and practice in the 
field of healthcare (Bekker et al., 2010). As stated on its own website, ZonMw “funds health 
research and stimulates the use of knowledge developed to help improve health and health 
care in the Netherlands” (ZonMw, 2015b). The research councils has four programme 
frameworks: Science and Innovation, Prevention, Care and Welfare, and Quality and 
Health care efficiency (my translation) (ZonMw, 2014). Although ZonMw has some ‘open’ 
programmes in which innovative research in funded, most of its programmes are thematic 
and formulated in close cooperation with the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports.107 
one central financing source and contract multiannual projects. The recommendations of the evaluation and a 
reorganisation at the Ministry of Health eventually led to the minister’s request of creating a new programme 
on animal-testing alternatives at ZON (‘Dutch Health Research’) (ZON, 2000). In 2001, ZON merged with the 
NWO department of Medical Sciences into ZonMw. 
106  ZonMw’s sense-making process is understood as the interplay between multiple players and organisations 
(see also §4.1.1). 
107  And with the Ministry of Economic Affairs for the programmes on animal-testing alternatives.
94  │  Part II - Empirical chapters Chapter 4 - Technification of policy issues   │  95
The programmes include research on dementia (“Memorable”), aging societies (“Ambient 
Assisted Living”), youth care (“Strengthening performance practices youth health care”), 
and animal-testing alternatives (“More knowledge with fewer animals”).108 The total 
programme costs cover around 150 million euros per year (ZonMw, 2015e).
Each programme has a programme committee which is responsible for drafting the 
programme text, the evaluation of proposals and the monitoring of the projects among 
other things (ZonMw, 2015d, p. 17).109 Policymakers and practitioners participate in 
ZonMw’s programme committees in order to improve the links between research and 
policy (e.g. Bekker et al., 2010) The committee evaluates the proposals on their relevance 
and on their overall (scientific) quality as based on the call’s criteria. The final decision 
whether a submitter will be granted the subsidy is based on the proposal, the referents’ 
evaluation on the (scientific) quality of the proposal, and the possible submitter’s rebuttal 
(ZonMw, 2015d).
The projects are monitored and evaluated regularly, and may include submitter’s progress 
reports, project leader’s meetings, site visits and end reports. The programmes are usually 
evaluated twice: one during the scope of the programme (i.e. mid-term self-evaluation) and 
once at the end of the programme (i.e. external end-evaluation) (ZonMw, 2015a, 2015d).
4.3.1.1 ZonMw’s research programmes on animal-testing alternatives
Since 2000, ZonMw has initiated four large programmes and one smaller programme on 
animal-testing alternatives (ZonMw, 2011e).110 ZonMw is also involved in other initiatives 
stimulating the research on animal-testing alternatives, including their membership 
of the European consensus platform for alternatives (Ecopa, 2015). Beside the research 
programmes, the programme secretaries, programme coordinators, board members and 
director of ZonMw are actively engaged in many initiatives concerning animal research and 
animal-testing alternatives. 
108  An overview of all programmes can be found on ZonMw’s website: www.zonmw.nl.
109  The programme committee is installed by the board of ZonMw, which remains ultimately responsible. The 
committee may decide to outsource certain tasks, such as the programme evaluation. 
110  The MKMD programme will be prolonged until 2018. 
Table 4-1: ZonMw’s programmes on animal-testing alternatives and relevant documents
Programme Period Budget Relevant documents
DPB I 2000 – 2004 €2,700,0001 (Hackenitz, 2004; ZON, 2000)
DPB II 2005 – 2008 €5,718,7142 (ZonMw, 2005, 2007, 2011b, 2011f, 2012a)
DPB III 2009 – 2012 €2,200,0003 (ZonMw, 2008a, 2011b, 2011f, 2012a)
DPBI-III (ZonMw, 2011e) 
ASAT 2010 €900,000 (ZonMw, 2011b, 2011e, 2011f)
MKMD 2011 – 2014 €5,450,000 (ZonMw, 2011c, 2011d, 2015c)
1  The total financial heritage from PAD was €6.675.805 of which M€2.7 was freely available.  
2  Including an additional budget of €200.000 for the scientific and social trend analyses. 
3  The 2011 output report noted €2.500.000.
The programme committee of ZonMw’s programmes on animal-testing alternatives consists 
of experts from various fields, with the majority coming from the natural sciences (e.g. full 
professor in molecular biology, toxicology, immunology, nuclear medicine etc.) and a variable 
number of experts from industries (e.g. NOTOX B.V. in the MKMD programme), NGOs (e.g. 
Proefdiervrij in all programmes), regulators (e.g. MEB in the MKMD programme), ethicists 
(e.g. Ethics Institute in DPB III), and patient organisations (e.g. Reumapatiëntenbond 
[‘Bond for patients with rheumatic diseases’] in the MKMD programme).111 Given the 
responsibilities of the committee, the composition plays a pivotal role in the sense-making 
process during implementation.
4.3.2 Issue naming: from animal welfare to human relevance
The first programme on animal-testing alternatives (i.e. DPBI) positioned the issue of 
animal research in a historical context and supported this frame with numerous facts and 
figures, such as an overview of the regulatory requirements for drugs and chemicals, and 
the decrease in the number of research animals. The search for animal-testing alternatives 
was firstly motivated by a recognition of research animals’ intrinsic value and the care that 
needs to be taken of such animals. In addition, scientific (e.g. the extrapolation difficulties 
between animals and humans) and economic (e.g. cheaper screening methods) arguments 
were also used to support the search for animal-testing alternatives.
First of all, animal-testing alternatives are aimed at improving the animals’ 
welfare, which is an ethical consideration. In this respect, scientific research 
is a tool to search for possibilities to reduce the burden on the animals. (my 
translation) (Hackenitz, 2004, p. 46)
111  The members of the programme committee hold seats in their individual capacity. 
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Over the course of the programmes carried out over the years, animal-testing alternatives 
became associated with delivering results that are more relevant to human. The latest 
MKMD112 programme internalised this consensus “for the growing awareness that (a model 
for the) human is becoming the standard model for the human biology, rather than the animal 
model” (ZonMw, 2011c). The Module Animal-Free Techniques speaks of a “mind shift” from 
the execution of traditional animal research to the build-up of integrated knowledge of 
the human system (“human model”) (ZonMw, 2011d). The integration of knowledge from 
different disciplines, a central tenet of system biology, thus became increasingly important. 
Overall, the issue’s focus shifted from seeing to the welfare of animals in experiments to 
developing models, which were likely to generate more relevant knowledge about the 
human situation (i.e. the programme’s promise).
4.3.3 Categorisation: from the three-Rs to avoiding the animal altogether
Over the years, the type of research considered relevant to the development of animal-
testing alternatives has shifted as well. The earlier ZonMw-programmes focused on 
research that started with the default animal model and aimed to replace, reduce, or 
refine the animal research associated with this model. I call these “second-generation 
animal-testing alternatives”, as opposed to the animal-testing alternatives of the previous 
PAD programme(s) (i.e. “first-generation animal-testing alternatives” 113) and alternatives 
in the later ZonMw programmes that appear to focus more towards an understanding of 
underlying biological mechanisms and processes of health, disease and toxic responses (i.e. 
“third-generation animal-testing alternatives”) (See also §3.3.2).
In the first programme, animal-testing alternatives were understood as “methods that use 
no, or at least fewer, research animals, as well as methods that aim to improve the welfare of 
animals in experiments” (ZON, 2000). This three-R definition had already been embedded in 
scientific discourse since the publication of Russell and Burch’s book, The principles of humane 
experimental technique, in 1959 (Russell & Burch, 1959: See also Chapter 3). This scientific 
discourse on animal-testing alternatives thus set the boundaries of what the first ZonMw 
programme considered a good alternative. The research was strictly distinguished from more 
fundamental research aimed at understanding underlying biological mechanisms of disease.
112  The programme’s name, “More Knowledge with Fewer Animals”, already suggests that the position of the 
knowledge that is developed plays a pivotal role. 
113  The PAD programme(s) focussed on “first-generation animal-testing alternatives”, including pig ears from 
slaughter houses to measure skin penetration, the growing of human tumours in bovine eyes to replace the 
naked mouse model, and the use of eyes from slaughter houses to replace the eye irritation test with rabbits 
(See also §3.2.4.2). First-generation animal-testing alternatives thus only covered the replacement of animal 
models, whereas the second-generation animal-testing alternatives also covered the refinement and reduction 
of animal models (i.e. the 3Rs). 
(Research on animal-testing alternatives) is not so much about empirical 
research to acquire insights into mechanisms, but about distilling new 
methods from existing knowledge in a creative manner. The innovation is 
thus not about the empirical findings but lies in the ability to combine findings 
in an intelligent way. (my translation) (Hackenitz, 2004, p. 46)
Research on alternatives seemed to be a goal in itself rather than a side product of knowledge 
development. Indeed, the programme evaluators warned for scientists who “hitchhiked” 
on the DPB budget. They understood such hitchhikers as scientists doing “fundamental 
research which can also be explained as a possible base for an animal-testing alternative, 
but which is not the main incentive” (my translation) (Hackenitz, 2004, p. 36). Fundamental 
research that could possibly lead to animal-testing alternatives in the long run did not, at 
least form the evaluators perspective, appear to be relevant for the DPB programme.
A shift towards a broader interpretation of animal-testing alternatives became visible in the 
DPB II programme. By welcoming new research strategies, such as “functional genomics 
and proteomics” (ZonMw, 2005, p. 17) the door was opened to a broader understanding of 
alternatives.
The current state of science offers the possibility to pay attention to research 
strategies that do not depart from standard animal models. These new strategies 
should be aimed at avoiding animal research in the future. (…) The Programme 
Committee does not consider it to be self-evident that such alternative models 
will again be animal models. Projects that focus on fundamental aspects of 
working mechanisms in non‑intact animal models will therefore be given 
priority. (my translation) (ZonMw, 2005, p. 17. Emphasis added)
Animal-testing alternatives were thus no longer exclusively interpreted as methods for 
replacing, reducing, or refining the animal experiment, but also as methods that aimed to 
avoid the use of animal models altogether.114 The study of more fundamental aspects of 
underlying biological mechanisms, and research leading to “more relevant extrapolation of 
animal experimental data for human effects” were warmly welcomed within DPB II (ZonMw, 
2005, p. 17). It seemed no longer a prerequisite to start from an existing animal model to 
be considered relevant for the programme: Methods and research strategies that worked 
around animals and were able to avoid animal experiments in the future also fell into this 
new understanding of animal-testing alternatives. 
114  The Dutch word vermijden (to avoid) is used and fits with the Dutch translation of the three Rs, which 
translates as the three Vs: vervanging (replacement), vermindering (reduction) and verfijning (refinement). 
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The broadening of the alternatives interpretation has continued over the years. The MKMD 
programme considered multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary initiatives the “foundation 
for the three-R alternatives” (ZonMw, 2011d) and classified more fundamental research 
on underlying mechanisms as animal-testing alternatives, too. These what I call “third-
generation alternatives” focus on the human situation and support knowledge development 
(i.e. fundamental insights into biological mechanisms, and model development) that 
produce relevant information while simultaneously aiming to overcome animal research. 
Overall, the interpretation of (research on) animal-testing alternatives seemed to have shifted 
from research directly focused on the animal model (“second-generation”) to research that 
may deliver more relevant information for the human situation (“third-generation”). 
4.3.4 Attributing responsibility: from scientists to co-responsibility 
Over the course of the ZonMW programmes, the perceived role of researchers, regulators 
(e.g. Medicines Evaluation Board, European Chemical Agency), and private partners (e.g. 
pharmaceutical industry) in the development, application, and use of animal-testing 
alternatives have changed. At the start this responsibility seemed almost exclusively 
attributed to scientists and gradually shifted towards increased co-responsibility of all 
partners in the chain. 
Since the start of the programmes in 2000, attention was paid to implementation and 
communication. According to ZonMw, implementation can be described as:
[A] process-orientated and systematic introduction of an innovation and/or 
change with proven value, with the purpose of a structural position in the 
(professional) acting and functioning of organisations, or in the structure of 
health care. (my translation) (ZON, 2000, p. 25)
In the first programmes on animal-testing alternatives, the implementation of results 
was primarily seen as the project leaders’ responsibility. Asked to pay attention to the 
“possibilities and critical factors” concerning the (future) implementation of their results 
in their proposal, project leaders seemed regarded as crucial pivots in the implementation 
process (ZON, 2000, p. 26; ZonMw, 2005). Yet, the evaluation of the DPB I programme revealed 
a “large gap between obtaining knowledge with respect to animal-testing alternatives and 
their application” (Hackenitz, 2004, p. 52). The relation between knowledge development 
and the application of animal-testing alternatives was apparently not self-evident. 
The subsequent programmes attempted to bridge this gap by involving stakeholders in 
the set up or development of the research proposals and the implementation process. 
For example, DPB III required stakeholder involvement in the project proposals and 
a users’ committee was established around each (group of) funded project(s) to create 
“early interaction between researchers and potential users” (ZonMw, 2008a). This users 
committee aligned with the programme’s understanding of implementation as:
[A] collective responsibility of ZonMw (the Programme Committee), project 
leaders of ZonMw projects, national and international authorities, industry 
and academia. (my translation) (ZonMw, 2005, p. 23)
During the operation of the programmes, the cooperation of partners in the development 
of animal-testing alternatives gained support. Against the backdrop of a range of initiatives 
to stimulate the cooperation between academia and industry in the Netherlands (e.g. 
Dutch top sector policy115, and public private partnerships such as the Centre for Image 
Sciences, and the FitFoodFun-Factor116), MKMD required chain involvement (e.g. contact 
with regulators) and cooperation between the relevant stakeholders. This programme’s Life 
Sciences and Health module even explicitly required the co-financing of the private partners 
in the research consortium (ZonMw, 2012b).117 Cooperation along the entire chain in such 
public private partnerships (i.e. PPPs) seemed understood as an important way forward in 
the stimulation of animal-testing alternatives. 
4.3.5 Causal story: from raising awareness to improving human relevance 
The overall rationale behind the research programmes on animal testing remained more 
or less stable over the course of the programmes: The development and implementation 
of animal-testing alternatives would diminish the dependency on animal research and thus 
lower the number of research animals. Yet, the causal story to legitimise a specific approach 
appeared to have shifted from raising three-R awareness via increasing the use of animal-
testing alternatives (i.e. three-R implementation118), to building a stronger business case, 
especially in relation to human relevance. 
115  This policy has faced some criticism, also because the selection excludes certain sectors of the Dutch 
economy, and the possibilities for innovative starters are minimal (E.g. WRR, 2013). 
116  The UMC Centre for Images Sciences is a cooperation between UMC Utrecht, Philips and Elekta to improve 
diagnostics and treatment of disease with imaging techniques; FitFoodFun-Factor is a cooperation between the 
Heart Foundation, the Netherlands Nutrition Centre and Lidl Netherlands to stimulate healthy food and move 
for primary school students. 
117  Partners could either contribute in kind (i.e. via personnel or specific substances), in cash (i.e. financial 
contributions) or through a combination of both. The module was part of the Top Sector Life Sciences and 
Health (LSH) and therefore had additional requirements. 
118  The introduction of animal-testing alternatives is frequently cited as a bottom-up approach from the 
actual development of three-R methods within universities or industrial R&D labs, to their validation (testing the 
reliability and relevance) and implementation (the regulatory acceptance of methods) (Vandebriel & Opperhuizen, 
2011). In policy sciences, however, implementation covers the entire process from the initial policy intentions 
to the use of three-R alternatives (as the focus of this study). I therefore use the term three-R implementation 
in the context of this chapter (See also Schiffelers et al., 2007, p. 288 on her use of the term “regulatory use”). 
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In DPB I, the problem was primarily framed as a lack of three-R awareness within the 
scientific community. The choice to fund multiple smaller projects, instead of fewer large(r) 
projects, fit with this perspective.
When you have less funding available, it is import to dived it among the 
community. (my translation) (Interview member programme committee, 
2012)
The fact that animal research was performed within many areas of the biomedical sciences, 
as well as in the environmental sciences and for the purpose of education, determined 
the broad programmatic scope of the programme. Ranging from “education” and “model 
development” to “regulatory research”, “specific wishes”119, and “dissemination” (ZON, 
2000), the programme covered most areas. Those who evaluated the programme agreed 
with this argument against the backdrop of societal support. 
Specifying the programme might be effective in terms of science, but it works 
against the broader ethical awareness and causes an erosion of societal 
support. (...) An expansion of the field of interest is a way to create wide 
support and maintain the change in mentality. (my translation) (Hackenitz, 
2004, p. 37) 
The following DPB II, and especially the DPB III programme, marked a significant shift in the 
rationale on which the programmes were built. The problem was no longer framed as a 
lack of three-R awareness within the scientific community but as a three-R implementation 
problem. The DPB III programme focused on getting the animal-testing alternatives of the 
previous DPB programmes in the next phase of the “knowledge value chain” (ZonMw, 
2008a). This knowledge chain comprised three subsequent phases, running linearly from 
“fundamental innovative and strategic research”, “applied research” and “(pre-)validation 
and implementation” (idem). Stimulation of all phases was considered to be most successful 
in achieving the programme’s goals. 
The approach to stimulate animal-testing alternatives seemed to shift in the 2011 MKMD 
programme. While the infrastructure on the “knowledge value chain” continued, the 
(often) problematic extrapolation of animal models to the human situation strengthened 
the focus on human(s) (models). Based on the 2009 Trend Analyses and the 2010 
119  These wishes were further divided into ecotoxicology, defence-related research, and a system monitoring 
the ratio between the use of alternatives and the number of research animals.
Programmatic Study120, four research areas were classified as “potential” (ZonMw, 2011c): 
human diseases, development of drugs for human use, risk assessment of potential harmful 
substances, and quality control of drugs, including vaccines and sera. The programme’s 
text enumerated many scientific focus points, including the (further) development and 
utilisation of technologies and techniques (e.g. system biology, -omics, imaging) for both 
human and animal models, translational research, the development of biological products 
with 3R-methods, the (further) development and utilisation of stem cell research and 
other tissue culture techniques, and the development of integrated testing strategies and 
predictive (computer) models (ZonMw, 2011c, p. 9).121 The functionality of three-R models 
(including animal-free techniques) appeared to be considered pivotal in understanding the 
human knowledge questions. 
4.3.6 Strengthened technification of solution to animal research
The previous subsections described the gradual changes in ZonMw programmes’ approach 
in the development and implementation of animal-testing alternatives. Animal-testing 
alternatives have increasingly become framed as possibilities to improve the human 
relevance of research (“issue naming”). Along with the shifting position of such alternatives, 
the interpretation of what could be considered relevant research also changed. While 
the “second-generation alternatives” started to replace, reduce, or refine the traditional 
animal model, “third-generation alternatives” started from the relevant research question 
(“categorisation”). Knowledge development and three-R implementation became framed 
as a shared responsibility of all stakeholders involved in the chain of animal research 
(“attributing responsibility”). The overall rationale behind the research programmes shifted 
from improving research animal’s welfare to building a business case for improved human 
relevance (“causal story”). 
Since all the individual frame characteristics seemed to lean towards a technical solution 
for the issue of animal research, it may be conclude that the implementation of animal 
research policy at ZonMw further technified the policy issue (i.e. “discourse structuration” 
Hajer, 1995. See also §2.3.1). 
120  For more information, see: (For more information, see De Cock Buning et al., 2009a, 2009b; Deleu & Van 
Boxel, 2010, 2011; Hendriksen & Komduur, 2009).
121  The list also more system-approach focus areas, such as “3R-promoting funding criteria” and “periodically 
evaluation of regulatory compulsory tests” (ZonMw, 2011c). 
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4.4 Factors driving the technification process
The previous section showed that the implementation of animal research policies in 
research programmes strengthened the technification of the policy issue. It is important 
to gain insight in the factors that contributed to this technification process. This section 
therefore will describe some relevant factors that made a further technification possible 
upon policy implementation, including the delegation of some crucial (technical) choices, 
the technology-push argument of innovation, and the evaluation’s first-order level of 
reflection. These processes pertain to the present study, but the list of factors is not - and 
should not be considered - exhaustive.
4.4.1 The delegation of choices to a research council
The first factor strengthening the technification process was the delegation of (technical) 
choices to a research council. Positioned between policy and science, research councils find 
themselves in the difficult position of having to manoeuvre between the abstract societal 
demands of policy and the science awarding systems.122 
The delegation of policy implementation fits with public science funding organisations’ 
traditional role of having to “mediate a broader contractual relation between the state and 
science that can be considered a principal-agent relation” (Van der Meulen, 2003, p. 399).123 
In this account of research councils, the government provides resources, authority, and 
monitoring to a funding organisation in order to reach the goals that the government cannot 
reach alone. In this case, the research council simply executes the political choices that have 
already been made on the policy level.124 Such an account seemed based on the assumption 
that no further choices are necessary or that at least no significant societal values need to 
be reconsidered and suits a more rational way of policy making (see also §1.2.2). 
However, many (political) choices still have to be made during policy implementation, a fact 
that challenges the notion of a strict boundary between the scientific and the political (e.g. 
Weingart, 1999). 
122  In Chapter 5, further attention will be devoted to these science awarding systems (e.g. publications and 
citation index) that make it more challenging to live up to the promise of animal-testing alternatives. 
123  In science policy studies, these relationships are often explained with the principal-agent theory. The 
basic idea is that the “principal” hands over resources to the “agent” in order to reach goals that the principal 
cannot reach alone (Gulbrandsen, 2005). The role of intermediary organisations, such as research councils, has 
complicated these bilateral relationships. Here, a research council can simultaneously be both agent (in relation 
to the government) and principal (in relation to scientists). 
124  For example, the formality of assignment letters keeps the idea of such a principal-agent relationship in 
place and contributes to the appearance of a policy-science dichotomy between the principal (government) and 
the agent (research council). 
The funding comes from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport VWS, but 
the content is actually from the Programme Committee (…) the knowledge 
infrastructure on the three Rs is obviously very wide. (my translation) 
(Interview programme secretary, programme coordinator & communication 
officer, 2013).
This quote from a ZonMw employee involved in the programmes on animal-testing 
alternatives appears to suggest that the programme committee play a pivotal role in the 
implementation of policy programmes into research programmes. As most members of 
this committee have a natural scientific background (i.e. PhD, associate professor of full 
professor in molecular biology, toxicology, immunology, nuclear medicine etc.), it seems 
likely that a scientific and technical solution to the societal problem of animal research 
prevails over a non-scientific solution (e.g. economical, ethical). The scientific and technical 
orientation also paves the road for scientific development (i.e. emerging technologies) 
that may changes the interpretation of animal-testing alternatives (see also §4.3.3 on 
categorisation) and reinforces the technification of the policy issue. 
Moreover, the way in which funding was allocated seemed to have strengthened the 
technification process as well. The gross amount of funding was allocated via bottom-
up calls for research, through which scientists could send their proposals within the 
boundaries of the programme and under the provision that certain other conditions were 
met, for example, co-funding in the LSH call within the MKMD programme. The availability 
of proposals appeared to determine the programmes’ understanding of animal-testing 
alternatives and the eventual orientation of the programmes. 
Overall, the organisation of the research council and the structure of the research funding 
partition seemed to have intensified the technification of the policy issue. Many choices 
were still to be made during implementation, and the proximity of the programme 
committee appeared to play a pivotal role in the programmes’ shifting understanding of 
animal-testing alternatives and its focus and orientation. 
4.4.2 Science and technology-push argument of innovation
The second factor that contributed to further technification was the programmes’ 
understanding of fundamental knowledge development regarding the innovation process 
on which the programmes were built. 
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The ZonMw programmes aimed to stimulate the use of animal-testing alternatives in the 
various practices that used animal experiments, such as the academia and the regulatory 
practice. Animal-testing alternatives appeared to be understood as innovations: Methods 
that could improve the current system of animal experimentation. The ZonMw programmes 
on animal-testing alternatives were built on the assumption that all research types (e.g. 
fundamental or applied science) were equally important in this innovation’s implementation 
process. The knowledge value chain was understood as one-directional and linear: from 
fundamental research, via strategic research, applied research, development-projects/pre-
implementation to implementation projects (ZonMw, 2011e, p. 14).
In all phases of the knowledge value chain, progress can be made towards 
a useful application in a next phase. That next phase can be, but is not 
necessarily, the phase of use or implementation. (my translation) (ZonMw, 
2011e, p. 14)
[K]nowledge development is very valuable, because without new insight, 
innovation falters. (my translation) (ZonMw, 2008b, p. 6) 
In DPB III, we have laid the accent on implementation research. That doesn’t 
mean fundamental research is not important anymore, but we have done 
that [in earlier DPB programmes]; you want to finance the entire chain of 
scientific research, also the end phase. (my translation) (Interview programme 
secretary et al., 2013)
Fundamental research was understood as the “starting point” of new innovations such as 
animal-testing alternatives (Interview programme secretary et al., 2013). The attributed 
importance of fundamental research was reflected in the available funding for type 1 
projects (i.e. “development”) in DPB III (ZonMw, 2008b) and the high number (around half) 
of DPB projects that were fundamental research projects (ZonMw, 2011e, p. 14). 
This pivotal role of fundamental research in the innovation process of animal-testing 
alternatives appeared built on a “technology-push” model (e.g. Coombs et al., 1987; Di 
Stefano, Gambardella, & Verona, 2012; Nemet, 2009) to innovation: A linear model 
according to which innovation is a sequence of stages starting from scientific research 
(Saad, 2000).125
125  Rod Coombs and co-authors showed that the work and ideas of two economists, Schumpeter and 
Schmookler, have become very influential in shaping studies of innovation and technical change. They argued 
that the ‘technology push’ hypothesis of the origin of innovations find a natural place in Schumpeter’s ideas 
(Coombs et al., 1987, p. 94 onwards).
The core of this science and technology‑push argument is that advances in 
scientific understanding determine the rate and direction of innovation. (…) 
These arguments envisioned a progression of knowledge from basic science 
to applied research to product development to commercial products. (Nemet, 
2009, p. 701)
The original technology-push argument has been criticised primarily for ignoring the 
prices and other economic conditions that affect innovations’ profitability. In addition, its 
emphasis on a unidirectional progression during the innovation process was incompatible 
with work that highlighted feedback, interactions, and networks (Freeman, 1994; Nelson 
& Winter, 1977). By contrast, the “demand-pull” argument, which was developed later on, 
argued that demand – and not scientific understanding – drives the rate and direction of 
innovation.126 
Based on these insights from Science and Technology Studies and Innovation Studies, the 
question remains to what extent knowledge development, as produced within the ZonMw 
programmes on animal-testing alternatives, has been the driver of recent innovations. This 
is an important question to answer in order to evaluate whether the programmes have 
lived up to the societal expectation of reducing the number of research animals. By the 
same token, it would provide insight into whether, as the demand-pull argument suggests, 
the programme may better focus on the demands of “users” (Nahuis, Moors, & Smits, 2012; 
Von Hippel, 1976) of animal research (e.g. scientists in industry, academia) to promote a 
more sustainable transition (See also Chapter 7, especially §7.2.1).127 
By introducing new projects requirements, the 2011 MKMD programme appeared to 
move beyond the technology-push argument. Cooperation between relevant stakeholders 
and “chain involvement” can be seen as an effort to bridge and improve the process of 
implementation and the actual use of the innovations. Many scholars have recognised and 
studied the role of users in the innovation process (Boon, 2008; Di Stefano et al., 2012; Von 
Hippel, 1976). This understanding now also enters the realm of animal-testing alternatives 
(e.g. Nooijen, Ploeg, Zuijdam, Roelofs, & Komduur, 2014; Vandebriel & Opperhuizen, 
126  Later work offers a less deterministic version of the science technology-push argument, while it continued to 
emphasise the role of science and technology. The concept became more multi-dimensional and acknowledged 
some of the nuances of the innovation process that the strictly linear model ignored. Furthermore, the 
demand-pull argument received criticism for different reasons, including the definition of “demand”, the failure 
to account for discontinuous change, and the argument’s assumptions regarding firms’ capacities to identify 
“unrevealed needs” (For an overview Nemet, 2009, p. 701).
127  The linear idea that innovations are developed by scientists, disseminated through intermediaries and 
then put into practice by users has been criticised by many (e.g. Leeuwis & Aarts, 2010 for an overview).
106  │  Part II - Empirical chapters Chapter 4 - Technification of policy issues   │  107
2011).128 Yet, the 2011 MKMD programme still started from the (scientific) knowledge 
question rather than stakeholder needs: The demand-pull argument seems still a long way 
down the road in ZonMw programmes on animal-testing alternatives. 
Overall, the ZonMw programmes’ technology-push approach in the stimulation of animal-
testing alternatives emphasised the importance of scientific developments and appeared 
to have strengthened the technification of the policy issue. There seems to be a movement 
towards a greater (societal) demand pull of animal-testing alternatives within the research 
programmes, but this trajectory is still in its infancy. 
4.4.3 First-order evaluation of programmes
Finally, the third factor that contributed to the technification of the policy issue was the 
technical level on which ZonMw’s programmes on animal-testing alternatives were evaluated. 
The main thrusts of the evaluations were to assess whether the programmes’ goals were 
achieved in terms of their three-R contribution (i.e. result-evaluation), and whether the 
selection procedure was carried out correctly (i.e. process evaluation).129 As stated in the 
DPB III programme text, 
The goal of the evaluation is to assess whether the application of developed 
and validated animal-testing alternatives within the programme has 
contributed to the reduction, refinement, and/or replacement of animal 
experiments. (my translation) (ZonMw, 2005, p. 29)
In practice, the evaluations faced great difficulties in answering this question. How does one 
measure whether the application of validated animal-testing alternatives has “contributed 
to the three-Rs”? In order to evaluate the “degree of success”:
[T]he committee considered whether a project potentially and clearly 
contributes to the reduction of animal research and animal suffering. This 
qualification is thus an indicator for the programme’s achievements (…).  
(my translation) (Hackenitz, 2004, p. 27)
128  For example, the 2011 RIVM study concluded that the chain of development, validation, and implementation 
of animal-testing alternatives is not at all a streamlined whole but consists of various separate organisations 
that do not cooperate in a structural manner: “There is no need for a validated alternative method without 
the possibility of implementing it within the regulatory domain. On the other hand, it is not possible to deliver 
reliable in vitro methods on demand (…)” (Vandebriel & Opperhuizen, 2011, p. 7).
129  The programmes were evaluated in 2004 (end-evaluation DPB I), 2007 (mid-term evaluation of DPB II), 
and 2011 (evaluation of all DPB programmes, including the mid-term and end-evaluation of DPB III) (Hackenitz, 
2004; ZonMw, 2007, 2011e). 
The success in terms of animal reduction seemed hard to operationalise, especially as the 
impact appeared only to be visible in the long run (Hackenitz, 2004, p. 26).
The number of research animals that can be reduced with these applicable 
three-R models is hard to estimate and not easily quantified. (my translation) 
(ZonMw, 2011e, p. 4).
To overcome the problem of counting research animals, the evaluations involved an 
assessment of the project’s own goals and some general research criteria.130 This type of 
evaluation resulted in extensive reviews of the projects (titles), the number of applicants 
per research call, and the quality of referents’ reports, among others. For example, the 
2011 evaluation provided a large overview of the projects’ percentages in terms of their 
three-R category (p.12), their area of interest (p.13), their position in the knowledge chain 
(p.14), and their success based on the original project’s objective (p. 18) (ZonMw, 2011e).
 
The programmes’ evaluations seemed to address questions with regard to their effectiveness 
in terms of their own goals, which aligns with the level of programme verification in 
Fischer’s framework of policy evaluation (Fischer, 1995; Fischer, 2007b). Concerned with 
the measurements of the efficiency of programme outcomes, the task of this phase is to 
produce a quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of programmes and the extent 
to which the programme is more efficient than the alternative means available (see also 
Chapter 2). In other words, the evaluation of the ZonMw programmes on animal-testing 
alternatives seemed to remain at the first-order level of policy reflection (Grin & Van de 
Graaf, 1996a, 1996b; Schön & Rein, 1994). Programme verification’s level of reflection 
hampers an evaluation of more fundamental issues, including the funding and developing 
of animal-testing alternatives as policy objective in itself (“situational validation”; first-order 
reflection), the infrastructure that requires animal experimentation (“societal vindication”; 
second-order reflection), and the boundaries of innovations (“social choice”; second-order 
reflection) (See also Chapter 7). 
Overall, the first-order level of the programmes’ evaluations appeared to contribute to 
a further technification of the policy issue, as more fundamental issues driving animal 
research were hardly touched on. 
130  The list of evaluation criteria was developed in consultation with the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sports which assigned the programmes (ZonMw, 2005, p. 30).
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter described how the public policy for animal research was implemented in 
research programmes and calls on animal-testing alternatives. It showed that during policy 
development, the increased focus on animal-testing alternatives as a technical solution for 
the social problem of animal experiments reframed the issue as a technical policy problem.
 
The technification process seemed reinforced by a more strict (frontstage) distinction 
between research and policy as part the current emphasis on the instrumental use of 
research in policy (i.e. evidence-based policies and practices, e.g. Bekker et al., 2010). 
Animal research policy was re-interpreted within the programme committees as part of the 
dominant discourse on animal research in the Netherlands (i.e. “scence-setting dimension 
Colebatch, 2009. See also §2.1). The programmes’ understanding of animal-testing 
alternatives was thus a negotiated and temporary fixed understanding of Dutch policy on 
animal research. A frame analysis of the ZonMw programmes on animal-testing alternatives 
showed that animal-testing alternatives became gradually framed as possibilities to 
improve the relevance of research for humans (“issue naming”), ways to generate more 
knowledge of underlying systems (“categorisation”), and a multi-stakeholder responsibility 
(“attributing responsibility”). The rationale behind the research programmes shifted from 
improving research animals’ welfare in the earlier programmes to building a business case 
for improved human relevance (“causal story”). All shifts supported the belief of animal-
testing alternatives as technical solution for the social problem of animal research: The 
delegation of policy implementation to ZonMw research council further technified the 
policy issue. 
Technification helps to smoothen out the implementation process as it renders the most 
intractable policy issues feasible. Framing issues as technical problems (for example, the 
shortage of animal-testing alternatives) creates manageable technical solutions in which 
science takes the lead. As “research councils’ raison d’être is the difficulty of bridging the 
gap between government policy and scientific performance” (Van der Meulen, 2003, p. 
325), the delegation of at least some part of the implementation process - that is the part 
that involves scientific knowledge development - to research councils such as ZonMw 
seems valid. 
Yet, as the policy issue on animal research was already understood as the development of 
animal-testing alternatives during policy development, the responsibility for the success 
of the overall policy programme was also delegated to the research council. Research 
councils are not equipped to take on such a responsibility, regardless of whether this is even 
desirable.131 Nonetheless, the success of the Dutch policy on animal-testing alternatives 
depended predominantly on the success of the research programme(s): The policy 
investments in animal-testing alternatives were expect to pay off in decreasing animal 
numbers in the Netherlands.
Delegating the process of finding a solution to the societal issue of animal research to a 
research council is problematic, because increased technification also implies a (temporary) 
depolarisation of the policy issue and hampers a second-order policy reflection. The focus 
on the development of animal-testing alternatives made the policy issue all about the 
shortage of such alternatives, rather than, for example, an ethical evaluation of the use of 
(research) animals.132 The frame shifts that accompanied the research programmes further 
strengthened the technification of the issue: Research animals were framed as models to 
be reduced, replaced, or refined. Moreover, the programme evaluation remained at the 
first-order level of policy reflection, and as such it ignored, lacked, and missed other, non-
technological fixes for the policy issue of animal research. Other socio-political factors 
limiting the use of alternatives, such as regulatory inertia, editorial power, and the lack of 
knowledge exchange between countries, research fields, and institutions appeared hardly 
addressed (see also Chapter 7). This not only leads to inadequate argumentation supporting 
the development of alternatives to animal testing but also to continuing controversy rife 
with misunderstandings and policy failure. As a result of the delegation of success, the 
depolarisation and lack of policy reflection remain largely invisible at the policy level, and 
by extension for society at large. 
These insights place the new evidence-based policy model in the Netherlands in a different 
perspective as well. The instrumental and linear view of the relationship between research 
and policy overlooks the unstructured and ambiguous nature of many policy problems, 
including animal experimentation, and potentially threatens the delicate balance that is 
needed to produce useable knowledge for doable problems (e.g. Bekker et al., 2010). 
Technification makes policy implementation easier, as it helps to translate (divergent) societal 
values into workable activities and practices, such as research calls and scientific research. 
However, the underlying diverging societal values and expectations still exist, even though 
they have (temporarily) been set aside. Scientific research alone cannot sufficiently meet 
the societal expectations regarding research, including the ones regarding animal-testing 
131  The position and function of research councils along the science-policy nexus is a topic of ongoing 
(scientific) debate (Gulbrandsen, 2005; Gulbrandsen et al., 2011; Hessels, 2010). 
132  Weingart (1999) study on scienti fi c experti se and politi cal accountability argues that the fact that 
many issues put on the political agenda are a product of perception through science, is one evidence of the 
“scientification of politics”.
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alternatives. Technification thus takes the sting out of the debate, but the latter could later 
make a return with a vengeance.133 Following Marleen Bekkers and colleagues (2010), it 
seems that productive research-policy relations need both the frontstage legitimatisation 
and backstage processes that support the co-production of research and policy.
We can conclude that the strict separation between research and policy in delegating policy 
implementation to ZonMw did not justify the persistence of the policy issue of animal 
research. The strong orientation towards science side-lined other actors and strengthened 
the technification of the issue. As such, the emphasis on evidence-based policies (based on 
the rational view) may have contributed to the incongruence between societal expectations 
and (technical) promises regarding animal research and animal-testing alternatives. Without 
guidance and specification, national promises of policy change have a hard time living up to 
the expectations of other actors in the field.134
133  Chapter 7 also discusses the drawbacks of this “technological fix”. 
134  A stricter definition of animal-testing alternatives on the central level of authority (for instance, Parliament) 
is not likely to avoid the gap between societal expectations on a high abstract level and the execution of policy 
(implementation problems), because “making policy is likely to involve participants in different organizations, 
and these may be (outside) the line of hierarchical authority stakeholders” (Colebatch, 2009. p. 26). Instead, 
we need an interactive account of policy making, which stimulates mutual learning between scientists, policy 
makers, users, and the society at large. 
Societal relevance in research 
programmes
Tensions within the Netherlands 
Toxicogenomics Centre
5
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5 Societal relevance in research programmes
Academic researchers are increasingly promising societal benefits in order to secure the necessary resources to carry out their work. However, to achieve societal relevance 
in research programmes is a rather complex endeavour. Scientists often struggle to locate 
the societal relevance of their research, situated between the dominant bibliometric 
assessments of science (e.g. impact factors, track records) and funders’ requirements for 
the valorisation of science (i.e. the value beyond the scientific domain). This struggle may 
lead to tensions in the research programmes and raise questions about the extent to which 
the present system and corresponding indicators can truly advance societal benefits. This 
chapter studies how the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre attempts to live up to the 
societal expectations regarding animal-testing alternatives against the backdrop of the 
changing nature of research funding. 135
The nature of research funding has changed dramatically over the past few decades, 
including the government’s expenditure on R&D and innovation and the changing “contract” 
between science and society (e.g. Hessels, 2010; Martin, 2003). A recent study from the 
Rathenau Institute showed that despite R&D expenditure increasing several times over, 
government support for R&D and innovation will drop in the 2013-2019 period (Van Steen, 
2015).136 The Rathenau Institute forecasts that unless additional investments are made, 
the Dutch government will be providing less direct (e.g. institutional funding) and indirect 
(e.g. tax incentives) financial support for R&D and innovation in a relative sense, and the 
support will not keep pace with economic growth. Yet, the quest for research growth – 
more specifically, the quest for societally relevant research, which lives up to the demands 
and questions of future generations, such as food security, sustainable agriculture, climate 
change and health – seems to be relentless. 
The increasing emphasis on the societal relevance of research seems to require a different 
organisation of science as well. Already, it is generally assumed that the interactions between 
universities, industry and public organisations have intensified over the last decades (e.g. 
Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). For example, intermediary funding organisations demand 
the establishment of so-called public-private partnerships within research programmes. In 
such partnerships, public institutions, such as universities and hospitals, are expected to co-
135 This chapter has been read by one of the workpackage leaders of the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre, 
prof. dr. Aldert Piersma. Piersma is affiliated as a senior reproductive toxicology researcher at the National 
Institute for Public Health (RIVM). The analysis and conclusion are my sole responsibility.
136  Research and development (R&D) is understood as an umbrella term for three types of activities, namely 
basic science, applied science and experimental development. Innovations consist of activities that lead to new 
or vastly improved products, processes and services, or to administrative, organisational innovation within 
organisations or broader social alliances. R&D can also be part of innovative activities and thus is labelled as 
being innovation-relevant. Nevertheless, the report also states that it is not always possible or simple to draw a 
strict distinction between R&D and innovation (Van Steen, 2015, p. 40). 
135
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create knowledge along with private institutions, such as spin-off companies, multinationals 
or NGOs. Based on a strong belief in creating both scientific and economic gains of research 
(“valorisation”), such public-private partnerships are at the foundation of present and 
future Dutch research policies (e.g. OCW, 2014).
Within this changing science-society contract, producing or promising societal benefits 
for academic research plays a vital role in the “credibility cycle” of science (Hessels, 2010; 
Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Such promises could catalyse credibility conversions, especially 
from recognition to money (i.e. the acquisition of research funding). For example, genomic 
research built on the promise to revolutionise our understanding of the human body and 
provide new avenues for medical treatment and biotechnology. As such, this emerging 
technology was able to secure major investments for research in this direction (e.g. the 
prestigious Human Genome Project (HGP)) (Collins, Green, Guttmacher, & Guyer, 2003; 
Zwart, 2008, 2013). 
The Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre (NTC) also built on this idea of revolutionising the 
world by applying “‘omics techniques” in the toxicological research of biochemical hazards. 
In doing so, the NTC claimed it was producing more relevant knowledge about the human 
body and its underlying mechanisms while using fewer research animals than was the 
case in traditional toxicological research. Its societal promise is emphasized in documents 
produced by the programme, as evidenced in the following extract:
The science and practice of safety assessment for drugs, chemicals, cosmetic 
and food is entering a period of revolutionary change today. This emerging 
era of safety assessment will enable better-informed, science-based decision 
making about the risks of substances to human and environmental health. At 
the same time, these next-generation safety assessments hold the promise to 
do so faster, more economically, and by using far fewer animals than current 
safety assessment methods. (NTC, 2007, p. 4. Emphasis added)
With a total budget of over 53 million euros (NTC, 2007), the NTC can be considered a research 
consortium of great magnitude by Dutch standards (and clearly of a different order than 
ZonMw’s programmes on animal-testing alternatives in Chapter 4). It publically legitimises 
its existence by pointing to important societal values, such as the safety and welfare of 
research animals. The question remains how a large research programme incorporates 
such public values into its daily practice, and which tensions scientists experience when 
striving for their work to have societal relevance. For example, the practical application 
of knowledge (e.g. animal-testing alternatives) may create societal benefits, but is hardly 
recognised as a rewarding scientific endeavour. The research question addressed in this 
chapter is:  What sorts of tensions may be developed when large research consortia, such 
as the NTC, strive for their research to have societal relevance?
The following section will outline this chapter’s theoretical framework and method. 
Subsequently, section 5.2 will provide a short introduction to toxicology and toxicogenomics 
in order to understand the general purpose of the NTC research programme. The three 
sections that follow will each examine a tension on a different level: on the public level 
with the public legitimisation of emerging technologies (§5.3); on the level of science 
assessment with the economic valorisation of research (§5.4); and on the level of science 
funding with societal benefits as spin-offs from mainstream research (§5.5). Finally, section 
5.6 concludes the chapter with a look at the implications of these tensions for achieving 
societally relevant research, especially with regard to the development of animal-testing 
alternatives. 
5.1 Promises, performance assessment, and societal relevance 
The increasing demand for societally relevant research has intensified the role of promises, 
especially in relation to society at large and intermediary research organisations.137 Promises 
play an important role in science: They can guide and provide structure to research 
activities, attract the interest of others and cultivate resources (e.g. Borup et al., 2006: 
See also Chapter 2). As such, activities and promises regarding technological developments 
and scientific research form a vital part of the “credibility cycle” of science (Hessels, 2010; 
Latour & Woolgar, 1986).138 Producing or promising societal benefits may thus catalyse 
some of the conversions, especially from recognition to money.
Promises may also legitimise research by providing both the problem (e.g. animal research 
in toxicological research) and the possible solution (e.g. development of animal-testing 
alternatives). As such, promises may develop into requirements to be achieved and into a 
necessity for technologists to work on (i.e. “promise-requirement cycle”) (Van Lente, 1993, 
2000).139 
137  In this research, a promise is understood as the (deliberate) discursive production of a desired future 
by individuals, organisations or a discourse coalition as a whole (‘the sender’). An expectation is defined as a 
created future image as a result of the produced promise (‘the receiver’). See also §2.6.2.
138  The credibility cycle explains how struggles for reputation influence the daily work of individual scientists. 
The model depicts the research process as a repetitive cycle in which conversions take place between money, 
staff and equipment, data, arguments, articles, recognition etc. (Hessels, 2010).
139  This function of promises aligns with that of frames (see also Chapter 2).
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Paradoxically, the societal relevance of research may also be in conflict with scientists’ 
credibility in practice, resulting in various types of tensions: From the more abstract 
relationship with society at large to the practice of doing research. Such tensions develop 
during the execution of research programmes and can therefore be seen as unanticipated 
consequences (after Merton, 1936).
A first type of tension may develop on the public level of the research programme. A 
promissory discourse (“promisomics”) runs the risk of becoming inflated and may entail a 
loss of credibility for science (Chadwick & Zwart, 2013). Such overpromising may form a first 
type of tension within research consortia, especially when societal benefits are deployed to 
legitimise disputed research and technologies. 
A second type of tension may develop on the level of science assessment. While performance 
assessment were initially undertaken as a means to enhance the societal accountability 
of scientists (Van der Meulen & Rip, 2000), such assessments have gradually fuelled 
the “publish or perish norm” in science (e.g. Weingart, 2005).140 Bibliometric tools (e.g. 
science citation index and analysis of impact factors) have added a quantitative dimension 
to the conversion from articles to recognition (Hessels, 2010). In other words, scientific 
publications risk becoming an end in themselves rather than a means of communicating 
scientific findings. 
The concept of “valorisation” has gained importance over the past decade as a way to 
emphasise the value of scientific knowledge beyond the scientific domain - and thus to 
provide an answer to the problems of the more traditional bibliometric tools. Often defined 
as “the process of creating value from knowledge by making knowledge suitable and/or 
available for economic and/or societal use and translating that knowledge into competitive 
products, services, processes and entrepreneurial activity” (National Valorisation 
Commission in Drooge et al., 2013), the concept incorporates the economic as well as (other) 
societal values of research. However, it has largely become narrowly understood in terms 
of universities’ economic contributions through patenting, licensing, spin-off formation and 
technology transfer (e.g. AWT, 2007; Drooge et al., 2011b, 2013).141 The emphasis on the 
economic valorisation and (quantitative) performance assessment of research programmes 
may therefore contribute to a second type of tension in research programmes striving for 
societal relevance.
140  In 1978, the journal Scientometrics was launched as a new medium to stimulate the development of the 
quantitative study of science, or scientometrics.
141  See also (Benneworth & Jongbloed, 2010) for an introducti on on valorisati on, including the realiti es that 
underpin the more limited view of valorisation as universities’ economic contributions and the consequences 
for the arts and humanities. 
Finally, a third tension – and related to the previous one - may develop on the level of 
research execution: especially when more basic research activities lead to more prestigious 
publications than application-orientated projects (Hessels, 2010) and scientists’ interests 
and curiosity diverge from the societal claim of research programmes. At the daily research 
practice, the (claimed) societal relevance of the research may move to the background and 
run the risk of becoming a side product of the programme rather than top priority. This 
poses a third tension for large research programmes: How to balance the societal relevance 
of research in the daily practice, especially when the programme entails diverging societal 
values such as safety, animal welfare and medical progress?
Such tensions or unanticipated consequence reflect the changing ideas about the role 
of science in our society, including the position of research councils, the programming of 
relevant research, and the development of relevant indicators for science evaluation. Barend 
van der Meulen (2003) has shown how the changing contract between science and society 
challenged divisions of the Norwegian Research Council to develop new policy instruments 
and to reconsider their position in relation to science, policy and society. Moreover, the 
term responsible (research and) innovation (RRI) has gained increasingly policy relevance 
over the last years, in particular within the European Commission’s Science in Society 
programmes as part of the EU Horizon 2020 initiative (e.g. EC, 2013a, 2013b) but also in 
Dutch research organisations (NWO, 2013, 2015). RRI seem to house three distinct features: 
the emphasis on the democratic governance of the purpose (e.g. socially and desirable 
ends), the responsiveness (e.g. anticipate on unintended impacts and ethically reflect on 
underlying purposes) and the responsibility (e.g. new responsibilities for policy makers and 
research funders) of research and innovation (Owen et al., 2012). RRI holds the promise 
of a transformation from science in society to “science for society, with society” (Laroche, 
2011 in Owen et al., 2012). Finally, various (Dutch) scholars and institutions are attempting 
to develop relevant indicators for the evaluation of science (e.g. De Jong, Van Arensbergen, 
Daemen, Van der Meulen, & Van den Besselaar, 2011; Drooge & Spaapen, 2011a; Drooge et 
al., 2011b; EriC, 2010b; VSNU, 2013). For example, Leonie Drooge and colleagues developed 
a “4D valorisation model” whose four dimensions (actors, aggregation level, discipline and 
stage) create unique “valorisation maps” for various situations (2011b).
These developments show that the contract between science and society is ever 
developing. An improved understanding of the unintended consequences that occur within 
large research consortia in their quest for societal relevance may help to reflect on the 
functioning of research programming, including the role of research funders, and may 
further the development of relevant indicators as well as.
118  │  Part II - Empirical chapters Chapter 5 - Societal relevance in research programmes   │  119
5.1.1 Interpretive analysis of a research consortium
This chapter’s interpretive analysis focuses on the NTC’s understanding of animal-testing 
alternatives as part of the societal relevance of its research activities. The analysis is built on 
various documents, including public policy documents regarding genomics investment in 
the Netherlands, and the policy documents (e.g. business plan, mid-term reports) of both 
the NTC and the NGI. These documents are considered a temporal fixation of negotiated 
meaning in interaction (e.g. on animal-testing alternatives) between the multiple players 
involved (see also Chapter 2 and 4). In addition, two NTC annual meetings were observed 
(in January 2011 and 2012) for a perspective on the progress being made. 
I conducted nine semi-constructed interviews to gain more insight into the work of the 
NTC programme, the (experienced) role of promises in the funding process and the kind of 
tensions that evolved during the development and execution of the programme. In total, six 
work package leaders of the 5 work packages (indicated as WP leaders NTC 1-6 in the text), 
one Ph.D. student, one senior researcher, one former employee of the NTC and one senior 
researcher involved in the execution of the resolution were interviewed. In addition to the 
official interviews, I spoke to many people who are part of the consortia during the annual 
meetings and postgraduate courses on toxicological risk assessment (October 2009) and 
toxicogenomics (February 2010). Through these courses, I obtained a more detailed and 
technical understanding of genomics as a developing technology, including its potentials 
and limitations and the process of risk assessment. The empirical data were analysed for 
the various levels of tensions as outlined in the previous section: public, science assessment 
and research execution. 
The next section will provide a short introduction to risk assessment, toxicology as a 
scientific discipline and the promises of toxicogenomics.
5.2 A short introduction into risk assessment, toxicology and toxicogenomics142
In everyday life, we rely on the safety of the food products we consume, the medicines we take, 
the chemicals we inhale, the surgeries we undergo, the household products we clean with 
and the cosmetic products we apply to our skin. Such products, medical devices and chemical 
substances need to be tested and verified as safe before they are placed on the market. 
142  This introduction departs from a rather narrow definition of risks and does not do justice to the vast 
number of relevant studies, literature and disciplines. For example, it ignores the social dimension of risk 
acceptance (e.g. Beck, 1992) as well as the negotiated risk of similar events across different countries (i.e. risk 
assessment as “boundary work” in Halffman, 2003, 2005).
Risk assessments are performed to gain more insight into the type of risk such products 
may carry. For instance, the assessments calculate the amount of food additives that can 
be consumed safely on a daily basis, or the time someone can work safely while exposed 
to certain chemicals. The assessment involves the identification of the hazard (the adverse 
effect of the compound), the characterisation of the hazard (a dose-response curve) and an 
assessment of the exposure. The goal of assessments may be to determine the acceptable 
daily intake (ADI) of substances that can be ingested daily throughout life without 
appreciable health risks (WHO, 1987) or otherwise.
Some of these risk assessments involve animal studies. For example, the ADI is determined 
by dividing the No Observed Adverse Effect Level (NOAEL) in research animals by the safety 
factor. This factor needs to compensate for any intraspecies (between sensitive humans 
and population as a whole) and interspecies (between the animal model and the human 
population as a whole) differences. The value depends on the adequacy of the safety 
database and whether the critical effect has been studied in humans. In general, however, a 
safety factor of 100 is maintained (a factor of 10 for both intra- and interspecies differences), 
which results in an ADI that is 100 times lower than the NOAEL in research animals. The 
safety evaluations of substances are conducted within the legislative frameworks of many 
different internationally operating organisations, including the OECD (chemical substances) 
and ICH (pharmaceuticals for human use).
Toxicology is the scientific discipline concerned with determining adverse effects, the dose 
at which something is hazardous, and the biological mechanisms underlying the effect: It 
is “the study of adverse effect of chemicals on living organisms” (Eaton & Klaassen, 2003, 
p. 7). Traditionally, toxicology is dominated by studies on the ‘phenomenological level’ (in 
vivo) in animal studies, such as the effect on organ weight, tumours development and death 
(Shostak, 2005). Toxicological studies are classified according to their point of interest or 
end point, such as reproductive toxicity (i.e. effect on reproductive system and offspring), 
carcinogenicity (i.e. cancer development) and genotoxicity (i.e. DNA damage). In 2013, 
49 335 (9.4%) toxicological studies were reported in the Netherlands (NVWA, 2014, p.18)143 
The majority of these studies reported studies to determine the reproductive toxicity of 
compounds (18 910), followed by teratogenic research (9 884) and sub-acute toxicological 
research (7 216). 
143  Note that this number of research animals does not cover the animals used within, or just at the 
boundaries, of the NTC programme. These animals fall primarily in the category of “answering scientific 
questions”. Moreover, toxicological research primarily involves the “safety assessment of substances”, which is 
stated as a separate goal in the Act on Animal Research (Article 1).
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Of these 49 335 reported toxicological studies, most involved rats (36 849), followed by 
mice (4518) and fish (4169) on a large distance (NVWA, 2014, p. 43. Table 6). Toxicological 
research primarily involves the safety assessment of substances (total of 38 532 studies in 
2013), including substances produced by or intended for industrial use (26 092), potential 
environmentally toxic substances (3 861) and food additives for human consumption 
(2 968) (NVWA, 2014, p. 37. Table 3B). 
Over the years, animal models have become the “golden standard” in risk assessments as 
well as drug development; the majority of the scientific community still regards the value of 
the animal experiments as self-evident.144 Disasters such as the sedative drug Thalidomide 
tragedy145 in the late 1950s have only intensified the use of research animals as “models” 
for humans. Over time, new animal studies have been added to the regulatory system 
and created a “patchwork” system, (e.g. Hartung, 2009a, 2009b). The use of animals in 
the safety assessments of substances is increasingly a topic of debate, especially since 
the relevance of animal models for certain assessments have been questioned, and EU 
regulations leave room for the use of alternatives to animal testing (e.g. Heringa, De Wit-
Vos, Bos, & Hakkert, 2015; Kooijman, 2013; Schiffelers et al., 2014; Schiffelers et al., 2007; 
Schiffelers, 2016 (expected); Vandebriel & Opperhuizen, 2011; Vonk et al., 2015).
Advances in biotechnology have changed the science of toxicology over the past few decades, 
even though many of its work have remained well above the molecular level for a long time 
(Shostak, 2005). The development of a number of technologies that profile changes in genes 
(and gene products) supports the hypothesis of the potential role that individual genes, 
proteins or metabolites play in biological processes (Aardema & MacGregor, 2002; Pennie, 
Woodyatt, Aldridge, & Orphanides, 2001). Genetic and molecular toxicology promised 
“a more comprehensive view of toxicity than has been possible previously, since toxicity 
generally involves (…) a cascade of gene interactions” (Aardema & MacGregor, 2002, p. 
14). In other words, such developments in molecular toxicology promised to open up the 
“black-box” of more traditional, phenomenological, animal-based toxicology. 
The molecularisation of toxicology continued with the emergence of toxicogenomics. It 
was introduced in 1999 as “a new sub-discipline derived from a combination of the fields 
of toxicology and genomics (…) concerned with the identification of potential human 
144  For a background on the use of animal studies in drug development (i.e. safety, efficacy and quality 
assessments of drugs), please refer to the work of Marlous Kooijman (2013) and Peter van Meer (2013) among 
others. Furthermore, Vonk and RIVM colleagues (2015) have taken up a paragraph about the “golden standard” 
of animal tests and draw explicit attention to some of the key problems associated with animal research, 
including disparate animal species, small experimental groups and variations in drug dosing schedules (p. 32).
145  Thalidomide was used to cure morning sickness for pregnant woman. It was withdrawn from the market 
in 1961 after it had caused severe birth defects, including the malformation of newborns’ limbs.
and environmental toxicants, and their putative mechanisms of action, through the 
use of genomics resources” (Nuwaysir, Bittner, Trent, Barrett, & Afshari, 1999, p. 153). 
Toxicogenomics focuses on toxicant-induced gene expression profiles, which can be used as 
a “highly sensitive and informative marker for toxicity” (ibidem). The basic principle is that 
chemical compounds induce (small) changes in gene expression and that such changes can 
be monitored in thousands of genes simultaneously by using what are called microarrays. 
Subsequently, common sets of changes in gene expression unique to that class of toxicants 
are determined, leading to a class-specific “toxicant signature”. The assumption is that a 
comparison of gene expression profiles induced by unknown agents with the established 
signatures can position the unknown agent within a particular class and provide valuable 
(toxicological) information about the substance (e.g. Aardema & MacGregor, 2002; Nuwaysir 
et al., 1999; Sarrif, Delft, Gant, Kleinjans, & Vliet, 2005).
While analysing gene expression levels still dominates toxicogenomics studies, 
developments in ascendant fields have made it possible to study other cellular levels, 
too. At present, toxicogenomics encompasses the broad range of studies of the cellular 
products controlled by the genome, such as proteins (‘proteomics’) and metabolites 
(‘metabolomics’). Together with transcriptomics (transcription levels) and genomics (gene 
expression level), these technologies are commonly referred to as “‘omics technologies” 
(e.g. Aardema & MacGregor, 2002). Collectively, they represent a sort of toolkit that focuses 
on the component most relevant to the research question at hand.
Thus, whereas analysis of gene expression had the ability to predict adverse toxicity 
(genetic toxicology), toxicogenomics promised a great capacity to further the mechanistic 
understanding of toxicant action (Aardema & MacGregor, 2002). It was expected that, by 
using the collective of approaches within toxicogenomics, a better understanding of the 
underlying mechanism would improve the efficiency of safety and risks assessments of 
drugs and chemicals (Hamadeh, Amin, Paules, & Afshari, 2002). In 2002, Raffaella Corvi 
from the European Centre for the Validation of Alternative Methods (ECVAM) wrote 
a short overview of ECVAM’s research areas in which toxicogenomics would initially be 
applied, including the monitoring of cells during in vitro cultures and the identification of 
new molecular endpoints for use in in vitro toxicity testing . Interestingly, Corvi did not 
mention the toxicogenomics potential to reduce animal numbers in risk assessments apart 
from mentioning the overall necessity of research into alternative methods to animal 
experimentation and testing with regard to the EU’s Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (See also §5.5). 
The demarcation of genomics as a new discipline, and of toxicogenomics in particular, was 
also important in terms of allocating new funding opportunities and investments. As Sara 
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Shostak notes in her paper on the emergence of toxicogenomics in the United States, “(...) 
the inclusion of ‘omics’ made clear that this was a genomic, molecularised science. Moreover, 
itself a neologism, ‘toxicogenomics’ signalled that this was a new science, worthy of new 
resources” (Shostak, 2005, p. 374). In the Netherlands, the potential of toxicogenomics 
was formally recognised with the establishment of the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre 
(NTC), part of the larger Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI), in 2004. 
The general hypothesis of this research is that at the higher organisational 
level, it is the toxic perturbation of a rather limited set of integrative biological 
pathways that induces certain human diseases such as generative diseases, 
organ failure and immune disorders, and that this enables the synergetic study 
of comparative mechanisms of toxicity across these biological pathways. 
(NTC, 2007, p. 21)
The next section describes how the understanding of animal-testing alternatives as a 
“business case” created a first tension on the public level.
5.3 Tension on the public level: animal-testing alternatives as ‘business case’ 
A first tension developed on the public level of both research consortia. Here, the societal 
relevance of genomics was used to legitimise the public investments in (at least in some 
respects) a disputed technology. The emphasis on the societal relevance of scientific 
developments was thus deployed to distract attention from other, unwanted, side effects. 
The overall mission of the NTC was “The Tactical Advancement of Applied Systems 
Toxicology” (NTC, 2007). According to the business plan, the key steps towards this 
ambition were focusing on systems toxicology model creation, fostering consortium-level 
collaboration with external partners, strongly emphasising the applied nature of research 
and in particular aligning research goals with the specific needs of governmental safety 
assessment imperatives. This last step made an explicit connection with animal-testing 
alternatives, albeit at some distance in the future: 
NTC’s focus will be on the “applied mechanistic research” to generate 
genomic-based insights and ultimately system toxicology models that will 
enable improved predictive toxicology for humans, the developments of new 
chemical safety assays to Replace, Reduce, and Refine animal models, and 
develop high throughput in vitro tests for use in meeting regulatory needs. 
(NTC, 2007, p. 8. Emphasis added)
The NTC built a strong case by integrating the societal and economic opportunities in one 
research programme. Drawing on some powerful European imperatives for the improved 
safety assessment of chemicals and cosmetics (e.g. REACH and the seventh amendment 
to the Cosmetic European Directive), the NTC articulated the need for its “applied systems 
toxicology paradigm”.146 In addition to this science-orientated case, the NTC created 
a powerful financial case. As forecasted by the Cambridge Healthtech Associates, the 
“economic magnitude” of this global market was expected to increase from 70 million 
euros to more than 200 million euros during the scope of the programme. It was estimated 
that an NTC-derived business enterprise would be able to capture around 15% (equalling 
about 30 million euros) on an annual basis (NTC, 2007). The development of new safety 
arrays was thus reframed as 3R-models (i.e. the replacement, reduction and refinement 
of animal model) with impressive economic potential to create or save money in the 
safety assessments of pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, cosmetics and foods. As such, 
animal-testing alternatives were reframed as a powerful “business case”. 
This reframing of animal-testing alternatives’ development attracted different actors and 
mobilised support from unexpected corners, such as research institutes and chemical 
industries. The interest in animal-testing alternatives’ development was thus no longer 
exclusively reserved for the relatively few animal welfare-driven researchers and other 
animal lovers, but attracted the attention of actors that were primarily interested in the 
human relevance and the economic potentials of such methods (See also chapters 3 and 
4). With the inclusion of toxicogenomics in the discourse of animal-testing alternatives, the 
scope of interested actors expanded greatly. 
The question remains where this ‘economical turn’ in the reframing of animal-testing 
alternatives in the light of genomic research came from. After all, the potential of the 
“genomic era” (e.g. Guttmacher & Collins, 2003) was also expected to put pressure on the 
number of research animals, given the importance of the animal model in applied and 
fundamental areas of biomedical research (e.g. COGEM, CBD, & Gezondheidsraad, 2010). 
5.3.1 Mobilising societal support for contested technologies
The relation between genomics and animal research was part of the Parliamentary debate 
on biotechnology in 2001. On the one hand, the political parties viewed genomics as a 
promising, emerging field worth investing in. Yet, on the other hand, some also feared that 
genomics research would lead to an increase in the number of animals similar to what had 
happened with the introduction of genetic modification in the 1990s. Education, Culture 
146  The emphasis on “applied” and “paradigm” is an action of labelling and reframing, similar to Shostak’s 
observation of genomics as a demarcated discipline.
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and Science Minister Loek Hermans acknowledged a general increase in animal research 
due to genomics but also stressed that the search for animal-testing alternatives would 
eventually lower the use of research animals. 
In general, genomics leads to an increase in experiments. There will be 
additional funding for the search for alternatives. That will cause a certain 
pressure on the use of research animals. However, when alternatives are 
found, and the developments in this area continue, the use of research 
animals will diminish greatly. If there is no need for research animals, they 
won’t be used. With study we hope to reduce the use of research animals 
as much as possible in term. (my translation) (Minister Hermans in Tweede 
Kamer, 2002a) 
The search for animal-testing alternatives was thus used discursively to compensate for the 
increase in overall animal research as a result of genomic research. With societal concerns 
about genetic modification fresh in her memory, Erica Terpstra, a fellow party member of 
the minister, argued that the development of animal-testing alternatives could also help to 
gain social acceptance for biotechnology and genomics. 
Biotechnological research demands much more research animals, but 
biotechnology can also have enormous potential for the development 
of animal-testing alternatives. I believe that the societal acceptance of 
biotechnology and genomics can only be increased by this. (my translation) 
(VVD politician and chair of the temporal committee on biotechnology Erica 
Terpstra in Tweede Kamer, 2002a. Emphasis added)
In February 2002, a resolution that earmarked 900 000 euros of the genomic budget for 
the stimulation of animal-testing alternatives was unanimously accepted by the House of 
Representatives (Tweede Kamer, 2002b, 2002c). The potential of both biotechnology and 
genomics in the light of animal-testing alternatives, and the additional available funding 
in this respect, was thus deployed to legitimise the tremendous amount of public costs to 
stimulate these technologies. Animal-testing alternatives were successfully mobilised to 
gain societal support for potentially disputed emerging technologies.
5.3.2 Inclusion of (toxico)genomics in the 3R-discourse
The implementation of the resolution was mandated to the then newly established 
‘Nationaal Regie-orgaan Genomics’ [‘National Coordinator Genomics’], as the precursor to 
the Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI). A former employee clarified that the ambiguity 
of the resolution left the interpretation up to the NGI.147 
It was quite a multi-interpretable resolution that was accepted. The only 
thing explicitly mentioned was that 900 000 euros were to be spent on 
animal-testing alternatives. However, whether this was to be used for the 
reduction of animals within overall genomics research or genomics could lead 
to technological endpoints, which could reduce the overall use of research 
animals… well, that was left completely up to the NGI. (my translation) 
(Interview former employee NGI, 2011)
According to this former employee, ZonMw was one of the first organisations to contact 
NGI about the allocated money. They suggested adding the money to the already existing 
ZonMw programme DPB (See also Chapter 4). As NGI “wanted to spend the money more 
programmatically and not subsidise some small projects”, they refused this route. Besides, 
NGI regarded themselves as being best equipped for technology development, as they had 
“had the money, the instruments, the knowledge and the network to make different kinds 
of connections”. However, they lacked the expertise on animal-testing alternatives (my 
translation) (Interview former employee NGI, 2011). 
In January 2013, the National Centre Alternatives to Animal Testing (NCA) presented its 
findings as requested by the NGI (NCA, 2003). The NCA advised to pay “structural attention 
to the animal use with respect to genomics” and “to stimulate three-R research within the 
genomic field” (my translation) (NCA, 2003, p. 2). They also advised to prioritise three-R 
research as part of the toxicogenomics developments with a “focus on the development and 
optimisation of in vitro models”. Moreover, the NCA concluded that “the implementation 
of genomics technologies could hold considerable promise for the 3Rs”, but that there was 
still “a long way to go before genomics technologies are converted to 3R output” (Head of 
NCA Professor Hendriksen in Thole, 2004/2005, p. 11).148 
In the end, NGI decided - against the advice of the NCA - to tackle the route of how genomic 
research could live up to the expectation of developing animal-testing alternatives. With its 
characteristic “business approach”, the NGI was convinced that animal-testing alternatives 
were able “to make money” and to “position the Netherlands internationally”. Besides, as 
the former employee explained, 
147  For the sake of clarity, I refer to both organisations as NGI in this chapter. 
148  This report was published by the Netherlands Genomics Initiative as a follow-up to the International 
conference “Genomics & Alternatives to Animal Use”, held 2-4 June 2004 in Maastricht, the Netherlands.
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[W]e did not see how NGI could tackle the problem of animal research within 
genomics research and, well, this route was more attractive and probably 
also a more effective way to spend the money (…). (my translation) (Interview 
former employee NGI, 2011)
Ever since, animal-testing alternatives have “played a role in the rhetoric of the NTC”, 
although over the years the NGI became more reluctant “to position the NTC explicitly 
as the consortium for animal-testing alternatives” (my translation) (Interview former 
employee NGI, 2011).
5.3.3 Creation of the societal promise
In sum, the promise of developing animal-testing alternatives was already deployed at an 
early stage of technology development to legitimise the investment in overall genomic 
research on the policy level. The question was not so much whether genomics research 
would increase the use of research animals, but rather where and by how many. As the animal 
model is deeply embedded in a complex system of many actors, (perceived) regulations 
and strong convictions, it seems highly unlikely that emerging technologies spontaneously 
create animal-testing alternatives and diminish the dependency on the animal model (see 
also Chapter 1 and the need for “chain involvement” to stimulate the implementation 
of animal-testing alternatives in Chapter 3 and 4). The parties’ concerns with regard to 
genomic developments and its pressure on animal research thus seemed reasonable and 
grounded. However, based on the ambiguous resolution with a small amount of funding 
allocated to meet this fear, it seems fair to assume that the resolution and the promise of 
developing animal-testing alternatives were deployed as political leverage to those critical 
of genomics investments, especially with regard to animal research.
The original point of concern moved to the background and became obscured from public 
scrutiny during the implementation of the resolution. Focused on the “business model” 
of research, the NGI was not as interested in diminishing animal experimentation within 
overall genomic research as it was in attracting private partners to research developments 
in the Netherlands. Lacking any political guidance on how to proceed with the resolution, 
the NGI did what it thought was best and what it knew how to do: It created political 
momentum for the further development of toxicogenomics as an emerging technology. 
We may thus conclude that the societal relevance was deployed to legitimise the genomic 
investments, which resulted in a first tension on the public level between the societal 
expectations (e.g. regarding a reduction of research animals) and the technological promises 
of both consortia in this regard. 
5.4 Tension over science assessment: valorisation of research
A second tension developed on the level of science assessment. Here the economic 
valorisation of the programme seemed to take precedence over the societal valorisation149, 
resulting in a tension to achieve the programme’s claimed societal relevance in terms of 
animal-testing alternatives. 
The establishment of the NGI network was built on developing ideas about the relevance of 
science in science policy. As it has evolved over the past decades, science has increasingly 
become understood as the interplay between various types of actors, notably organised 
into public-private partnerships (see also §5.1 and Chapter 2). On paper, all the actors in 
the partnership work together towards a defined goal. Private partners, such as industries, 
SMEs and NGOs can either contribute by sending in personnel and in-house knowledge 
(‘in‑kind’), financial contributions (‘in‑cash’), or both. The assumption of such partnerships 
is that more relevant knowledge is developed, in terms of benefits to the society at large, 
instead of scientific progress per se. The credo is that society has to benefit from science, 
not vice versa. Yet, how this relevance should be understood differs greatly from one actor 
to the next.
The societal value of the NTC’s programme was unmistakably presented in its 2011 progress 
report: 
NTC’s major societal goal is to strive for developing and finding regulatory 
acceptance of ‘omics-based alternatives to current animal models for chemical 
safety testing, with a focus on seeking replacements based on in vitro cellular 
systems. All WPs have set roads in place for that. (NTC, 2011, p. 63)
The progress report described valorisation as the “socioeconomic impact of the work” 
(p.3) and clearly demarcated it from the consortium’s overall advances in toxicogenomics 
research. Following the division of the NGI, the NTC showed the economic value of its 
programme by means of primarily quantitative indicators, such as the number of filed 
patents, the number of reviewed invention disclosures and an overview of the screened 
abstracts and posters for possible intellectual property (NTC, 2011, p. 58-63).
149  I distinguish between “societal valorisation” and “economic valorisation” in order to make a distinction 
between a broad definition of valorisation and the often-used narrow definition of valorisation (e.g. in terms 
of patents and spin-offs). I am aware that such a distinction is problematic as well, as it suggests that economic 
value is demarcated from overall societal value, as in fact it is a selective part of it. 
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In line with the NTC’s major societal goal, the largest part of the section on societal 
valorisation covered the programme’s contribution in terms of “replacements and 
alternatives for animal testing” (p.63-69). An extensive overview was to show the “state of 
affairs” regarding the development of ‘omics-based alternatives into current animal models 
for chemical safety. From the descriptions, it remained unclear, however, in which phase 
these ‘omics-based 3R-alternatives were in relation to their use. Furthermore, apart from 
the organisation of a workshop on genomics in cancer risk assessments and the awarding 
of a ZonMw Pearl, it was not stated what the NTC did in order to get its knowledge (and 
models) with regard to ‘omics-based alternatives beyond the programme’s boundaries (i.e. 
societal valorisation). An exception was their orientation towards the European Centre for 
the Validation of Alternative Methods (ECVAM). The report stated that one protocol was 
sent to ECVAM in November 2010 and promised that more would follow. ECVAM is the 
central organisation for the scientific validation of methods that reduce, refine or replace 
the use of animals for safety testing and efficacy/potency testing of chemicals, biologicals 
and vaccines (EURL-ECVAM, 2015b).150 
Thus, even though the scientific output of the programme seemed to be outstanding and 
convincing, it was unclear what this progress meant in terms of the societal expectation 
of reducing animal research for safety evaluations and regulatory acceptance (i.e. societal 
valorisation). To understand NGI’s interpretation of the societal relevance of their research, 
it seems vital to look into NGI’s – as the main funder of the NTC – understanding of societal 
relevance. 
5.4.1 NGI’s understanding of valorisation
The NGI required a fundamentally different mind-set from their researchers than did other, 
more traditional, government-based subsidies of scientific research (e.g. ZonMw, see also 
Chapter 4). Built on a business model of science, the NGI emphasised the importance of the 
150  ECVAM is now known as the European Union Reference Laboratory for Alternatives to Animal Testing 
(EURL ECVAM). Scientific validation of EURL-ECVAM is only demanded upon official regulatory acceptance, 
such as the uptake in the European Pharmacopoeia – which defines requirements for the qualitative and 
quantitative composition of medicines, the test to be carried out on medicines and substances and materials 
used in their production – or in the legal frameworks of biocides (Regulation (EC) No 528/2012), detergents 
(Regulation (EC) No 648/2004), veterinary medicinal products (Directive 2001/82/EC, supplemented with 
changes in Directive 2004/28/EC and Directive 2009/9/EC), among others. Note, however, that validation does 
not equal the acceptance and use of such methods (e.g. Kooijman, 2013; Schiffelers et al., 2007; Schiffelers, 
2016 (expected)). Non-EURL-ECVAM alternative methods may thus already be used for screening, or other 
purposes, as long as this poses no direct legal consequences. For example, chemical industries may already 
use non-validated alternatives for the screening of potential candidates. Recently, the RIVM published a report 
stating that nine out of the 10 studied EU legal frameworks for the safety assessment of chemical substances 
pose no legal barriers for the use of alternatives in animal testing (Heringa et al., 2015). Moreover, a second 
RIVM report showed that existing pharmaceutical legislation does not impose any legal constraints on the use 
of alternatives to animal testing, but also concluded that such legislation does not actively encourage the use of 
these alternatives either (Vonk et al., 2015).
return on investments besides the overall scientific output of the consortium. It proposed an 
“incubator model”, in which new public-private partnerships were to be created, financially 
stimulated during a certain period and subsequently embedded in the Dutch life sciences 
and technology infrastructure. 
In 2011, the Review Committee of NGI’s second phase (2008-2013) concluded that “overall, 
the Review Committee’s view is that output is higher and has more impact than originally 
planned and has thereby exceeded expectations” (Technopolis Group, 2011, p. 5).
The Dutch genomics community has made a remarkable awareness shift 
towards understanding the value of valorisation and intellectual property, 
while industry has shown growing engagement by increased participation in 
the various programmes. The success factors for this development are the 
reinforced valorisation effect of NGI in (almost) every centre, including the 
targeted valorisation budget. (….) The realisation of the economic targets 
set for each NGI centre (such as patents, spin-offs, new public and private 
projects) is very well on track. (Technopolis Group, 2011, 5 and 10. Emphasis 
added)
The societal valorisation of the overall NGI programme seemed more difficult to measure 
and evaluate, as indicated by the absence of indicators in the report. It was foremost 
understood as “communication towards society” (p. 12) and the work of the Centre for 
Society and Genomics (CSG). As measured by the numbers of non-scientific publications 
and presentations, public debates, educational activities, clinical applications, new products 
and advisory reports, the NGI concluded that “the diverse and numerous social valorisation 
activities contribute to a greater understanding of genomics and its relevance” (NGI, 2011). 
Apparently, societal valorisation was primarily understood as a way to explain genomics 
to the general public. In science communication literature, such linear models are known 
as the “deficit model” or the “Public Understanding of Science (PUS) model” (e.g. Durant, 
1993; Van der Auweraert, 2008; Van Rijswoud, 2014). These dominant models in science 
communications are built on the assumption that improved science literacy of the public, 
as based on scientific facts and possibilities, informs the public and reduces the public’s 
resistance towards science.
The NGI’s narrow understanding of societal valorisation hampered a more thorough 
evaluation of the relevance of the NTC research with regard to the societal promise of 
developing animal-testing alternatives. Tailor-made indicators to measure the progress 
in this respect were generally missing in the progress reports, with the exception of the 
NTC’s own mention of the ECVAM report filing. Based on this indicator, however, it should 
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have been concluded that the societal promise of developing ‘omics-based alternatives for 
regulatory acceptance lagged behind expectations.151 
5.4.2 Problems during the daily research practice
The NGI’s emphasis on economic valorisation also created tensions in the daily practice of 
researchers, especially with regard to the reward system of science and the societal promise 
of developing animal-testing alternatives. 
The NGI requirements contributed to a simplified image of science, in which researchers 
deliver the project’s results before moving on to the next. One of the work package leaders 
felt that the appearance of a strict separation between different research activities was 
destructive and created problems with intellectual property (IP) of research. 
The making of the reporter cell lines started 10, 11 years ago with 
transcriptomics. It all just took far longer than we had anticipated beforehand. 
(…) It is impossible to think, now I’m working for the NTC, and half an hour 
later, now I’m working for STW, that is not how it works, of course. It is a 
continuous process. (…) That is the difficulty of dividing intellectual property 
among projects and funders, because who owns which IP? It’s all public 
funding. Why all the fuss? (my translation) (Interview work package leader 
NTC 1, 2012)
Besides, the funders’ and society’s demands are not always perceived as rewarding from 
a scientific perspective. For example, patenting “delays the publication process”, whereas 
the ECVAM application process “takes a really long time” and “does not have the highest 
priority” (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 2, 2011). It seems that the 
funder’s demands thus conflict in some respect with the daily practice of doing science, 
especially when it comes down to those aspects that are not necessary science-awarding. 
Secondly, the NGI’s emphasis on creating economic value had unintended consequences 
for the practice of research, especially with regard to the predictive value and the potential 
regulatory acceptance of ‘omics-based tests. For example, the patenting of certain gene 
profiles requires the lowest number of genes possible to avoid patent infringement, while 
this may conflict with the scientific predictive value of the gene profile. A work package 
151  It must be said that the filing of a dossier to ECVAM is not the holy grail of indicators, as “you will need 
a file for the OECD with a well-validated test, but that does not necessarily have to be done by ECVAM. You 
can also organise it yourself with other labs” (Interview commercial partner NTC, 2012). Yet, this same person 
acknowledged, in the light of animal-testing alternatives, that the filing of the dossier to ECVAM or OECD “might 
be more important”. 
leader, involved in the patenting of such a gene profile, explained it to me as follows: 
The test involves 2x20 genes, but the eventual patent is about 2x3 genes. The 
reason for this is that patenting is vulnerable. Not expensive, but vulnerable, 
because others can change one gene in the profile without causing patent 
infringement. (…) Those three genes have a bit lower predictive value than 
the 20 genes, though. (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 
2, 2011)
Furthermore, there was some tension within the consortia about the possibility of the 
patenting of gene profiles as such hampering the regulatory acceptance of ‘omics-based 
tests, which would work directly against the societal promise of developing animal-testing 
alternatives. One of the NTC work package leaders, who was also involved in the regulatory 
acceptance of animal-testing alternatives, said he experienced this “split” and was still 
uncertain how to deal with it:
[T]he OECD152 has guidelines on how to do toxicological research. Those 
guidelines hardly involve patents, because once they do so, the OECD actually 
says: “you need to use that particular test of that company”, and they won’t 
do that. So they prefer tests that are not patented at all. (…) On the one hand, 
the NGI wants all sorts of products on the market with economic value. One 
of the vehicles to do so is patenting, and that is what we do. (…) Yet, I don’t 
understand it from the perspective of regulators who want an OECD test.  
(my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 3, 2012)
On the other hand, others believed that there was no reason for concern in this respect, 
especially as patents are very common in the modern life sciences. 
Patents are everywhere, so why should the alternative tests not be allowed 
patents? (my translation) (Interview commercial partner NTC, 2012)
However, this man also acknowledged the difference and a certain “tension” between a 
more generic patent, like a “new way to read out genes” and a more innovative patent 
152  The OECD refers to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Its mission is “to 
promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world” (OECD, 
2015a).
The OECD has published many Test Guidelines which require the use of research animals, including the 
Herhberger Bioassays in rats (TG441) and the Amphibian Metamorphosis Assay (TG 231) for the screening or 
testing of chemicals for endocrine disruptions (OECD, 2015b).
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based on a particular “mechanism and the involvement of particular genes”. Furthermore, 
he stressed that the value of the patent depends on the buyer as well, “you may have patents, 
but who is going to buy these?” (my translation) (Interview commercial partner NTC, 2012). 
Thus while it remains unclear whether patenting gene profiles truly obstruct the regulatory 
acceptance of ‘omics-based 3R-tests, it seems at least worthwhile to look into the dynamics 
of patenting on the one hand and the development and (regulatory) acceptance of patent-
based tests on the other hand prior to the establishment of new research requirements 
related to animal-testing alternatives. 
5.4.3 The struggle for societal relevance
The societal relevance of scientific research is rapidly growing in importance, especially to 
secure research funding. Balancing and achieving this societal relevance, however, seems 
more difficult in practice than on paper, both for the researcher and the funders of research. 
Because how does one evaluate what societal relevance means in the light of individual 
projects? This section showed that the NGI has emphasised the economic valorisation of 
research, supported by the “incubator model”, over societal valorisation. Furthermore, its 
rather ill-defined definition of societal valorisation functioned primarily to explain genomics 
research to the public (i.e. Public Understanding of Science). 
With this narrow definition of societal relevance and the complex network of animal 
research, the NGI seemed under-equipped to evaluate the societal relevance of the NTC 
progress in relation to its jointly shaped promise of developing animal-testing alternatives. 
They simply did not have the in-house expert knowledge of the systems in which the NTC’s 
research was to be embedded, especially not with regard to the (regulatory) acceptance of 
‘omics-based tests. Hence, custom-made indicators to evaluate the progress on this level 
were lacking.153 To this end, the NGI more or less relied on the NTC in its efforts to live up to 
jointly shaped societal expectations.
In the dynamics between conducting scientific research and securing research funding, 
however, this reliance poses a serious threat to the development of animal-testing 
alternatives, let alone the societal expectation of reducing animal numbers. Positioned in a 
system that expects delivery in the short term, researchers are likely to choose the activity 
that best secures the near future. As long as both the reward systems of science pay little 
153  It is fair to note that it is not necessarily up to the NGI alone to develop such custom-made indicators. 
Measuring the progress regarding animal-testing alternatives is rather difficult and currently a topic of debate 
(e.g. Van Zijverden et al., 2013b). Yet, and especially with regard to the legitimisation of the societal promise of 
research programmes, research funders also have a responsibility to measure, contribute to and achieve the 
societal relevance of scientific research. 
attention to the societal valorisation of research and the funder’s requirements mainly 
emphasise economic valorisation, it seems rather unlikely that researchers will employ 
those activities that are needed to secure direct societal benefits (e.g. development of 
animal-testing alternatives). 
We can thus conclude that the funder’s emphasis on economic valorisation and the science 
rewarding systems (e.g. bibliometric analyses) may produce tensions on the level of science 
assessment in the orientation towards societal relevance. 
5.5 Tension in the execution: developing ‘animal-testing alternatives’
A third tension developed on the level of research execution as the development of animal-
testing alternatives was by many NTC researchers understood as a side product of other 
more mainstream research. 
The scope of the NTC programme was said to cover possible application in the fields of 
pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, cosmetics and foods. Yet the question remains how 
the work package leaders within the NTC interpreted the “development of applied system 
toxicology methods” with a “substantial reduction in the use of animal-based tests” (NTC, 
2007, p. 7) in their work. 
Against the backdrop of the European REACH154 enforcement in 2007, some NTC partners 
focused on the alternative methods for regulatory toxicology. REACH came into force on 1 
June 2007. It was adopted to improve the protection of human health and the environment 
against the risks that chemicals can pose. In principle, REACH applies to all chemical 
substances, including those used in industrial processes, cleaning products, paints, as well 
as clothes and furniture. REACH affects a wide range of companies across many sectors, 
including manufacturers, importers and downstream users (e.g. ECHA, 2015). The regulation 
was expected to have a great impact on the number of research animals, because of the 
additional animal testing that is required. The exact impact of the regulation, however, 
differed significantly between the EU Institute of Health and Consumer Protection’s “2.6 
million vertebrate test animals (mammals, birds and fish) over a time period of 11 years” 
in 2004 (Van Der Jagt, Munn, Tørsløv, & De Bruijn, 2004) and the Transatlantic Think Tank 
for Toxicology’s (T4) “54 million vertebrate animals” in 2009 (Rovida & Hartung, 2009). Yet, 
both estimates agreed on the huge percentage to be used for reproductive toxicological 
endpoints. 
154  REACH stands for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (ECHA, 2015). 
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REACH legislation was enforced, which also showed that the required 
reproduction test, such as the two-generations studies, required by far the 
most research animals. When developing alternatives, it therefore seems 
logical to think about this area. Overall, you need about 60% of all research 
animals for these kinds of tests: adult animals, as well as their offspring. (my 
translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 4, 2011)
According to the ECHA, REACH also promotes alternative methods for the hazard 
assessments of substances in order to reduce the number of tests on animals (ECHA, 2011). 
Alternative test: alternative techniques that can provide the same level of 
information as current animal tests, but which use fewer animals, cause less 
suffering or avoid the use of animals completely. Such methods, as they become 
available, must be considered wherever possible for hazard characterisation 
and consequent classification and labelling for intrinsic hazards and chemical 
safety assessment. (ECHA, 2011, p. 7)
The researchers used the NTC programme to further validate the tests they had been 
working on for years in order to make the test more sound and robust, and to convince the 
regulators of their relevance. 
What we try to do is to scientifically, mechanistically characterise these tests, 
so that we know what happens. Is what happens in the test really relevant for 
what happens in the research animal? If we can show the relevance, then we 
may be able to convince the regulator that it is useful to use the alternative 
test. Maybe not as a complete substitute, but perhaps in some sort of pre-
stage, that one pre-screens the substance in an in vitro test, or a battery of in 
vitro tests, and that one subsequently decides whether or not to test in vivo 
and how to do that. (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 4, 
2011) 
For others, this optimising stage was still a bridge too far. They used ‘omics technologies in 
the process of “hazard identification” to optimise their animal studies and thereby reduced 
the number of animals per study. 
At this moment, I see the potential of genomics technologies primarily in 
the hazard identification and the reduction of animal use in the subsequent 
steps. We already have experience with this in our own institute (…) With 
this foreknowledge we can design animal studies with fewer animals. We are 
able to look more specifically into the parameters found during the hazard 
identification process. The intention is to use this for risk characterisation 
processes. (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 5, 2012)
Yet, other work package leaders seemed to apply ‘omics technologies for a better 
understanding of biological mechanisms with no direct reference to the development of 
animal-testing alternatives. 
We start from an understanding of the mechanisms of disease to define drug 
targets and the development of compounds that are directed at those targets. 
(…) The cell model we use is not a validated system that everyone can use and 
that is for the regulatory toxicology of great importance, of course. A cell system 
of which everyone says, this is the method to predict whether or not something 
is hazardous. (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 6, 2012)
Look, one can only really measure cancer in an animal or a human. We look at 
the cancer characteristics that we know cause cancer and are related to it. But 
that is a very big step, which cannot be replicated in a cell tissue system. (…) 
We are just busy developing better systems that really tell us something about 
a substance and how we can relate that to cancer research. (….) You don’t 
look at cancer, you never look at cancer. I look at what piques the attention of 
a little reporter. (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 1, 2012)
The advantages of ‘omics based tests were, at least to some researchers, based on the pre-
screening of the numerous amount of compounds within industries.
The future is about whether we can find interested companies for our test: 
companies that screen 10 000, 100 000 molecules for certain pharmaceutical 
characteristics (…) because many substances are excluded based on tests that 
may not even be predictive. Then they throw away substances that could 
have made billions in profit. So we think we can play a role in that niche. (my 
translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 1, 2012)
The researchers involved in the NTC thus differed in their interpretation of ‘omics in relation 
to the development of animal-testing alternatives. Most researchers interpreted the model 
development as ways to “unravel” and “understand” mechanisms underlying disease and 
toxic responses, whereas others used the ‘omics potential to optimise their previous work 
on alternatives for regulatory purposes or to gain more knowledge in order to refine animal 
experiments. 
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5.5.1 Ambiguous relation with animals as models
In the light of the NTC’s claim of contributing to and developing animal-testing alternatives, 
it is interesting how animals are positioned both within and just outside the NTC programme 
and involve the same partners. 
The NTC business plan already showed the diverging and sometimes ambiguous relationship 
with animals in general, and animals as “biological models” in particular, among the different 
work packages (WPs). For example, mouse models were used to “expand our database 
of in vivo gene expression data” (WP1), whereas further studies in rodents were used as 
follow-up from the in vitro phase to compare selected genes and pathways with classical 
endpoints (WP2). The zebra fish developmental assay was used as an alternative to the 
mammalian embryo culture, and in vitro work was “supplemented with dedicated testing 
in the pregnant rodent to establish the relevance of the in vitro findings” (WP3). Blood 
samples from patients were compared with similar samples from mice and rats treated 
with the same drug (WP4), in addition to the use of “wild types” and specific transgenic 
mice to study organ toxicity (WP4) (NTC, 2007). These plans highlighted the importance 
of “animal models” in the NTC’s interpretation of developing animal-testing alternatives. 
Apparently, according to them, the contribution and development of alternative methods 
required more research animals. 
The use of additional animal research to optimise models puts the work of the NTC - and 
that of many other programmes - in a strange light. While strictly speaking the partner’s 
work outside the programme exceeds the NTC’s responsibility, it highlights an important 
tension when developing animal-testing alternatives. After all, it can be debated whether 
additional animal work to “increase patent value” (Interview work package leader NTC 
6, 2012) or to make “3D screenings models” based on human tumours (Interview work 
package leader NTC 1, 2012) is actually valid.
What we want eventually, for the reporters as well, is to make new mouse 
models. That is impossible within the alternative programmes; they won’t 
pay for that. No, I really want a mouse model with the reporter that predicts 
the carcinogenicity of a certain compound. Then I would like to show in a 
mouse that if the substance led to liver tumours, the reporter would primarily 
turn on in the liver as well. Such information can then be taken back to the 
reporter model to validate (…) to make even better reporters that better 
predict cancer. Preferably in vitro so I wouldn’t need mice at all, but I have 
to show in the mouse that it works first. (my translation) (Interview work 
package leader NTC 1, 2012)
Moreover, the technological possibilities in themselves do not replace the use of research 
animals in safety evaluation and toxicological research all together. Besides, the existence 
of false positives (the test tests positive but should have tested negative) and false negatives 
(the test tests negative but should have tested positive) may pose a problem to the full 
acceptance of in vitro models. 
Eventually, all substances in need of market approval will be tested in research 
animals. You would want a system that is just as good as everything tested in 
rats and mice, that it all be negative. Then you could say, “my in vitro system 
is so good, there is no false positive”. On the other hand, you could also say, 
“it is too stringent, and no substance passes”. That is something you don’t 
want either. So you always have more false positives and false negatives than 
what you would like to achieve. (my translation) (Interview work package 
leader NTC 1, 2012)
The interpretations above highlight the complexity of developing animal-testing 
alternatives, especially as follow-up animal studies are needed to optimise in vitro models, 
whose likelihood of being accepted remains highly uncertain. Moreover, it also suggests 
the need for a systemic change (e.g. regulatory toxicology) in additional to the technical 
development itself. Apparently it is rather difficult to develop relevant and valid indicators 
to measure the societal relevance of programmes such as this one.
5.5.2 (Ir)relevance of research models
With regard to the societal promise of animal-testing alternatives, it is important to look at 
the researchers’ stated motives in their search for alternative research models. Note that 
alternative models do not necessarily equal animal-free or three-R models here.
Whereas all researchers emphasised the human irrelevance of animal models to some 
extent, the researchers differed in what they perceived to be the better alternative for their 
research. For example, some stressed the limited relevance of classic animal studies for 
human risk assessment. Their search for alternative models was driven by a more realistic, 
refined assessment of health risks. 
During the risk assessment process with research animals, you come across 
all sorts of problems. Animal experiments are generally performed with an 
extremely high dose, which humans would never be exposed to. Subsequently, 
those results are extrapolated to values realistic to the situation in which 
humans are exposed. (…) The more precise the extrapolation, and the better 
one can take away the uncertainties, the better it is. If you know more about 
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the working mechanism, if you have sensitive biomarkers (...) you’re a step 
ahead. (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 5, 2012)
Yet, others questioned the relevance of basic ‘omics technologies (i.e. transcriptomics) 
with regard to the mechanistic understanding. Here the search for an alternative model 
was grounded in the belief that a more mechanistic understanding would be of greater 
relevance to the biological, human system. 
What does decreased gene expression mean in a biological sense? What 
we try to do with functional genomics, eventually, is to turn off individual 
genes with DNAi and study which genes are relevant to the biology. (…) If one 
understands what a substance does, which proteins are involved, well, then 
we also understand the system better and can classify substances as either 
bad or good. (my translation) (Interview work package leader NTC 6, 2012)
It is possible to have three times more transcription and 20 times more protein, 
or 20 times more RNA and three times more protein, or 10 times more RNA 
without more proteins, so there is a lot of variety. (my translation(Interview 
work package leader NTC 1, 2012)
Finally, some emphasised the difficult position of animal models in general. On the one 
hand, they argued that animal models were irrelevant to study the human response, 
because such models lacked certain important human features, but they also stressed, on 
the other hand, that animal models were still needed to answer more in-depth questions, 
for instance about immunology. 
Well, can the mouse skin predict what would happen in the human skin? 
Mouse skin is much thinner and has much more hairs than human skin. 
Besides, there are certain repair enzymes present in the human skin that are 
not present in the mouse and vice versa. So there are quite a few differences 
between mice and humans that are also visible in the mouse study’s results. 
They cannot be applied to the human situation in practice. (my translation) 
(Interview senior scientist NTC, 2011)
It is a struggle between two thoughts, because mouse models can answer 
different questions that cannot be answered in the skin model. We can hardly 
include patients in our studies. (…) A skin model doesn’t have T and B cells, 
and if you want to reconstruct that in a skin model, that is very difficult and 
way beyond the truth as well, I think. (..) Besides, the longevity of a skin 
model is only a few weeks, and skin cancer develops in five to 10 years. (my 
translation) (Interview senior scientist NTC, 2011)
5.5.3 Animal-testing alternatives as side products of mainstream research 
In sum, researchers in the NTC programme adhere to a widespread interpretation of animal-
testing alternatives in their daily work practice and research projects. Whereas some try 
to improve the relevance of their earlier developed models for regulatory toxicology by 
including more sensitive ’omics-based biomarkers, most researchers still found themselves 
a long way from of any test application. They seemed not so much interested in test 
applications as in developing models that could better understand and predict human 
response. It can thus be concluded that in the daily research practice of individual 
researchers, other goals prevail over the development of animal-testing alternatives for 
risk assessment or regulatory toxicology. 
Within the NTC, the search for alternative models was not seen as a separate activity 
or even a research field but as a “welcome spin-off” of other, more dominant research 
developments enhancing the mechanistic understanding of the human body (“third-
generation alternatives”; see also §3.3.2 and §4.3.3).
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter studied which tensions developed within the Netherlands Toxicogenomics 
Centre in its quest to produce societally relevant knowledge, e.g. the development of 
animal-testing alternatives.
Firstly, the possibilities of establishing animal-testing alternatives played a crucial role 
in the societal legitimation of genomics research in the Netherlands in general, and of 
toxicogenomics in particular. With the increase in research animals’ numbers resulting from 
genetic modification in the 1990s still fresh in mind, it was anticipated that the allocation 
of some funding for animal-testing alternatives could help emerging technologies, such 
as genomics, to achieve societal acceptance. During the implementation process of this 
allocation, the developments regarding toxicogenomics were used to make a new package 
deal. The societal promise of improving the safety assessment with fewer animals while 
simultaneously gaining economical wins pulled the contested public debate on animal 
research out of its impasse. Developing alternatives was no longer limited to a handful 
of dedicated animal lovers but opened the door for new players to enter the arena. This 
positioning of toxicogenomics strengthened the societal expectation that the newly 
established the NTC would deliver models that could diminish the number of research 
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animals in risk assessment. The legitimisation of disputed research activities by pointing to 
the societal benefits poses a first tension in the programme. 
Secondly, the NTC struggled to live up to the funders’ expectations regarding the valorisation of 
research. In line with more recent trends in research funding, the NGI emphasised a “business 
model approach” for doing science. They seemed primarily interested in the scientific and 
economic progress of the centres, as indicated by the emphasis on the numbers of published 
articles, dissertations, patents and spin-offs. The NGI’s interpretation of societal valorisation 
was rather narrowly defined as the public understanding of science and mostly included the 
centre’s effort with regard to science communication as measured by their non-scientific 
articles, among others. As both the NGI and the NTC claimed to value the societal valorisation 
of research, it is remarkable that the development and finding regulatory acceptance was 
not an integral part of the evaluation process and that there were no indicators in place to 
evaluate the progress in this regard. The absence of ways (e.g. relevant indicators) to evaluate 
the societal valorisation of research poses a second tension in the programme. 
Thirdly, the research for 3R-alternatives becomes increasingly a “welcome spin-off” of other 
research. The advantage is that the search for such methods becomes integrated along the 
full range of scientific disciplines, instead of in a separate and scientifically uninterested 
subfield. The downside, however, is that far more research will be labelled as “alternative 
research”, which complicates the visualisation of progress in this respect.155 As such, the 
decision between dedicated or mainstream research development poses a third tension in 
the programme.
Overall, the acceptance of toxicogenomics within the alternative-discourse thus strengthens 
the shift towards the development of “third-generation alternatives”. This interpretation of 
animal-testing alternatives underscores the importance of understanding the underlying 
working mechanisms in the human body. While the focus on the “target organism” may 
surely be of great importance to advance knowledge of the human body, it remains 
uncertain whether existing animal models will actually be replaced or supplemented by 
such additional technological possibilities, and therefore, the effect on animal numbers 
remains unclear.
Moreover, the relevance of toxicogenomics for the screening of new compounds means 
these developments are now facing an even more complicated tension. As the system of 
155  In this respect, it would be refreshing to visualise the percentage of other types of funded research (i.e. 
other research programmes, or health funding organisations) that would also be granted under the present 
discourse of alternative research. 
risk assessment is not likely to change as rapidly as the emerging technologies develop, the 
contribution of ‘omics-like technologies may lead to a relative reduction but hampers an 
absolute reduction of research animals. In other words, the number of animals per test or 
substance may be reduced by including ‘omics-based parameters, but this leaves the total 
number of research animals untouched. 
Thus, the inclusion of toxicogenomics in the alternative-discourse has silently moved 
the scientific interpretation of alternative models even farther away from the societal 
expectation of reducing animal numbers by developing animal-testing alternatives. 
The tensions that developed during the execution of the NTC programme also opens up 
the (governmental) initiatives to develop animal-testing alternatives to public scrutiny. 
Surely, there are still many technical hurdles to overcome and fundamental questions to 
answer, not least of all is the extent to which the ‘omics-yielded data can be used to predict 
human responses of unknown substances. After all, increased DNA transcription does not 
necessarily lead to increased protein production, and increased protein production does not 
necessarily lead to an increased (toxicological) response. Even after decades of research, the 
mechanistic foundation of ‘omics technologies still seems to be in their infancy. However, 
regardless of the uncertainties, ‘omics technologies are increasingly applied in important 
fields in the natural sciences, including the life sciences (e.g. cancer and food research) and 
chemical sciences (e.g. toxicological and safety research). 
The expectation seems that the availability of data from various sources, including for 
example omics-technologies and system biology (i.e “big data”), and the possibilities 
of emerging technologies such as organ-on-a-chip and organoids will increase our 
understanding of the human body.156 It seems highly unlikely that such technological 
progress depends on the development of animal-testing alternatives initiatives in order to 
flourish. However, initiatives to develop animal-testing alternatives are easily redirected to 
advance technologies and the mechanistic understanding of the human body. 
156  In short, system biology refers to the computational and mathematical modelling of complex biological 
systems, including humans. Organ-on-chip (e.g. long-on-a-chip, heart-on-a-chip) is a multi-channel 3D 
microfluidic cell culture chip that stimulates the activities, mechanism and physiological responses of entire 
organs and organ systems (see for example the Dutch start-up Mimetas). An organoid is a 3D organ bud grown 
from (human) stem cells that still have the possibilities to differentiate into different cell types (see for example 
the Dutch Hubrecht Organoid Technology not-for-profit organiszation). 
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The real, more fundamental question thus remains whether small research projects such 
as the one funded by ZonMw (see also Chapter 4) or large research consortia such as the 
NTC can truly advance animal-testing alternatives and have ensure they live up to the 
societal expectation of decreasing animal numbers, or whether they are merely an excuse 
to reassure the public. 
Without public deliberation on societal relevance and the values grounding research 
programmes such as the NTC, their activities and outcome are unlikely to meet the public’s 
expectations of the societal relevance of science. Even though the production of new 
package deals, such as the NTC’s combination of safety and animal-testing alternatives, may 
successfully attract new support and secure research funding, it may also create tensions 
on various levels. As such, the claimed societal relevance of research programmes may 
even, paradoxically, widen rather than bridge the gap between science and society in this 
respect. 
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6 Vulnerability of discourse coalitions The support for animal-testing alternatives as an answer to the societal concerns regarding animal experimentation appears to be deeply rooted in the Dutch policy-science 
nexus (i.e. Dutch policy in Chapter 3, research councils and programmes in Chapter 4, and 
research consortia in Chapter 5). Yet, it seems that this “normative horizon” is starting to 
look more diffuse. The quotations below, which come from a parliamentary debate in 2013, 
reveal that there is no such thing as political consensus on the issue of animal research and 
that investment in animal-testing alternatives is valued rather differently from one political 
party to the next.
Reduce, replace and refine is a nice approach of which nobody can disapprove. 
But let’s be clear, acceleration should be part of the list. (Party for Freedom 
MP Dion Graus) 
If we do not know the effects of the present policy, we can talk all we want, 
but I wonder what we are doing. (GreenLeft Party MP Jesse Klaver)
At the same time, some spokesmen ask: What is a high budget? That is a 
political choice; I see that. (State Secretary of Economic Affairs, Sharon 
Dijksma) (my translation) (All quotations from Tweede Kamer, 2013)
The political debate also reveals a lack of consensus with respect to the effectiveness of 
current animal research policy in the Netherlands. Tied to a disappointingly limited decrease 
in animal numbers over the past decade, the policy seems to have lagged behind societal 
expectations. Animal-testing alternatives no longer seem to be a shared value but a topic 
for further political debate.
Building on the empirical work from the previous chapters, this chapter studies how the 
discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives initially was able to accommodate a large 
variety of actors, values and goals but now seems to be falling apart. The research question 
addressed in this chapter is the following: How can the present tensions in the discourse 
coalition be explained in the light of the discursive processes that formed the coalition in 
the first place? 
In this chapter, I will argue that the vulnerability of the discursive processes that helped to 
establish a new discourse on animal-testing alternatives, as well as the current tensions 
within the discourse coalition, seem to be taking their toll. The present discourse coalition 
is facing its limits.
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A better understanding of the discursive processes that enabled the formation of the 
discourse coalition in the first place and insight into the tensions to which the coalition is 
presently exposed may help to explain the appearance of the blurry horizon at present and 
restore its former clarity. 
The next section describes the theoretical notions needed for overall analysis in this chapter. 
Section 6.2 describes how a new discourse on animal research dislocated the previous one, 
making way for a discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives. The chapter continues 
in section 6.3 with the discursive processes that enabled this new discourse coalition, 
including the vulnerabilities of these processes. Section 6.4 looks into the tensions to 
which this discourse coalition is exposed at present. The chapter concludes with some final 
remarks and builds towards concrete policy improvements that will be laid out in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Discourse, discourse coalitions and the co-creation of promises and expectations
The discourse analysis central to this chapter builds on the theoretical framework of 
discourse, discourse coalitions and the co-creation of promises and expectations as outlined 
in the previous chapters (and especially §2.3).
As a reminder of the theoretical notions introduced in chapter two, discourse coalitions are 
understood as “the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, 
and the practices that conform to these story lines, all organised around a discourse” (Hajer, 
1993, p. 47). A discourse coalition is centred around a specific discourse and may entail 
a variety of actors, including NGOs, political parties, scientific organisations and research 
institutions (Hajer, 1995; Van den Brink, 2009). 
A discourse coalition can be said to dominate a given political realm when it controls the 
discursive space: Central actors are persuaded or forced to accept the rhetorical power 
of a new discourse (“discourse structuration”) when the policy process is implemented 
according to the ideas of a given discourse (“discourse institutionalisation”). The concepts 
of discourse and discourse coalitions make it possible to study and grasp the orientation 
towards animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands. 
Discourse coalitions are thus always subject to tensions challenging the boundaries of the 
coalition. When the coalition can no longer manage the tensions, it will likely disrupt the 
corresponding discourse, too (“discourse dislocation”) (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Van den Brink, 
2009). 
Such tensions often result from diverging promises and expectations in the discourse 
coalition. The analytical distinction between promises and (societal) expectations is relevant 
to this chapter. Promises are understood here as the messages that the discourse coalition 
sends as a collective identity. Expectations, by contrast, are regarded as the messages 
received by either individual members of the coalition or the society at large (i.e. “societal 
expectations”; see also §2.6.2). 
6.2 The creation of a new discourse coalition and its technological promise 
To understand why the present discourse coalition seems to be facing its limits, we must 
first look into the process of how the new dominant discourse on animal-testing alternatives 
formed in order to replace the old one on animal experimentation. 
6.2.1 Making room for a new discourse
Towards the end of the 20th century, the development of new arguments opposing animal 
experiments dislocated what was then the leading discourse on animal experimentation.157 
Before, animal experiments had mainly been rejected on ethical grounds. Many held that 
the “intrinsic value” of animals gave us the moral obligation not to use them in experiments, 
regardless of the potential benefits for humans and other animals (For an excellent outline 
of the use of the concept: Brom, 1999). This ethical argument divided stakeholders into 
two opposing camps: those opposing animal experiments under any condition and those 
who did not (yet) see any other way forward. However, new arguments against animal 
experiments evolved, which led to new coalitions between groups that had previously 
opposed each other. For example, an increasing number of researchers criticised the 
use of animal studies in drug development by referring to their low predictive value (For 
references refer to: Kooijman, 2013, p. 10). Moreover, the high rate of potential drugs that 
did not make it through the process of clinical trials, despite encouraging results in animal 
studies, increased companies’ incentives to search for methods with a higher predictive 
value (Kooijman, 2013). Scientific and economic arguments against animal experiments 
thus began to enter the field as well. With the rise of these new arguments, the boundaries 
between the two former discourse coalitions underwent a significant shift.
The disruption of the dominant discourse on animal experiments boosted the formation 
of a new discourse on animal research. With the introduction of the new arguments, the 
problem of animal experimentation was no longer solely ethical (and thus requiring an 
157  Margo van den Brink (2009) used the concept of dislocation exclusively for extreme disruptions, such as 
replacing one discourse by another (see also Chapter 2).
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ethical solution). Scientific and economic motives also became reasons to move away 
from traditional animal experiments. Stakeholders’ conflicting and opposing values, which 
hampered cooperation within the former discourse, were thus no longer perceived as 
problematic. Instead, a shared future would flourish, based on a shared need for “animal-
testing alternatives”. 
6.2.2 The maturing of a discourse coalition
The ethical, economic and scientific arguments fitted neatly into a bigger narrative that also 
formed the discursive glue for a new discourse coalition. After all, alternative methods with 
a higher predictive value (scientific argument) were to save money (economic argument) as 
well as animals (ethical argument). Animal-testing alternatives were presented as a “win-
win-win situation” (see also Chapter 3) and attracted a diverse number of stakeholders into 
the same discourse coalition. The discourse coalition was thus formed around the binding 
narrative or discourse rather than a shared norm and value system per se. 
Despite the attractive power of the narrative, the boundaries of the discourse coalition 
were continuously being tested by the exclusion of some and the inclusion of other actors. 
Some actors, like ADC and SHAC-NL158, were successfully kept out of the coalition by being 
labelled as “extremists” or even “terrorists” (e.g. AIVD, 2004, 2007; AIVD, 2009)159. By 
contrast, actors working on the development of emerging technologies were included in 
the coalition because of their potential to keep the narrative vivid and promising (see also 
Chapter 5 on ’omics technologies).
6.2.3 The establishment of a new dominant discourse 
Meanwhile, the new discourse structured the way in which animal research was 
conceptualised and the central focus on animal-testing alternatives became more and more 
institutionalised (Hajer, 1995: See also Chapter 2). The attention for alternative methods 
grew, both in the Netherland and abroad. For example, animal-testing alternatives became 
part of both national and international legislation (e.g. Wod and Directive 86/609/EEC) 
and developed into a separate policy issue (e.g. VWS, 2011b: see also Chapter 3). Further 
institutionalisation of the discourse was accomplished by newly established research 
programmes on alternatives methods (e.g. AXLR8, 2014. See also Chapter 4 and 5), 
specialised scientific journals (e.g. ALTEX, AATEX) and the establishment of several validation 
158  ADC stands for the Dutch Anti Dierproeven Coalition (Coalition against Animal Testing), and SHAC-NL is an 
abbreviation of Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty Nederland. 
159  This research has not explicitly paid attention to the formation and maturing of the discourse coalition as 
such. The so-called outsiders may thus well have made a deliberate decision not to enter the coalition. 
For the purposes of this chapter, while I am personally opposed to actions undertaken by individuals, groups or 
organisations to violate Dutch law, these “activist” or “terrorist” groups play an important role in establishing 
the boundaries of the dominant discourse in the Netherlands and are therefore relevant to this analysis. 
centres (EURL-ECVAM, 2014; ICCVAM, 2014; JacVAM, 2014). The narrative on animal-
testing alternatives thus started to dominate the conceptualisation of the field (“discourse 
structuration”) and solidified into specific institutional arrangements and organisational 
practices (“discourse institutionalisation”). In other words, the new discourse on animal 
research became dominant in the Netherlands (Hajer, 2005).
6.2.4 The discourse coalition’s shaping of promises and expectations
The discourse coalition’s binding narrative co-created different promises and expectations, 
of which some were more prominent and present than others.160 The discourse coalition’s 
promise was built on the belief that science and new technologies are the answer to the 
problems associated with animal experiments. Furthermore, there was an assumption 
that the development of new animal-testing alternatives would guarantee the use of such 
methods (see also Chapter 4 on the “technology push” approach). In public, the anticipated 
reduction of research animals’ numbers thus legitimised the investment in animal-testing 
alternatives (see Chapter 3 for the legitimation as found in policy documents, Chapter 4 
for research councils and Chapter 5 for the academic community). In other words, the 
discourse coalition created a technological promise regarding the investment in animal-
testing alternatives.
The creation of promises inevitably yielded various expectations as well. For example, 
some members of the scientific community expected three-R alternatives to deliver “better 
science” (see also Chapter 5), whereas for others such methods were expected to improve 
overall animal welfare in research and testing circumstances. Still for other members, 
three-R alternatives were expected to stimulate cooperation between various stakeholders. 
Many of the expectations that were created were not always congruent. 
More important in the light of this research, however, was the shaping of an expectation 
among the public at large. This societal expectation entailed a direct relationship between 
(an investment in) animal-testing alternatives and the number of research animals used. 
This societal expectation was further strengthened by the claims the discourse coalition 
made on various semi-public occasions, such as meetings and public debates on this topic, 
and in a range of documents, including policy documents, research calls and research 
proposals (for examples, see Chapters 3-5). The societal expectation thus followed the 
technical solution as shaped by the discourse coalition and was reinforced over time by the 
discourse coalition’s claims and promises. 
160  The distinction between promises and expectations here is analytical and does not seek to compromise their 
co-creating relationship over time. The created promise is thus as much the result of the societal expectations 
regarding animal-testing alternatives as the societal expectation is the result of the coalition’s promise. 
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6.2.5 The successful reframing of an old discourse
The narrative of animal-testing alternatives paved the road for a technical solution to the 
problem of animal experiments. The contrasting values with regard to (research) animals, 
which had led to a deadlock in the old discourse on animal experiments, changed significantly 
with the introduction of a new discourse (i.e. “discourse dislocation”; See also §2.3.2). 
The discourse coalition’s shared need for animal-testing alternatives provided guidance 
and was able to end the stalemate on the issue of animal experimentation. The focus on 
animal-testing alternatives thus successfully reframed the problem of animal experiments 
as a technical problem that required a technical solution. 
With this technical focus, the discourse coalition co-created the societal expectation that 
an investment in animal-testing alternatives would directly lead to a decrease in animal 
numbers. 
6.3 Discursive processes binding the new discourse coalition
The previous section described the establishment of a new discourse coalition around 
animal-testing alternatives, including its technological promise to reduce animal numbers. 
Yet, the question remains how the new discourse coalition was able to accommodate such 
a diverse assortment of actors, values and goals into a single narrative. This section answers 
this question by looking into three different, yet related discursive processes: the level of 
policy reflection, the concept’s flexibility and the function of promises and expectations. In 
addition, it addresses the vulnerability of the present discourse coalition by sketching the 
opposite pole of each of these processes.
6.3.1 The level of policy reflection
One of the processes that may make it possible for the discourse coalition to accommodate 
such a variety of stakeholders, values and goals may be its presence on the first-order 
level of policy reflection (Fischer, 2003; Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996a; Schön, 1983).161 The 
161  Following Grin and Van de Graaf (1996a), I argue that the object of Fischer’s first-order discourse is 
analogous to the object of Schön’s first-order reflection in action, and what Fischer calls second-order discourse 
corresponds to Schön’s second-order reflection. Therefore, these concepts are used interchangeably throughout 
this chapter.
Fischer’s framework offers the logic of four interrelated discourses that outlines the concerns of a post-empiricist 
policy evaluation. The first two discursive phases of the logic of the policy evaluation, constituting the level of 
“first-order evaluation”, are technical verification and situational validation. First-order evaluation focuses on 
the specific action setting of a policy initiative and the situational context in which they occur. The second two 
discursive phases of the logic, or the level of “second-order evaluation”, are societal vindication and ideological 
choice. Here, evaluation shifts to the larger societal system of which the action is part. For more information on 
the model, please see Fischer (2003), p. 191-198 and Chapter 2.
different interpretations and expectations with respect to the seemingly shared goal of 
animal-testing alternatives, as well as their underlying structuring values and norms, were 
not addressed.
The discourse coalition functioned on the basis of a technical-analytical discourse on the 
first-level of policy evaluation (Fischer, 1995, 2003; Fischer, 2007a). The binding narrative 
and discourse coalition’s promise were both built on the assumption that more three-R 
research would lead to increased implementation and use of animal-testing alternatives. 
Whether this type of research was relevant to the problem at hand was hardly discussed 
within the discourse coalition. 
The technical-analytical focus of the discourse coalition was strengthened by delegating the 
national policy’s implementation process to a research council. Since their main assigned 
and perceived role was to stimulate research into and development of animal-testing 
alternatives, the implementation of such methods and the reduction of animal numbers 
were placed at somewhat of a distance. Besides, the leading dominant “science and 
technology push” approach focused more on development than the use and need of such 
methods (see also Chapter 4, and especially §4.4.2).162 
Furthermore, the evaluation of scientific programmes as part of the national policy on 
animal-testing alternatives remained within the scope of technical verification. The goal 
of technical verification is “to produce a quantitative assessment of the degree to which 
a certain programme fulfils a particular objective (…) and a determination (…) of how 
efficiently the objective is fulfilled (Fischer, 2003, p. 193). Both the evaluation of the DPBI-
III programmes (Chapter 4) and the NTC programme (Chapter 5) fit into this prime concern 
of measuring the efficiency of programme outcomes.
The functioning on this first-order level of policy reflection made it possible for all members 
in the discourse coalition to work with - instead of against - each other. They were able to 
recognise themselves in the binding narrative and the discourse coalition’s promise without 
needing to discuss their different or even opposing values and norms with the other 
members. Politicians, NGOs, industries, funding organisations and scientists, among others, 
all worked towards the seemingly shared goal of animal-testing alternatives. The discourse 
coalition and its first-order level of policy reflection thus provided concrete guidelines on 
how to act. 
162  It is fair to say that ZonMw aims to stimulate the implementation of animal-testing alternatives by funding 
possibilities (so-called VIMPs) and the active connection of stakeholders in recent years. However, ZonMw’s 
research agenda remains dominated by scientific inputs and research questions rather than market demands 
(an approach known as “demand pull” in innovation literature).
Chapter 6 - Vulnerability of discourse coalitions   │  155154  │  Part III - Assessment and conclusion
The central tenet of three-R research as “societally relevant” (see also Chapters 4 and 5) 
contributed to strengthening the discourse coalition further. Developing and contributing 
to the three Rs as a spin-off from other research evolved into a new and interesting way of 
legitimising research. 
6.3.1.1	 Vulnerability:	neglect	of	second-order	policy	reflection	
On the one hand, we may thus argue that the discourse coalition’s functioning on the first-
order level of policy reflection facilitated the cooperation between a diverse range of actors 
in the field. All members were able to recognise themselves in the overarching and binding 
narrative of the coalition that provided them with concrete guidelines on how to act.
On the other hand, this neglect of the second-order level of policy reflection may also pose 
a threat to the future of the present discourse coalition. Given that the diverging values, 
prioritisations and norms are hardly discussed within the discourse coalition, it remains 
unclear whether individual members really strive for the same goal of decreasing animal 
numbers.
This lack of clarity poses a threat to the present discourse coalition, as members may 
be working together with different and irreconcilable understandings of the preferred 
social order (i.e. second-order reflection). The empirical chapters have already indicated 
that members from within the coalition have different reasons to work on animal-testing 
alternatives. To some, better-informed science may prevail, while others saw the reduction 
of research animals as a top priority.163
Animal-testing alternatives are still being presented as a technical solution to animal 
experimentation (first-order reflection) in the present discourse coalition, without the need 
for further specification and elaboration on the different ideas of the preferred social order 
(second-order reflection). This operating on the first order was an absolute necessity for 
the establishment of the discourse coalition in the first place, as the member’s second-
order differed too much from each other to find overlapping and shared ideas. Complete 
ignorance of this second order, however, may lead to a false sense of security regarding 
animal-testing alternatives and their effect on animal numbers in research. Contrasting 
ideas on this matter may drive the present discourse coalition apart in the long(er) term. 
163  Note also that the concept of animal-testing alternatives in itself departures from the existence of animal 
experiments. 
6.3.2 The flexibility of the concept
Another discursive explanation of why the discourse coalition was able to accommodate 
such a diversity of norms and values may be the flexibility of the concept. The concept 
of ‘animal-testing alternatives’ was robust, yet flexible enough, to integrate the three 
arguments (i.e. economic, scientific and ethical) into a trustworthy narrative, while still 
leaving room for new players and their interpretations.
The strength of the concept was determined by its simultaneous provision of guidance 
as well as flexibility (Note the resemblance with a “boundary object” Star, 2010; Star & 
Griesemer, 1989: See also Chapter 2). The concept made clear that something had to be 
changed (i.e. guidance), but it lacked the details on how to achieve this (i.e. flexibility). 
This combination made it possible for diverging stakeholders to work together towards one 
normative horizon (i.e. the use of animal-testing alternatives) without the need to express 
their conflicting values on numerous issues related to animal experiments.164 
The guidance and robustness of the concept minimalised the need for stakeholders to 
express their different opinions, values and norms. Building on Russell and Burch’s ideas 
regarding the three Rs (Russell & Burch, 1959), the members of the discourse coalition 
ostensibly felt that their different prioritisations, ideas, norms and values were well-
represented within the concept. For example, animal welfare NGOs were primarily 
interested in the replacement alternatives, statisticians in the reduction alternatives, and 
zoologists in the refinement alternatives. As most stakeholders could position their own 
work, agendas, values and norms within the range of the concept, there was no need to 
express these with the same openness and hostility as in the previous discourse regarding 
animal experimentation and research.
Moreover, the flexibility of the concept provided room for new players to enter the 
discourse coalition and alter the concept’s meaning. With the inclusion of new stakeholders, 
the interpretation of animal-testing alternatives expanded towards a broader and more 
scientific understanding. Animal-testing alternatives became a synonym for ethical, 
economic and scientific improvement, as opposed to classical animal models (see also 
Chapter 3 on shifting policy frames as reflected in Dutch policy documents since the 1970s).
 
Moreover, this process of inclusion also affected the discourse coalition’s interpretation of 
what counted as good animal-testing alternatives. At first, only those models that could 
164  In fact, this chapter is built on the assumption that the existence and expression of conflicting stakeholder 
values were the main reasons behind the political and societal impasse on animal research in the 1990s. The 
fact that such an expression of values was no longer needed within the presented narrative on animal-testing 
alternatives has surely contributed to the success of the story.
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replace the animal experiment were labelled as “alternative” (i.e. “first-generation animal-
testing alternatives”). Later, animal-testing alternatives were understood as either the 
replacement, reduction or refinement of the former animal model (i.e. “second-generation 
alternatives”). With the inclusion of new players and emerging technologies, this definition 
was even further broadened. Methods and technologies that could only partly replace, 
reduce or refine animal experiments in a testing strategy also became labelled as an 
alternative. Animal-testing alternatives became more and more “positive side effects” of 
other research. In recent years, the avoidance of animal experiments has also been included 
in the definition of animal-testing alternatives. It seems that research, technologies, methods 
and other initiatives no longer have to be directly linked to (former) animal experiments in 
order to be named an “alternative” (i.e. “third-generation alternatives; See also Chapter 5).
6.3.2.1	 Vulnerability:	over-flexibility	
On the one hand, we may thus argue that the flexibility of the concept was needed to 
accommodate a diversity of stakeholders, view, values and norms within the same discourse 
coalition at first. We may even claim that without this flexibility, the formation of a discourse 
coalition would not have succeeded.
On the other hand, this same flexibility also poses a threat to the present discourse and 
coalition. The inclusion of more and more interpretations runs the risk of over-flexibility: The 
concept becomes an umbrella concept without any, or at least with much less, distinctive 
power. New methods that never used animal models before can then also be relabelled as 
animal-testing alternatives and as such gain widespread legitimacy, while other non-animal 
methods fail to jump on the alternative bandwagon. As with the concept of “sustainability”, 
the distinctive power between an animal-testing alternative and a non-animal-testing 
alternative runs the risk of becoming less clear due to over-flexibility.
The broadening of the concept may also directly backfire at the discourse coalition, as 
the gap between the technological promise and the societal expectations increases. After 
all, the inclusion of new technologies such as ’omics technologies and 3D-printing (i.e. 
“third-generations alternatives”) makes it even more difficult to position animal-testing 
alternatives inside the context of fewer research animals as it remains to be seen whether 
such technologies will truly overcome the use of research animals or whether they will 
supplement present animal experiment. Therefore it can be expected that the inclusion of 
new technologies and the broadening of the concept make it even harder for the discourse 
coalition to live up to its own technological promise and the societal expectation that is 
derived from it.
The flexibility of the concept of ‘animal-testing alternatives’ was needed to accommodate 
the various stakeholders and their ideas, values and norms in one discourse coalition. 
However, this strength may also turn against the discourse coalition and pose a threat to its 
future existence and success. The distinction between an alternative and a non-alternative 
becomes less clear, which makes the concept increasingly susceptible to exploitation: It is a 
matter of (re)framing and marketing whether, for example, a new technology is regarded as 
an animal-testing alternative or not. When this happens, the gap between the technological 
promise and societal expectations is likely to widen even more.
6.3.3 The functionality of promises and expectations 
The third explanation of the discourse coalition’s ability to accommodate such a diversity 
of stakeholders may lie with its powerful use of promises and expectations. The discourse 
coalition created a strong technological promise to which all members could relate, while 
the inclusion of new technologies kept the coalition’s binding narrative alive and strong.
Promises and expectations play a crucial role in everyday life, as they guide activities, provide 
structure, attract interest, foster investment and legitimise actions (e.g. Borup et al., 2006; 
Van Lente, 1993: See also Chapter 2 on the STS field “sociology of expectations”). Likewise, 
the technological promise played a crucial role in the formation of the new discourse 
coalition. It provided the internal structure of the coalition and guided its activities towards 
the ostensibly shared goal of animal-testing alternatives. Furthermore, the promise 
mobilised societal and financial support for three-R research (see also Chapters 4 and 5). 
The technological promise thus made a strong verbal and discursive link between animal-
testing alternatives and animal numbers in experiments.
Nonetheless, promises continually require attention to maintain and renew their supportive 
function.165 In this case, the inclusion of emerging technologies kept the binding promise 
alive and vivid. Chapter 5 showed how the promise of the emerging ’omics technologies 
fuelled the discourse coalition’s technological promise, and the positioning of such 
technologies was able to re-boost the coalition’s promise. At present, the promise of 3D 
printing seems to have partly taken over this position (NKCA, 2014; Proefdiervrij, 2014c).166 
Like biofuels, it seems that animal-testing alternatives need ever-newer ‘generations’ to re-
strengthen the power of the technological promise. 
165  See, for example, the discussion on biofuels. Once hailed as a solution to many emerging problems, 
including climate change and energy security in developed and developing countries, biofuels are increasingly 
a topic of debate for their contribution to rising food prices and a loss in biodiversity. 
166  The NKCA report points out that the most likely effect of 3D-printing is on the substitution (‘voorkomen’) 
or avoidance (‘vermijden’) of animal experiments. Furthermore, the report addresses several points of interests, 
including the monitoring and evaluation of the three Rs and the socio-ethical aspects of 3D printing, such as 
human enhancement. 
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6.3.3.1 Vulnerability: over-promising
On the one hand, we may argue that the introduction of new promises from time to time is 
crucial in order to keep the discourse narrative alive and vivid. It mobilises research funding, 
gives direction to policy and attracts the attention of the general public. 
On the other hand, this same function of promises also poses a threat to the present 
discourse and coalition. The inclusion of promises runs the risk of over-promising: improbable 
views of the future without reflection on the present situation and earlier promises. Such 
overstretched promises may not to be limited to the research field but could appear in the 
funding and policy area, too. 
This process of over-promising might divert attention away from earlier promises and avoid 
overall policy reflection on the topic. Firstly, the positive effects of emerging technologies on 
the numbers of research animals are more present in the policy discourse than the counter 
stories of an increase in animal numbers related to the same technologies. For example, 
genomics technologies were embraced because of their likely role in decreasing animal 
numbers, while the simultaneously expected increase in genomics was mostly denied by 
the discourse coalition (see also Chapter 5 and the establishment of the NTC). Secondly, 
the inclusion of new technological promises might strengthen the focus on technological 
solutions to the problem associated with animal research. Therefore, the process of over-
promising may hamper a more fundamental reflection on the present policy (i.e. second-
order policy reflection). 
Finally, the process of over-promising risks an overall decrease in the discourse coalition’s 
credibility. Promising claims may find their way into the discourse coalition but are likely to 
raise eyebrows soon after. As these over-promising claims cannot live up to their own made 
expectation, they also risk spoiling it for other, more feasible and realistic claims. In the long 
run, they may place the entire coalition under pressure, and the discourse coalition would 
no longer be seen as reliable and credible.
Promising claims play an indisputably crucial role in the establishment and preservation of 
discourse coalitions, especially in areas with great uncertainty and high societal expectations, 
like the field of animal-testing alternatives. However, over-promising may hamper more 
fundamental policy reflection and lead to an overall loss in the discourse coalition’s 
credibility. It may be wise to take this into consideration before a new (technological) claim 
is accepted in the discourse coalition, given that anyone or anybody would be able to hinder 
its inclusion. 
6.3.4 Balancing discursive processes 
This section described three discursive processes that may explain how the new discourse 
coalition on animal-testing alternatives was able to accommodate such a diverse range 
of actors, values and norms. The processes identified were labelled as: the level of 
policy reflection, the concept’s flexibility and the function of promises and expectations. 
Collectively, these processes seemed to have played a crucial role in the establishment and 
maintenance of the power of the discourse coalition.
However, the processes that are responsible for binding the discourse coalition may also 
pose a threat to the coalition if they become too one-sided. First-order policy reflection 
may draw away the attention from a more fundamental second-order policy reflection; the 
acceptance of all new understandings under the heading of animal-testing alternatives may 
lead to a meaningless concept, and over-promising may lead to a decrease in the discourse 
coalition’s legitimacy. 
The discursive processes that were so successful in pulling the public debate out of its 
impasse may therefore also pose a serious threat to the stability of the discourse coalition 
in the long(er) term. Like any other discourse coalition, it is always vulnerable to evolving 
tensions from both within and without. The next section asks whether the discourse 
coalition regarding animal-testing alternatives is currently under pressure by looking into 
the tensions surrounding the discourse coalition. 
6.4 Discourse coalition under pressure?
Discourse coalitions are always subject to tensions challenging the boundaries of the 
coalition (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Van den Brink, 2009), and the present coalition is no exception. 
The previous section showed that the establishment of the present discourse coalition 
befitted from at least three discursive processes, but that these same processes may also 
pose a threat to the preservation of the discourse coalition in the long run.
This section looks into several tensions surrounding the discourse coalition, including the 
dominant orientation towards the development of alternative methods, rather than their 
use and relevance for animal numbers (i.e. “science and technology push” approach), the 
stable number of animals used in research and testing, and the growing discontent of 
members within the discourse coalition. 
Chapter 6 - Vulnerability of discourse coalitions   │  161160  │  Part III - Assessment and conclusion
6.4.1 Tension from the foundation: the technology-push argument
The first kind of tension seems to have been created by the discourse coalition’s view 
that science and technology would overcome the need for animal experiments. To a large 
extent, research proposals have driven the scope of developments, and the animal-testing 
alternatives that have been developed have been pushed towards the market. This approach 
was built on the belief that the availability of alternative methods would guarantee their 
use and subsequently have an impact on the animal numbers, too. This linear assumption 
of knowledge progression has become known as the science technology-push argument in 
Innovation and Science and Technology Studies (e.g. Nemet, 2009: See also Chapter 4). Recall 
that “the core of the science and technology-push argument is that advances in scientific 
understanding determine the rate and direction of innovation” (Nemet, 2009, p. 701).
The original technology-push argument has been criticised primarily for ignoring prices and 
other economic conditions affecting the profitability of innovations. In addition, its emphasis 
on a unidirectional progression within the stages of the innovation process was incompatible 
with work emphasising feedbacks, interactions, and networks (Freeman, 1994; Nelson & 
Winter, 1977). By contrast, the demand‑pull argument, which was developed later on, argued 
that demand (instead of scientific understanding) drives the rate and direction of innovation.167
The criticism of the technology-push argument may explain why the primary focus on science 
and technology in the area of animal-testing alternatives has not been to create substantial 
innovations in the animal-testing practice. For example, Chapter 4 showed that ZonMw 
programmes on animal-testing alternatives were more science-driven than orientated 
at the challenges users of animal research (e.g. industry, academia) experienced. In fact, 
only academics and knowledge institutes were allowed as project leaders in the research 
proposals. Moreover, Chapter 5 showed that the Netherlands Genomics Initiative tried to 
include some ideas of the demand-pull argument in the organisational infrastructure of 
their centres by requiring matching of industries. This idea was built on the assumption that 
matching selects only those projects that are of serious interest to the users of research 
animals and create long-term commitment. However, as the Netherlands Toxicogenomics 
Centre primarily received in‑kind matching (e.g. sharing experiences, databases and 
compounds results), it is at least questionable whether this assumption truly holds.168 It 
167  Later work offered a less deterministic version of the technology-push argument, while still emphasising 
the role of science and technology. The concept became more multi-dimensional and acknowledged some of 
the nuances of the innovation process that the strictly ‘linear’ model ignored. Furthermore, the demand-pull 
argument was criticised on different grounds as well, including for its definition of ‘demand’, the failure to 
account for discontinuous change and the argument’s assumptions concerning firms’ capabilities in identifying 
‘unrevealed needs’ (For an overview, see Nemet, 2009, p. 701).
168  In one of their latest calls, the ZonMw MKMD programme required substantive in-cash contributions 
from industrial or other societal partners in research proposals. Many researchers experienced problems in 
seems that the present three-R scientific practice, including its funding, is inadequately 
connected to the users’ practice of animal models (i.e. academia, knowledge institutes and 
industries). 
Moreover, there are some indications that the role of leading scientific groups and journals 
play a crucial role in the acceptance of three-R innovations in scientific research, although 
this has not yet been studied intensively. Overall, non-scientific factors (e.g. legislative 
context, acceptation, risk minimisation) seem to determine the rate of innovations more 
than the investment in three-R research per se.169
6.4.2 Tension from the promise: stable numbers
The second type of tension may have been created by the absence of visible results in 
terms of animal research numbers. The discourse coalition co-created a promise that the 
investment in alternative methods was directly related to the decrease in animals used 
for research purposes. However, this number has remained relative stable around 600 000 
animals per year since 2000 (NVWA, 2014 p. 14/15). Based on these numbers, we may 
conclude that the coalition’s promise has not lived up to its own expectations. 
In response, the majority of the discourse coalition has argued that the decrease in numbers 
was stunned by the increased generation of (scientific) knowledge.170 Indeed the policy on 
animal-testing alternatives seems to have led to a relative reduction in animal numbers, 
for example per substance or per experiment or knowledge question (see Chapter 4 and 
5). The discourse coalition’s promise was thus at least partly reinterpreted as a relative, 
rather than an absolute, decrease in animal numbers. This difference in the interpretation 
of “reduction” may have placed the discourse coalition under more pressure. 
6.4.3 Tension from the inside: members’ discontent
Finally, public discontent from within the discourse coalition seems to have contributed 
to the third tension. Some of this discontent focused on the perceptibly slow progress of 
Dutch policy and the lack of transparency. Others’ objections related to the usefulness 
of animals numbers as a policy indicator. These examples of resistance indicate that the 
individual values of discourse coalition’s members are currently tested and put the survival 
of the coalition under pressure. 
the formalisation of this type of contribution (Personal communication programme assistant ZonMw, 2013). 
Apparently, the in-cash contribution requirement did not work out as intended. 
169  For a general overview of factors stimulating or obstructing the implementation of the three Rs in the 
regulatory process, see (Schiffelers et al., 2007). 
170  However, the indicators that are available at present do not demonstrate this. See also: (Van Zijverden et al., 2013b)
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Some members of the discourse coalition have openly and frequently shared their 
frustration with the lack of transparency and the slow progress towards a research animal-
free situation. For example, the Party for the Animals has raised concerns on numerous 
occasions about the exclusion of “killed-in-stock animals”171 from the yearly tally of 
research animals (e.g. Tweede Kamer, 2011b). Because these animals were not counted 
as research animals, they were not included in the annual number, either. As such, the 
number of research animals reported was almost half as low as the total number of research 
animals indirectly involved in scientific experiments.172 Furthermore, the Dutch Society for 
the Replacement of Animal Testing (‘Proefdiervrij’) has frequently and publicly shared its 
concerns about the slow progress (Proefdiervrij, 2013, 2014b; Zuidgeest, 2013). To support 
the transition towards an animal free research world, Proefdiervrij has been collaborating 
with ZonMw on the development of “animal-free techniques” since 2005 (Proefdiervrij, 
2015: See also Chapter 4).
On a related but slightly different note, other members have raised their concerns about 
the effectiveness of the current policy on animal research and animal-testing alternatives. 
For example, the Dutch GreenLeft Party (GroenLinks) and Democrats (D’66) wondered 
whether the policy was successful, given the absence of a clear decline in animal numbers 
(Tweede Kamer, 2011b). 
6.4.4 A discourse coalition under pressure 
The present discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands has faced 
at least three different, yet related, types of tension. These include the coalition’s focus 
on research and technology (i.e. “science and technology-push approach”), its promise 
to reduce animal numbers in an absolute sense and several of the coalition’s individual 
members’ public discontent.
The focus on research and technology may be regarded as the least visible tension here, 
as it has been rooted in the discourse coalition and forms the core foundation of the 
discourse’s promise. As such, it seems very unlikely that this tension can be solved without 
the coalition collapsing into smaller new discourse coalitions.
171  This category includes animals used in specific breeding programmes to generate a specific gender or 
genotype, for instance, but are not used in experiments as defined by Dutch legislation. This category has been 
labelled “killed-in-stock” [in Dutch: ‘gedood in voorraad’] animals by the Party for the Animals. Recently, the 
Secretary of State Sharon Dijksma has also paid attention to this topic in her ‘plan of action’; (EZ, 2014b). 
172  In 2012, 579 338 research animals were used for experimental purposes. Another 524 735 animals were 
killed or died before the experiment was carried out; (NVWA, 2014), Table 8, p. 25
The second tension originates in the focus on animal numbers as a primary policy indicator. 
Both the coalition’s promise and the effectiveness of the Dutch policy on this topic are 
measured in terms of research animal numbers. This type of tension relates to the discourse 
coalition’s foundation on science and technology but may be more susceptible to change. 
For instance, indicators other than research animal numbers may be capable of showing 
the current progress of the field (e.g. number of implemented animal-testing alternatives, 
or qualitative progress reports by experts). 
The public discontent of several coalition members is certainly the most visible tension out 
of the three. This does not mean, however, that the tension is easy to solve in the present 
coalition. On the contrary, the fact that actors resist the current state of affairs indicates 
that their individual and represented values are not addressed well enough by the present 
discourse coalition, and they may not accept this state of affairs much longer.
All in all, these tensions indicate that the present discourse coalition in the Netherlands is 
under serious pressure and may not be able to continue for very long in its present form. 
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined how the current vulnerability of the present discourse coalition on 
animal-testing alternatives could be explained by looking at the discursive processes that 
helped to mature the new discourse. 
The discourse on animal experimentation was gradually replaced by a new discourse 
that placed animal-testing alternatives at its core. This new discourse created room for 
a new discourse coalition as well: One that believed in animal-testing alternatives as the 
solution for animal experimentation. This new coalition attracted the majority of relevant 
stakeholders, including the ones that were in rather different discourse coalitions at first 
(e.g. NGOs and industry). Collectively, this coalition created a technological promise: The 
investment in research on animal-testing alternatives would lead to a decrease in animal 
numbers. 
This new discourse coalition was made possible by the accommodation of at least three 
discursive processes: the relatively low level of policy reflection, the concept’s flexibility 
and the function of strong, appealing promises and expectations. Owing to these processes, 
stakeholders with rather divergent ideas, values and solutions were able to work alongside 
each other towards an ambiguously shared future of animal-testing alternatives. These 
processes were therefore of great value, and probably even indispensable, for the formation 
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and maturation of the new discourse. Without the processes and new discourse, the old 
discourse on animal experimentation would likely still be deadlocked.
However, these discursive processes likely will not hold forever, as each one has some 
vulnerability. For example, ignorance of second-order policy reflection may lead to a false 
sense of security regarding animal-testing alternatives, whereas over-flexibility runs the risk 
of losing distinctive power, and over-promising may lead to an overall loss of the discourse 
coalition’s credibility.
Indeed, there are some indications that various tensions place the present dominant 
discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives under pressure. These tensions include 
the discourse coalition‘s orientation on science and technology as a solution to animal 
experimentation, the created societal expectation of a decrease in animal numbers as a 
direct result of the investment in three-R research, and the public statements of discontent 
by several members from within the discourse coalition.
Based on these tensions and the vulnerabilities of the discursive processes that helped to 
establish the discourse, we may conclude that the present dominant discourse on animal-
testing alternatives is currently losing its ability to mobilise and attract support (i.e. “power” 
Avelino, 2011). The discourse coalition is still expanding thanks to new scientific actors but 
seems unable to attract new players (i.e. “outsiders”) that are crucial for a sustainable 
transition that better reflects the societal values regarding animal research (e.g. animal-free 
research or reduction of absolute research animal numbers). Without others, the desire for 
change only seems to circle inside the heads of a handful of committed individuals, which 
makes it quite difficult – if not impossible – to influence the dominant system of animal 
experimentation.
Finally, the unconditional belief in science and (new) technologies to overcome animal 
experimentation steers clear of some rather difficult political and societal choices. Given 
the vulnerability of the present discourse, however, a more thorough policy reflection 
is essential: The dominant belief in science and technology to live up to the societal 
expectation of reducing animal numbers in research is no longer tenable.
The next chapter elaborates on issues that need public deliberation as to stimulate a more 
meaningful policy reflection and to advance sustainable policy change.
Sustainable policy change
Public deliberation to stimulate more
meaningful policy reection
7
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7 Sustainable policy change In the previous chapter I argued that the current dominant discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives is losing its power and therefore slowing down a sustainable transition 
that better reflects the societal values regarding animal research. In this chapter I will 
elaborate on issues that need to be further addressed in public deliberation as to stimulate 
a more meaningful policy reflection and to advance sustainable policy change. 
This chapter anticipates the various levels of policy evaluation and reflection (e.g. Fischer, 
1995; Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996a) and suggest several means on how policy may be 
performed (and improved) from a central governments perspective. I will address some 
of the choices that need to be made without claiming to provide the normative answers: 
The direction and outcome of policy reflection requires public deliberation.173 The central 
question structuring this chapter is therefore the following: What possible means and 
corresponding policy instruments, reflecting the different levels of policy evaluation on 
animal research, may stimulate a more meaningful policy reflection to advance sustainable 
policy change in the Netherlands? 
This chapter starts from the premise that at least some level of policy change is desired 
in the Netherlands. Firstly, this desire aligns with the trend of a more conscious attitude 
towards animals in general, including the on-going discussions about circus animals, 
bullfighting and minks, the growing interest in organic farming and green labels in fishery, 
and the continuing attention directed at research animals. This growing awareness is also 
reflected by the two seats that the Party for the Animals (PvdD) occupies in the Dutch 
Parliament. Secondly, the attention trained on animal-testing alternatives fits within 
the broader academic and political debate regarding the societal relevance of scientific 
research. The latter includes the large body of academic literature on the transformation in 
knowledge infrastructure and the relevance of science (Gibbons et al., 1994; Martin, 2003; 
Rip, 1988; Weingart, 1997)174, the collective initiative of some major Dutch players that 
led to the “Evaluation of Research in Context” report (EriC, 2010a), and the national NWO 
programme on Responsible Innovation (NWO, 2013) that followed the European move 
towards Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) (EC, 2013a; Owen et al., 2012. See also 
Chapter 5).175 Lastly, it seems that some level of policy change is required in order to move 
173  This chapter focusses on the central government and its possibilities to advance a sustainable policy change 
in the Netherlands. However, I realise that “governing is less and less a matter of ruling through hierarchical 
authority structures, and more and more a matter of negotiating through a decentralized series of floating 
alliances”(Goodin, Rein, & Moran, 2006, p. 12). Therefore a sustainable transition requires broad cooperation 
from a great many independent actors, including industries, banks and investors, health funding organisations, 
and the public at large.
174  See also Chapter 5 and Laurens Hessel’s dissertation on “science and the struggle for relevance” (2010).
175  The question seemed to remain whether policy-driven demand can truly induce (non-incremental) 
innovation (e.g. Nemet, 2009). In his study on the demand for wind power, Gregory Nemet provided three 
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beyond the current political deadlock and to overcome the vulnerability of the discourse 
coalition on animal-testing alternatives.
The next section outlines the theoretical framework of this chapter, which includes the 
focus on policy evaluation and reflection. The chapter continues with separate sections 
for each of the levels of policy evaluation: technical-analytical discourse (§7.2), contextual 
discourse (§7.3), systematic discourse (§7.4), and ideological discourse (§7.5). The chapter 
concludes with some final remarks in section 7.6.
7.1 Policy evaluation, reflection, and policy instruments 
The chapter builds on Fischer’s framework of policy evaluation (Fischer, 1995; Fischer, 
2007b: See also Chapter 2), with additional insights concerning policy reflection (Grin & Van 
de Graaf, 1996a, 1996b), user-involvement (e.g. Nahuis et al., 2012; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 
2008), and transparency and accountability (Koppell, 2005; Roberts, 2009).
Frank Fischer developed his framework to analyse different layers of argumentation within 
existing policies. Each of the different levels raised a different set of questions assembled in 
different discourses. In other words, in his work, Fischer followed an evaluation approach to 
policy. The present chapter applies Fischer’s framework to distinguish between the different 
levels of policy reflection that may be achieved in public deliberation. In this chapter, his 
work is thus used for a prospective approach to policy evaluation and policy design.
The adopted framework makes a distinction between first-order policy reflection, which 
assumes animal-testing alternatives as a solution to the various problems (e.g. economic, 
ethical and scientific) associated with animal research, and second-order reflection, 
which positions animal experimentation inside the broader societal context driving 
these experiments. In the second order, neither the use of animal experiments nor the 
development of animal-testing alternatives are taken for granted. Each of the orders is 
divided into two other levels (“discourses”), thus creating a framework of four levels in 
total. The framework clearly demonstrates the interrelatedness of all the levels and treats 
each of them as equally important. However, the most fundamental questions concerning 
explanations for the apparent inconsistency of the precipitous decline of highly cited patent just as demand for 
wind power created a multi-billion dollar market: the rapid convergence on a single dominant design limited the 
market opportunity for non-incremental change, uncertainty in the longevity of policy instruments dampened 
the incentives for innovations that were likely to take several years to pay off, and alternative explanations – such 
as declining R&D funding and weakening presidential engagement on energy – seems to have been important. 
He concludes that “policy-makers should have limited expectations about the extent to which demand-pull 
instruments alone will induce non-incremental technical change” (p. 708). 
animal research are raised within the framework’s “ideological discourse”, and addressing 
the questions within this particular discourse will likely yield the largest level of policy 
change. 
This chapter also addresses several approaches on how to achieve the different policy 
objectives (i.e. “approach”). For example, the involvement of users in the research process 
of animal-testing alternatives may help to develop more relevant three-R alternatives. 
Furthermore, reflection on the societal values that guide animal experiments may help to 
decrease the reliance on these experiments. 
For each of the approaches, some viable public policy instruments are provided. Such 
instruments are understood as “sets of techniques by which governmental authorities wield 
their power in attempting to ensure support and effect social change” (Bemelmans-Videc, 
1998, p. 3). These categories follow Vedung’s (1998) “stick-carrot-sermon” classification. 
This trichotomy refers to the application of rules and regulations (i.e. “stick”), the use of 
economic means such as taxes and subsidies (i.e. “carrot”), and the provision of information 
that seeks to influence people with reasoned arguments, the exchange of knowledge, and 
persuasion (i.e. “sermon”). This differentiation between policy instruments may be difficult 
to uphold in practice. For example, producers may regard the labelling of products as 
regulation while consumers see it as information (Hadden, 1986 in Vedung, 1998). Yet, 
the classification is analytically useful for the purpose of this chapter and outweighs the 
limitations of the trichotomy (e.g. Hood & Margetts, 2007). This chapter thus describes 
three categories of policy instruments for each approach that may support the desired 
policy objective corresponding with the level of policy reflection. This approach can be 
summarised by the figure below. 
Policy objectives
Assumptions
Approach
(how to achieve  
the policy objective)
Corresponding policy instruments 
(stick, carrot, and sermon)
Figure 7-1. Backbone of chapter as divided into three policy instruments per approach. The approach 
corresponds with the four levels of policy objectives as based on the theoretical framework of policy reflection.
The description of the approaches, and corresponding public policy instruments, lay bare 
some of the issues that need public deliberation without claiming completeness. After all, 
the decision for the final policy approach and its instrument(s) is the results of the public 
deliberation and further policy reflection which have yet to take place. Furthermore, the 
selection of a particular instrument remains the outcome of a theorisation of the relationship 
Framework of  
policy reflection
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between the governing and the governed rather than a neutral means (e.g. Lascoumes & Le 
Gales, 2007). The suggestions are gathered from the realm of animal experimentations, as 
well as other policy fields, including health research, pollution, and sustainability. 
The table below provides an overview of the different levels of policy reflection as applied 
to the issue of animal experimentation. Each row represents a different level of policy 
argumentation and reflection. The columns indicate the paragraph and corresponding 
level as distinguished in the framework (1); the objectives and questions raised within 
the particular level (2); the inferred policy objective (3), the policy question (4) and the 
approach (5) relevant to the practice of animal research in the Netherlands.
Table 7‑1. The chapter’s theoretical backbone and outline.
Chapter’s 
paragraph and 
corresponding level
Argumentation 
concerns
Inferred policy 
objectives
Policy question Approaches
§7.2: Technical-
analytical 
discourse: 
programme 
verification 
Evaluation 
of the policy 
objections, 
means, and ends
Development of 
animal-testing 
alternatives 
How do we improve 
the efficiency and 
efficacy of research 
programmes on 
animal-testing 
alternatives?
Develop 
useful 
animal-testing 
alternatives
§7.3: Contextual 
discourse:  
situational 
validation
Problem 
definitions and 
the meaning of 
objectives, means 
and ends
Use of animal-
testing 
alternatives 
How do we improve 
the implementation 
and use of animal-
testing alternatives?
Stimulate use 
of animal-
testing 
alternatives
§7.4: Systematic 
discourse:  
societal validation
Empirical and 
normative 
background 
theories
Avoidance of 
(certain) animal 
experiments
How do we 
avoid animal 
experimentation 
altogether?
Responsible 
animal use
§7.5: Ideological 
discourse:  
social choice
Normative-
ontological 
preferences 
Addressing 
social choices 
(which indirectly 
affect animal 
research)
How do we  
wish to live?
Life choices
The next section studies how it might be possible to stimulate policy change by having 
research produce more relevant animal-testing alternatives (i.e. “programme verification”).
7.2 Technical-analytic discourse: development of relevant 3R-alternatives 
The Dutch policy on animal-testing alternatives is grounded on the assumption that 
the development of such alternatives through research will lead to the replacement, 
refinement, or reduction of contemporary animal experimentation. Yet, questions can be 
raised about the efficiency and effectiveness of such research programmes (i.e. “programme 
verification”). This section investigates how the current research programmes could develop 
more relevant animal-testing alternatives by involving the user in the research process of 
development. 
7.2.1 The need for user involvement
The development of three-R alternatives is no guarantee for their actual use. Most studies 
conducted in the area of animal-testing alternatives focus on the technical possibilities 
and limitations of specific methods and underlying mechanisms. The evidence on the 
implementation and use of such models is scarce (Freriks et al., 2005, p. 21), but there are 
indications that animal-testing alternatives face problems upon implementation and use. 
For example, newly developed alternatives face problems with “regulatory acceptance” 
(Schiffelers et al., 2007), as well as during drug development (Kooijman, 2013). Moreover, 
professionals experience difficulty in finding existing animal-testing alternatives to use in 
their own work (Van Luijk et al., 2011).176 These indications suggest a mismatch between 
the developed alternatives and the demands and needs of (potential) users of animal-
testing alternatives.
Some of these problems could be caused during the development of these 3R-alternatives 
(i.e. 3R-innovations), especially by the relative absence of specific users in the development 
process. A number of different strands of scholarship have increasingly drawn attention to 
the importance of understanding “user-technology relations” (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008). 
These studies show that intensified user interaction increases the chances for successful 
innovation (e.g. Smits & Boon, 2008 for innovations in the pharmaceutical industry). This 
literature suggests that the involvement of users in the development process of animal-
testing alternatives may improve implementation and speed up their use.177 As Wouter 
Boon (2008) summarises the process in his dissertation, “[t]oday, innovation is no longer 
176  Both Schiffelers and Van Luijk speak of “three Rs” or “three-R models”, referring to the Replacement, 
Reduction and Refinement of animal experiments. Kooijman talks about “innovative methods”. In this study, 
these terms and animal-testing alternatives are used interchangeably.
177  Besides these instrumental arguments, user participation is also justified on moral and political arguments
(Caron-Flinterman, Broerse, & Bunders, 2007; Collins & Evans, 2002; Nahuis et al., 2012). Moral arguments focus 
on the rights of people to participate in decisions that will (eventually) affect their lives. Political arguments are 
related to the idea that democratising scientific research is a public good. 
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seen as an autonomous process dominated by scientists and industrialists, but as part of a 
‘game’ in which a heterogeneous set of actors is involved” (p.30). If users are involved in the 
development process, they may articulate the specific needs of the context of use, which 
leads to more suitable technologies and a greater likelihood of the technology’s further 
“domestication”. 
7.2.2 Improving the relationship between users and developers in three-R research
Insights from various user studies suggest a three-step approach to optimise user 
involvement: Identify the user, organise contact, and determine the level of participation.
 
7.2.2.1 Identify the user
Technology users reflect a rather heterogeneous set of actors who can be found at every 
stage of the value chain (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008). As such, funding organisations may 
be relevant to users in one situation, whereas peer scientists, animal researchers, and 
colleagues from other disciplines may be more relevant in others. In yet another situation, 
the inclusion of “non-users” (Wyatt, 2003) may be favoured, including scientists deliberately 
working with non-animal techniques or cosmetic industries.178 
The identification of the relevant users can be supported by various methods, such as 
focus groups and semi-structured interviews (e.g. Reed et al., 2009), among others. It is 
important to keep in mind that these methods may also determine who is included and 
who is omitted. This is of vital value, as it affects “who and what really counts” (Mitchell 
et al. quoted in Reed et al., 2009, p. 1938). For example, bottom-down approaches tend 
to identify the “usual suspects” and therefore run the risk of under-representing the 
marginalised or powerless groups (see Reed et al., 2009, p. 1939 for references on this 
topics). While there is no universal checklist available, Femke Merkx (2012, p. 28-31) and 
Mark Reed et al. (2009) both provide a valuable starting point. 
The list of users in the domain of three-R research thus depends on the specific situation but 
may include individual patients, patient organisations, fellow scientists, animal caretakers, 
cosmetic industries, clinicians, regulatory agencies, toxicologists, policy advice groups, food 
consumers, and R&D scientists, among others. 
The question remains as to who the relevant user is within a specific research project. 
There are some indications that scientists experience difficulties in naming the user of 
178  Since the European testing ban on finished cosmetic products in 2004 and ingredients in 2009, research 
facilities from cosmetic industries have been encouraged to look into alternatives. See also http://ec.europa.eu/
consumers/sectors/cosmetics/animal-testing/, retrieved on 23 October 2013.
their research or that those identified are too far removed from the research process to 
be of direct relevance at an early stage of development. For example, a recent call within 
the MKMD research programme received many proposals in which general end-user 
categories, such as “patients” or “regulators”, were listed instead of specific persons and 
names (Personal communication programme assistant ZonMw, 2013). This corresponds to 
the experiences from the national knowledge centre NKCA’s employees, who were often 
asked to “name a regulator” who could be referenced in research proposals (Personal 
communication NKCA employee, 2013). All in all, the identification of relevant users is not 
as self-evident as it may sound at first.
Based on these experiences, it would be wise to start with the actual research product or 
process (e.g. a specific molecular mechanism in one organism, the differentiation process 
of a specific cell culture) rather than working backwards from the ultimate research goal 
(e.g. the specific disease, model, or technique) to identify the relevant user. The scientists 
will play the largest role in this identification process, although funding organisations may 
facilitate and support identification by providing workshops and offering advice.179 Such 
initiatives may stimulate user involvement amongst project leaders in the research field of 
animal-testing alternatives, given that funding organisations take such initiatives seriously, 
too. Without a further placing in the infrastructure of research, it is likely that a gap remains 
between the actual relevant users of research and the relevant users as promised on paper.
 
7.2.2.2 Organise contact
A growing body of literature in the fields of Science and Technology Studies and Innovation 
Studies has explored the variety of ways in which users can be involved in the innovation 
processes but largely circumvents the research process (Boon, 2008; Merkx, 2012; Nahuis 
et al., 2012; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008). In addition, the few studies that do focus on 
the participation of users in research emphasise patient participation in applied areas of 
health research, including health technologies research, clinical studies, public health, and 
prevention (For references, see Caron-Flinterman et al., 2007). These studies also point to 
the struggles to involve users. For example, patient participants experience great difficulty 
with committees of experts, because they do not speak the same language, or because they 
do not feel that they are being taken seriously (e.g. Caron-Flinterman et al., 2007).
In addition, many scholars have signalled the need for a neutral facilitator and overall 
coordination of user participation (For references, see Merkx, 2012, p. 13). Femke Merkx 
179  In 2013, I asked the Rathenau Institute to facilitate a workshop on knowledge dissemination and user 
identification as part of a larger meeting for ZonMw project leaders (November 14th, co-organised by ZonMw, 
NKCA and the CSG Centre for Society and the Lifesciences). The ‘Value of Science’ workshop was set up to 
encourage the project leaders and other attendants to think of their own relevant users. 
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also provided an excellent overview of the methods to facilitate such a dialogue on 
participation (p.32-36). For example, in the “world café setting”, several participants work 
around one question or challenge in several rounds (Brown & Isaacs, 2005; Merkx, 2012). 
The question remains how to involve users in the three-R research process. Again, there are 
indications that scientists experience problems in the actual involvement process or that 
their initiatives stall in a later phase because of differences in perspective. For example, 
one senior scientist argued that, despite the early involvement of regulators, it always 
remains a precarious process, because of the uncertainty as to whether the test will in 
fact be implemented in new regulations. He explained that this process was sometimes 
“frustrating”, and that his role as a scientist was limited. In the end, he argued: “it remains a 
political process”. In addition, he explained that the involvement of users such as regulators 
in an early phase of research may also experience resistance, as the projects are perceived 
as too technical to make a meaningful contribution (Interview work package leader NTC 4, 
2011). This example suggests a clear need for information on the ways in which users could 
be involved in the research process and the support of scientists in doing so. 
I suggest that funding organisations could play a more active role in facilitating user 
involvement on the programmatic and project level of three-R research. This role thus 
exceeds the inclusion of overall end-user categories in call committees, as these users did 
not always prove to be the relevant users for individual projects. Moreover, the inclusion of 
regulators may need a different approach.180 
7.2.2.3 Determine level of participation
Finally, it may be wise to manage the expectations regarding the level of user participation 
in research beforehand in order to avoid disappointment. Users can be involved in different 
ways with ranging levels of influence on the decision-making process. The “ladder of 
participation” (Arnstein, 1969) may provide a helpful tool to differentiate between different 
levels of participation and to manage the expectations of both the users and producers of 
knowledge. For example, participation may be interpreted in some cases as “informing” or 
“consulting” and as “co-creation” in others (Reumapatientenbond, VSOP, & ZonMw, 2006, 
p. 19).181 
180  Given the different route of regulatory acceptance of animal-testing alternatives in comparison with 
the development of three-R alternatives in the academic setting, more insight is needed into the role of the 
regulator in the acceptation process. Marie-Jeanne Schiffelers (dissertation expected in 2015) addresses this 
issue in more detail. 
181  The participation of patients is central in this handbook. However, this typology could well be applied to 
other users, including regulatory bodies, fellow researchers, or social movement organisations. For criticism of 
Arnstein’s ladder and suggestions for improvement, see Jonathan Quetzal Tritter and Alison McCallum (2006), 
among others. 
Despite good intentions and careful preparations, the involvement of users in technology 
development (e.g. animal-testing alternatives) is never an absolute guarantee for success. 
Based on numerous retrospective studies of technological innovations, the type of 
interaction also seems to depend on the phase of technology development (Rip & Schot, 
2002), the flexibility of the technology, and the heterogeneity of the user population (Bijker, 
Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; For an overview: Nahuis et al., 2012).
7.2.3 Policy instruments to stimulate user involvement in research
Involving users in the three-R research practice may be stimulated by various policy 
instruments, ranging from the relatively inactive role of scientists (e.g. writing societal 
relevance paragraphs) to a more active role taken by the funding organisation (e.g. 
appointing user-brokers). The table below describes some policy instruments that may 
either stimulate, motivate, or force scientists to involve users in their research practice.
Table 7-2: Some viable policy instruments to stimulate, motivate, or force scientists to involve users in 
their research practice.
Type Function Possible instruments Characteristics, limitations References
Sermon Stimulating 
scientists 
to involve 
users in their 
research
Societal relevance 
paragraph
Risk of symbolic and only  
on-paper involvement
Information (i.e. 
course) on user 
involvement
Optional; depends on 
scientists’ willingness to 
participate
Carrot Motivating 
scientists 
to involve 
users in their 
research
Scoring criteria for 
funding
Requires the quantification 
of user involvement (what to 
measure?); risk of on-paper 
involvement as part of funding 
strategy
Subsidy for undertaking 
user involvement, 
visiting user-relevant 
congresses
Relatively simple; no 
guarantee for good 
involvement (how to qualify 
good involvement?)
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Stick Forcing 
scientists 
to involve 
users in their 
research
Co-financing required
In-kind and in-cash 
possibilities; criticism 
regarding the focus on 
enterprise in academia 
and the long-term effects; 
increased competition 
between scientists (requires 
other competences)
(Gulbrandsen, 
Mowery, & 
Feldman, 2011; 
Larsen, 2011)
Appoint user-brokers 
within each scientific 
three-R project
Expensive; success rate is 
unknown; different types of 
expertise needed; production 
of ‘brokering knowledge’
(Meyer, 2010)
All 3 Almost all suggestions, except for the last one, build on the scientists’ responsibility 
and depend on their intrinsic willingness to involve users and invest energy. However, 
funding organisation may play a role in the match-making between scientists and 
potential contributors (industries, SME, public organisations).
7.3 Contextual discourse: connecting to stakeholders’ values 
The previous level assumed that the development of three-R alternatives is a guarantee 
for their implementation and use as well. In this section, I will argue that this “science and 
technology-push argument” does not match the current practice of three-R alternatives. To 
go beyond this approach, this section looks at the practices in which three-R alternatives 
might be implemented (e.g. academia, industries) or the contexts in which they may 
play a role otherwise (e.g. innovation policy, start-ups investments, public crowd-funding 
initiatives). Following up on the empirical verification of outcomes in the previous section, 
this section deals with the validation of the policy programme and asks whether or not 
the particular programme objective(s) are relevant to the particular problem situation 
(“contextual discourse”). Animal-testing alternatives thus remain the accepted solution 
for the problems associated with animal research, but the placing of these 3R-alternatives 
within their larger infrastructure is challenged. Accordingly, this section considers how 
the implementation of animal-testing alternatives may be improved by connecting to the 
stakeholders’ values and assessment criteria by the process of reframing (see also Chapter 2). 
7.3.1 Need for other drivers of three-R use
There are indications that neither the “science and technology-push” approach model (see 
also Chapters 4 and 6), nor the sole focus on the animal welfare rationale can guarantee 
the successful implementation and use of animal-testing alternatives. There are also other 
drivers and barriers that stimulate and obstruct, respectively, the implementation and use 
of such methods.
Firstly, a technology-push approach does not seem to live up to the expectation that animal-
testing alternatives will be implemented and put to use per se.182 In Chapter 4, we saw that 
such an approach may yield valuable three-R knowledge (e.g. insights regarding mechanism, 
models), but that the actual use of such knowledge is lacking or remains unknown. The 
claim that the ZonMw programmes were successful was based on their three-R harvest, 
rather than the use of the three-R models that had been developed, or the programmes’ 
impact on animal numbers (ZonMw, 2011e). The evaluators claimed that “chain financing” 
was needed to avoid the stranding of potential three-R models (p. 24). It remains unclear 
whether such a linear approach to innovation function in practice, as insights from 
innovation theories and market failures suggest otherwise. For instance, many scholars 
emphasise that science and technology co-evolve with societal and economic pressures, 
which is – almost by definition - not a technologically deterministic process (e.g. Gibbons 
et al., 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Nemet, 2009). In other words, the successful use of 
animal-testing alternatives does not seem to rely only on the technicalities of the model 
and the involvement of the relevant users (i.e. “technical-analytical discourse”) but also 
on finding the right tone and aligning with the stakeholders’ values, stakes and motivators.
 
Secondly, the animal welfare argumentation opposing animal experiments may not be 
the most relevant argument for all (potential) stakeholders of animal-testing alternatives. 
There are other drivers that may either improve or hamper the implementation of such 
methods in specific fields and for specific actors (e.g. Schiffelers et al., 2007 for the “3R 
acceptance model” for regulatory use). For example, Marlous Kooijman and colleagues 
found that the institutional logic of medicine regulation hampered the use of animal-free 
methods in the case of EPO potency testing (Kooijman, Van Meer, Moors, Schellekens, & 
Hekkert, forthcoming). Besides, the few journals that are publishing articles on three-R 
alternatives have a relatively low impact factor, which makes them less attractive for many 
scientists looking to publish, especially so-called “negative data” (i.e. animal studies that 
have not yielded positive or the expected results).183 These examples suggest that the 
animal welfare argument of implementing animal-testing alternatives is not able to lead to 
a breakthrough in the use of three-R methods alone. Therefore, we need to look into the 
stakeholders’ values and assessment criteria (i.e. different frames) in order to stimulate the 
use of 3R-methods. 
182  In a pure technology-push approach, animal-testing alternatives are delivered to the “market” without 
further guidance or embedding. See Chapters 4 and 6 for more information about this approach and references 
to the literature. 
183  The criticism directed at impact factors remains outside the scope of this research. For an overview, please 
see (Amin & Mabe, 2000; Garfield, 2006; Seglen, 1997). Furthermore, ZonMw encourages the publication of 
negative (or neutral) data via the ‘Amendment 21’ module (currently the knowledge infrastructure-module) as 
part of its newest MKMD programme.
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Bottom-up approaches allow frames and parameters to be defined by the stakeholders, 
so that the analysis reflects their concerns more closely (Merkx, 2012). In addition, the 
involvement of “upstream end users” (Lyall, Bruce, Firn, Firn, & Tait, 2004) may influence 
the decision-making process through formal channels.184 This type of involvement may 
stimulate mutual learning amongst actors (e.g. on their different assessment criteria) and 
may avoid the failure of policy initiatives and instruments. Collectively, these attempts – 
either non-anticipated or strategic manoeuvres – can be recognised as reframing: Creating 
room for animal-testing alternatives to gain ground within various contexts, including 
the academic research practice, the innovative drug development practice and the R&D 
departments of the food and chemical industries.
7.3.2 Reframing ‘animal-testing alternatives’ as to fit the situation
The development, acceptance, and use (i.e. “implementation”) of animal-testing alternatives 
may be stimulated by active reframing of the issue (e.g. Gray, 2003. See also Chapter 2). 
Such a process may disconnect animal-testing alternatives from sole animal welfare motives 
as to align with issues more relevant to the various users’ values and assessment criteria 
(e.g. better predictable tests in drug development, improved scientific relevance of models 
in academia, and reliable screening methods for food products and chemical substances). 
The process of reframing is best described in literature for various types of conflicts (see 
also Chapter 2). For example, Roy Lewicki and colleagues (2003) have described various 
local environmental cases where reframing helped to move beyond the intractability of the 
conflict. Yet, in the context of animal-testing alternatives, active reframing may also help to fit 
the ‘animal-testing alternative’ within the appropriate situation in the right wording. Like the 
introduction of the concept of “sustainable development”185, new notions (e.g. “patient-centred 
innovation”, “animal-free research model”, “predictable screening method”) may be able to 
attract new players to the field of 3R-alternative and help to improve their implementation. 
184  In their definition, the category of upstream end users includes those who have formal channels to 
influence the strategies and programmes of research organisations through core funding, the creation of 
research needs, and the production of government documents, among others. This category includes bodies 
acting in the public interest, commercial companies, and other bodies acting on behalf of private or commercial 
interests. At the other end, they distinguish downstream end users from their upstream counterparts in that 
the former’s motivation for making links usually comes from the sponsored bodies, as a means to encourage 
knowledge transfer and the application of their research outputs. Downstream end users (by definition) do not 
commission research or influence the organisation’s research programme; if they do, they are also included 
in the upstream category. This category includes members of the public acting in various roles, business users 
of information, and services that the research organisations provide (See Lyall et al., 2004, p. 78 and beyond). 
185  During the rise of environment issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the focus was on the “limits to 
growth”, which proved to be something of a non-starter for the business community. However, the introduction 
of the concept “sustainable development” in 1987 opened new possibilities. By drawing on the discourses of 
both business and the environment movement, the new concept opened the way for both groups to sit at the 
same table (Fischer, 2003, p. 147). Fischer speaks of a “discourse hegemonic shift” rather than reframing.
This process of reframing already occurs in various places and on several occasions in 
the field of animal research. For example, researchers are encouraged to develop and 
use animal-testing alternatives in their research, as some of these methods are thought 
to produce “better science” (see also Chapters 4 and 5). On a similar note, industries are 
motivated to work on and implement such methods because of the “innovative character” 
of the latter (e.g. SLiM, 2013).186 For others, the animal welfare perspective remains the 
main driver. The continuous process of (re)framing is reflected in the naming of the methods 
and (subsequent) changes in the field. For example, the mixed use of “three-R innovations”, 
“animal-free methods” and “alternatives to animal testing” points to users’ different values 
and relevant assessment criteria. This mixing is not just rhetorical: Reframing the issue 
may actually work in a way that is performative and may subsequently change the field of 
animal-testing alternatives as well (see also Chapter 2 and 3).187 Eventually, one or more 
of these new frames may replace the different co-existing frames and become the new 
societal norm, or “global discourse” (Zwartkruis, 2013). 
Furthermore, it needs to be accepted that finding integrative win-win situations (e.g. by 
reframing) often only scratches the surface in complex disputes (Putnam & Wondolleck, 
2003). At the contextual discourse level of policy evaluation, animal-testing alternatives are 
still accepted as the solution to the many problems associated with animal research. The 
problems are, however, defined in ways that make them more recognisable to users and 
other stakeholders than the animal welfare problem definition (i.e. ethical framing) often 
used in public. It remains at least questionable whether reframing of the issue truly satisfies 
multiple stakeholders with their diverging world views, values and expectations. 
7.3.3 Public policy instruments
To stimulate the use of three-R methods, this level of policy reflection aims to incorporate the 
contexts of such methods into the development and dissemination process. Given the large 
range of actors (e.g. chemical industries, funding organisations, animal welfare organisations, 
regulatory bodies, academic institutes, patient organisations, and consumers), the type of 
products and purposes (e.g. food, education, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, defence, and 
knowledge), as well as the range of public perceptions (varying from complete rejection to 
acceptance under specific conditions), it is necessary to customise the policy instruments 
in order to meet the specific users’ needs. Nevertheless, the scheme on the next page may 
serve as a useful starting point.
186  Given the relatively large amount of money spent on pharmaceuticals and the low market introduction 
of substances (roughly only 1 in 5 000–10 000), the motives for alternative (better) testing methods to screen 
substances and to study pharmacovigilance seem indisputable (Van Meer, 2013).
187  My interpretati on of animal-testi ng alternati ves covers all of these interpretati ons and frames. As such, I 
do not intend to be normative about whether some methods are better alternatives than others.
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Table 7-3. Some viable policy instruments to stimulate, motivate or force (re)framing of three-R alternatives.
Type Function Possible instruments Characteristics, 
limitations
References
Sermon Interesting 
users for 
the use and 
potential 
of three R 
alternatives
Addressing the 
relevant issue in 
communication with 
and to the users (e.g. 
translational research, 
or the predictive value)
What is the relevant 
issue for which 
stakeholder?; 
much time needed 
for research and 
consultation
Carrot Motivating 
users for 
the use and 
potential 
of three R 
alternatives
Three-R databases
Difficulty to define 
search entries
(Van Luijk et al., 2013; 
Van Luijk, Cuijpers, Van 
der Vaart, Leenaars, & 
Ritskes-Hoitinga, 2011)
Three-R benchmark1
Development of relevant 
indicators needed; likely 
resistance from industry; 
large amount of funding 
needed
(AtMF, 2012; SLiM, 2013)
Extension of patent 
expiry date
Risk of increasing 
health care costs
(Mulder in Tweede 
Kamer, 2011a)
Acceptance of patented 
innovations in regulation
(Kooijman, 2013); 
Chapter 5
Challenge driven 
3R-development 
competition2
Includes SMEs and 
other “solution 
providers” besides the 
scientific community
(NC3Rs, 2015)
Acceleration of market 
approval when use of 
animal free techniques
Difficult to judge; 
only one-to-one-
replacements
(Kooijman, 2013)
Stick Forcing 
users to 
use three R 
alternatives
Regulation
Already in place 
(through legislation) 
but hard to control in 
practice
1 This benchmark aims to include companies’ animal research policies as well. As such, this instrument is 
positioned on the boundary of this and the next level of policy evaluation (i.e. systematic discourse).
2 CRACK IT is an open innovation programme designed to accelerate the development, application and 
commercialisation of technologies with 3R-potential as they emerge from the research base. As the sponsors 
(e.g. pharmaceutical, chemical or consumer products sectors) develop the challenges, the programme is 
more organised around a demand-pull approach to innovation than the present Dutch science-push approach 
of 3Rs (see also Chapter 4 and 5).
7.4 Systematic discourse: responsible use of research animals 
Many practices still rely on animal experiments to understand the mechanisms of disease, 
determine dose-response curves of adverse effects, and support the health claims of 
products, among others. This use of research animals is grounded in the general assumption 
that their use yields reliable and useful information for the human situation.188 Nevertheless, 
questions can be raised about the efficiency of the individual animal experiment (“systematic 
discourse”). This section builds on the idea that discouraging animal research, as well as the 
dissemination of more publicly available information concerning animal research, will lead 
to more a responsible use of research animals in the Netherlands. 
7.4.1 The need for additional information
It seems that many of the societal and parliamentary questions and concerns regarding 
animal research in the Netherlands surface as a result of ambiguous or missing information 
on this topic (e.g. Van Zijverden et al., 2013b). Apart from the factual information in the 
yearly nVWA reports ZoDoende and the annual reports from publicly funded licensee 
holders, the sharing of information with the general public is rather limited.189 For example, 
there is no detailed information available on the use of animals within the industry and 
other private institutions. Moreover, animals that fall outside the category of “research 
animal” (i.e. most invertebrates, embryonic forms and “animals killed in stock”) are not 
included in the problem definition of most political and public debates.190 
The contexts under which animal experiments are judged and performed also fall largely 
outside the purview of the general public. For example, the evaluation process of the Animal 
Ethics Committee is not publicly available,191 and only studies with significant results end 
up in scientific journals.192 Furthermore, privately performed experiments only scarcely end 
up in papers, databases, or otherwise publicly available sources, and the various dilemmas 
that researchers and institutions face when performing the experiments largely go 
188  As animal experiments are also performed to advance the veterinary sciences, it’s more appropriate 
to speak of the relevant target organism, including being humans (e.g. drug development) and animals (e.g. 
veterinary research and livestock improvements). 
189  As a result of the revised EU directive, licence holders will need to provide more information to the general 
public, including layman’s project summaries. For research performed in the Netherlands, these summaries can 
be found on the website of the Central Authority for Scientific Procedures on Animals (CCD, 2015).
190  See also the problem of counting as in Chapter 1. Note that “animals killed in stock” (i.e. animals that are 
used to breed a specific strain but are not used in an experiment) have been listed on a separate page in the 
yearly reports Zo Doende for a number of years.
191  Since 2010, all committees are obliged to publish a layman’s summary of their activities and evaluation 
using a standard format (see also the website of the umbrella organisation NVDEC, www.nvdec.nl).
192  However, ZonMw and others do promote the publication of “negative results” (see also Chapter 4). 
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unmentioned.193 Besides, the academic contribution to this topic is relatively small and falls 
predominantly within particular domains of animal research, such as drug development 
(Kooijman, 2013; Van Meer, 2013) and regulatory testing (Schiffelers, 2016 (expected)). 
It would appear that the absence of this kind of information hampers an honest public 
evaluation of the relevance and acceptability of animal experiments in the Netherlands and 
beyond. By being more transparent about the choices that need to be made prior to an 
experiment and the animals that are used, stakeholders might improve their accountability 
on this topic. Subsequently, such an increase in accountability may further lead to more 
responsible animal use: Animal research that falls within the boundaries of that what is 
societally accepted.194 
7.4.2 Accountability: moving beyond numbers and outcome indicators
On this level, the need for additional information comes close to the call for increased 
transparency on this topic.195 Various studies suggest the positive potentials of transparency 
as a regulatory instrument to stimulate and improve the practice of animal experiments, 
although there is no guarantee, because of reframing and spin. In the words of John Roberts 
(2009), the promise of transparency is its presumed mechanism of accountability: “to cast 
light upon what would otherwise remain obscure or invisible and to do so in order to provide 
the basis for confidence for distanced others” (p.957).196 Jonathan Koppell (2005) goes a 
step further and differentiates between five levels of accountability, including transparency 
(“Did the organisation reveal the fact of its performances?”) and responsiveness (“Did the 
organisations fulfil the substantive expectation?”). 
Nevertheless, the call for additional information and (thus) more transparency should not 
be seen as the Holy Grail. Increased transparency may cause panic and crisis and has the 
unintended consequence of changing that which is rendered transparent (Roberts, 2009). 
193  In 2013, NKCA published the book ‘De V van verhalen’ [the loose English translation would be ‘the R of 
readings’, with reference to the three Rs], which contained the views of various players in the field of animal 
experimentation, including animal-testing alternatives. 
194  The boundaries of what kind of research is ‘responsible’ thus remain the outcome of on-going public 
debate, with the expectation that improved transparency, including the dilemmas and problems encountered 
when performing animal experiments, stimulate a more honest debate than at presence. For example, the use 
of animal research for detergents and other household product may fall outside the societally accepted borders 
within the near future, just as animal research for cosmetics in the past. Another example might the duplication 
of animal research between countries or even between research institutions within the same country.
195  Naturally, increased transparency can occur on all levels of policy reflection. The difference is what kind 
of information is shared. 
196  The ideal of complete transparency resembles Foucault’s ideas on panopticism in Discipline and Punish: 
the Birth of the Prison (1977): “The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see 
everything constantly. A central point would be both a source of light illuminating [...] everything that must be 
known, a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned” (p.173). 
In this sense, we may speak of the “performativity of transparency” (Mackenzie, 2006 in 
Roberts, 2009) rather than just the act of making things visible. So while transparency in 
policymaking does not necessarily increase public trust, the lack thereof may increase 
public distrust (e.g. Brown & Michael, 2002; Paula, 2008). 
Increased transparency is not new to the field of animal research. Many actors have initiated 
ways to increase the openness and transparency on animal experiments in the Netherlands. 
For example, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority publishes 
an annual report on the numbers of research animals and animal experimentations (e.g. 
NVWA, 2014), and many actors have their own webpage on the issue.197 Furthermore, 
the “Code Openness Animal Experimentation” (VSNU, NFU, & KNAW, 2008) strives for “a 
binding openness and dialogue on animal experimentation” through self-regulation.198 
Since 2010, the Dutch Animal Ethics Committees are obliged to publish an annual layman’s 
summary of their decisions and activities,199 and most public animal research facilities have 
opened their doors to the general public by appointment. However, most of these initiatives 
focus primarily on the outcomes (i.e. numbers, decisions, and experiments) rather than the 
dilemmas and problems experienced by those in the field. Such initiatives seems to have 
tipped the scales and have given in to the pressure of audits, evaluations and performance 
indicators (i.e. “audit society”: Power, 1997).200 
In addition, some commercial parties have included their animal research’s policy in their 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR201) reports (e.g. GlaxoSmithKline, 2014).202 With these 
reports, companies show their normative standpoint on the issue and take responsibility 
for the impact of their activities on animal experimentation. However, the extent to which 
197  For example, governmental sites, such as www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/dierproeven, and www.
nkca.nl; and private sites, such as www.informatiedierproeven.nl, and www.proefdiervrij.nl. In addition, 
several umbrella organisations published their viewpoints on animal research on their websites, including the 
health funding organisations (www.gezondheidsfondsen.nl/over-ons/publicaties.aspx), and pharmaceutical 
companies (www.nefarma.nl/visiedocumenten), and cosmetic companies (www.ncv-cosmetica.nl/nl/wet-en-
regelgeving/alternatieven-voor-dierproeven/). (All accessed in August 2014.)
198  Examples on the annual reports of the institutions: (Nieuwenhuis, 2013; Radboud UMC, 2014).
199  The annual reports can be found on the website of the umbrella organisation NVDEC (www.nvdec.nl/
styled-4/index.html, accessed November 7th 2013). 
200  In The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Michael Power (1994) asks how auditing can be such a robust 
policy tool when it often seems to fail so spectacularly and what it mean when a society relies so heavily on an 
industry of checking (what Power calls “audit explosion”). 
201  In Dutch, Corporate Social Responsibility is translated as “Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen 
(MVO)”. Regarding research and innovation, the terms “Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Onderzoeken” [‘societally 
responsible research’] and “Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Innoveren” [‘responsible innovation’] have been 
coined (e.g. NWO, 2015; Proefdiervrij, 2012). 
202  More CSR reports can be found at www.sustainability-reports.com (accessed November 7th 2013). This 
list is not meant as a complete overview, and hence other initiatives may have been undertaken in both the 
private and public sector. The examples are from the Netherlands and may differ between countries.
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their policies truly aim for change - and what this change is - is left up to the organisations 
and their stakeholders to decide.
The initiatives thus inform people on the outside of the animal research field (and three-R 
alternatives), while those that spread the information keep control over what is shared. 
The field lacks transparency mechanisms that would discourage the use of animal research. 
By opening up the “black box” that supports animal research, the support for particular 
fields, experiments, animal species, and goals may either be strengthened or weakened. 
As such, additional transparency may thus help to separate the wheat from the chaff and 
to differentiate between animal experiments. Consequently, transparency may lead to an 
improvement in responsible animal research, as only those experiments that are societally 
accepted will be performed. 
7.4.3 Public policy instruments
This section looked into the possibility to tackle animal research directly rather than to 
stimulate the development and use of animal-testing alternatives (which was at the core of 
sections 7.2 and 7.3). The following policy instruments aim to stimulate responsible animal 
use in the Dutch research practice by either providing more information about animal 
research or by discouraging animal research altogether. Collectively, these instruments 
increase transparency around animal research in the Netherlands.
Table 7-4: Some viable policy instruments to encourage responsible use of research animals.
Type Function Possible instruments Characteristics, 
limitations
References
Sermon Informing 
end users  
of animal 
experiments
Labelling and 
traceability of  
products
Problem of inclusion, 
exclusion (“counting as”, 
Chapter 1); increased 
administrative work
(Marotta, Simeone, 
& Nazzaro, 2014; 
Min Aung & Seok 
Chang, 2014, both 
about food)
Cross-links between 
policy and policy 
documents
Telling a more coherent policy 
story between the various 
ministries and corresponding 
topics (e.g. health, safety, 
innovation, work)
Incorporate animal 
research into 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) 
policy and documents1
(Breems, 2006)
(Proefdiervrij, 
2012) (SLiM, 2013)
Carrot Discourage 
animal 
research
Animal testing tax or 
levy2
What determines the level of 
tax?; punishment rather than 
encouragement; earmarking 
of taxes is unusual
(Steenwijk & Van de 
Loo, 2003; Tweede 
Kamer, 2003)
Cap-and-trade system3
Licensees need to buy 
permits to perform animal 
experiments or trade them 
with others; risk of moving to 
other countries
(Hahn & Stavins, 
2010)
National ethics 
committee4
Expected knowledge 
exchange between 
institutes; many different 
kinds of expertise 
necessary to judge the 
various proposals
(Paula, 2008; 
Paula, 2001; Swart 
& Schroten, 2011)
Systematic reviews
Review of literature 
prior to animal studies 
similar to clinical studies; 
not everyone can do it 
themselves
(Ritskes-Hoitinga, 
Leenaars, Avey, 
Rovers, & Scholten, 
2014; Van Luijk et 
al., 2014)
Stick Forcing
Registration of animal 
experiments5
Financial and 
administrative 
consequences for 
licensees
(Nordmann & Rip, 
2009; Van Zijverden, 
Noorlander, & Deleu, 
2013b)
1 The Dutch government cannot force the inclusion of animal research in CSR policies. However, it can 
facilitate the topic and promote animal welfare according to the ISO guidelines (ISO, 2010; Van Gelder & 
Herder, 2010).
2 The possibilities of such a tax have frequently been placed on the political agenda in the Netherlands. 
Armed with report, The price of an animal of 2003, some politicians argued that the tax would raise the 
necessary funding to stimulate animal-testing alternatives. Up until this date, the minister has not agreed 
with such a tax. However, the Secretary Dijksma installed a taskforce that will look into other possibilities to 
fund animal-testing alternatives (EZ, 2014b). 
3 Based on personal communication with employees of the NKCA in September 2013. 
4 The establishment of the Central Authority for Scientific Procedures on Animals [Centrale Commissie 
Dierproeven, CCD] can be seen as the precursor of such a national ethics committee. 
5 Based on the registration of clinical trials, www.trialregister.nl.
7.5 Ideological discourse: reflection on societal values that guide animal experiments
The fourth and final phase of policy evaluation considers the fundamental ideals and 
values that organise the accepted social order of animal experimentation, including 
animal-testing alternatives. This ideological discourse asks whether fundamental ideals (or 
ideological principles) provide a consistent basis for a legitimate resolution of conflicting 
judgements (Fischer, 2003, p. 195). As such, this level is also concerned with the ways in 
which ideological discourse (re)structures the world we live in. Animal experimentation is 
approached as an outcome of – or a compromise between – different and often conflicting 
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values and ideologies, including safety, health, innovation, animal welfare, and economic 
progress. The questions raised on this level are the most fundamental and the most difficult 
to answer. Yet, they form an indispensable part of policy evaluation, and this discussion 
shines a light on the silent choices that organise our modern need for animal research. This 
section assumes that some fundamental ideals, such as our hunger for new knowledge and 
better health care, still rely on animal research. Hence, the development of animal-testing 
alternatives is understood as a means to escape the underlying ideals that drive animal 
research in the first place. Seeking a solution for the problems associated with animal 
research therefore seems unlikely to succeed without a more thorough understanding of 
the ideological discourse that underpins animal research. 
This section starts with a reflection on some of the societal values that organise our modern 
social order and our fixation on technological solutions for social problems. It will conclude 
with some public policy instrument to stimulate discussion. 
7.5.1 Society’s needs: organising values
The reason why animal experimentation generates an ethical dilemma lies with the large 
range of values involved and the different prioritisation that stakeholders adhere to these 
values. Animal experimentation is thus not an ethical dilemma purely because research 
animals are involved.203 Accepting animal experimentation as a compromise of different 
values opens the door to the many values that collectively form the ideological discourse 
structuring modern animal research. These values include our “zero-tolerance behaviour” 
towards side-effects of pharmaceuticals and other products, the perception of health and 
innovation as a goal in itself, and our increasing reliance on science and technology to live 
up to our own expectations, among others.
To a large extent, our dependence on animal experimentation originates from our extreme 
focus on risks and safety. To paraphrase Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, “it is a 
society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates 
the notion of risk” (1998, p. 209). In other words, we live in a “risk society” (Beck, 1992; 
Franklin, 1998).204 
203  Animal experimentation is often regarded as an ethical dilemma because animals are involved. This 
understanding of an ethical dilemma, however, is rather limited. This section understands the totality of 
organising values (where some are more straightforward than others) as equally relevant in the creation of an 
ethical dilemma. 
204  For Beck (1992), risk may be defined as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced 
and introduced by modernization itself” (p.21). He warns about exclusion, as such discussions “[run] the risk of 
atrophying into a discussion [of nature] without people, without asking about the matters of social and cultural 
significance” (p. 24. Italics in original). 
Over the years, many (medical) scandals have resulted in a tight network of rules and 
regulation, “pieced together like a patchwork quilt” (Hartung, 2012, p. 21). But what 
do all the (animal) experiments, rules, and regulations offer us? At most, they provide 
(some) answers to our own questions and driving values. In Beck’s words, behind today’s 
calculations, objectifications, and rationalisations, “the question of acceptance [arises] and 
with it anew the old question: how do we wish to live?” (1992, p. 28). 
The way we approach health and sickness today is another example of an organising value 
that we cannot escape nor deny. We try to stay “healthy” (whatever that may mean) by 
eating “healthy products”(i.e. fruit, vegetables, and products low in salt, sugar and fats), 
while at the same time doing “unhealthy” things (i.e. smoking, over-eating). We take care 
of our sicknesses and rely on a broad range of (technological) possibilities to cure us. Many 
scholars have addressed this issue of the “regulated body”. For example, Deborah Lupton 
argues that “the pursuit of good health has become an end in itself rather than a means to 
an end” (1995, p.70). Rather than accepting sickness and death, modern Western science 
and health care try everything within their limits to cure people and defer death. For this, we 
rely to a large extent on science and technology, of which animal models are an important 
part. In other words, in order to tackle the issue of animal experimentation, one cannot 
neglect the fundamental ideas our modern society holds towards life itself.205 
7.5.2 Escaping the technological fix
The reliance on animal models as a technological solution for a variety of social problems 
associated with health, environment, safety and food consumption also points in the 
direction of a “technological fix” (Rosner, 2004) as part of the structuring device within 
the ideological discourse. A technological fix assumes that science and technology provide 
us with solutions for all kinds of problems. For example, the tissue engineering of organs 
as a solution for the problem of organ failure, bariatric surgery to solve extreme obesity, 
and the building of dykes to prevent water flooding large parts of the Netherlands. Wiebe 
Bijker (2006) has labelled this pervasiveness of science and technology in modern, highly 
developed countries as a “technological culture”. 
Technological fixes often create quick wins and are generally assumed to be easier and less 
painful to achieve than political or social change. After all, how often do we over-think the 
location of the Netherlands when building dykes, address socio-economic factors during 
bariatric surgery, or challenge the quality of health when performing an animal experiment? 
205  Note the work of Machteld Huber (2014) on a new, dynamic definition of health in this respect as well. She 
proposes to reformulate the WHO definition of health as “the ability to adapt and to self-manage”. The strength 
of this concept lies in the integration of the three domains of health: physical, mental, and social. 
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However, to paraphrase another influential scholar in the field of risk and technology, the 
“very idea that there could be a technical solution to a disagreement about goals and 
purposes shows that political reconciliation is rejected” (Douglas, 1992, p. 33). Again, this 
underscores the importance of a more thorough public deliberation about the values and 
priorities that structure animal experiments as part of our modern society.
The absence of a meaningful policy reflection on the values that structure and organise 
animal research seems to keep the policy issue in its current state of deadlock. The societal 
values driving animal research and the tensions evolving simultaneously remain implicit in 
most public places, including policy documents, scientific papers, and annual reports. This 
silence suggests that a more thorough public deliberation about the values accepting and 
driving animal research is not encouraged. However, without reflection on and escape from 
the technological fix, the long-awaited policy change - or even a more radical, structural 
change of a societal (sub)system (i.e. transition) (Rotmans, 2005; Rotmans et al., 2001) - 
may be farther away than ever before.
7.5.3 Public policy instruments
The most radical (policy) change on animal research is expected from a more thorough 
policy reflection on present policies. Such reflection asks for a more meaningful public 
deliberation on the values that (in)directly drive animal research in our modern societies. 
The mediating organisations between research and policy that seems best equipped 
to fulfil such a role are the advisory councils and planning bureaus in the Netherlands, 
especially with their backstage processes206 that support the co-production of research and 
policy (Bekker, 2010 #747. See Halffman & Hoppe, 2005 for the changing science/policy 
boundaries in both advisory councils and planning bureaus in the Netherlands). Nicely 
summarised by Marleen Bekker and colleagues (2010), “[t]hese bodies have to be close to 
politics without being too close; they have to depoliticise policy problems without doing 
away with the normative choices associated with them; and importantly, they have to 
sustain their authoritative positions and credibility in order to perform these role (p.249).207 
In addition, Rathenau institute’s expertise on Parliamentary Technology Assessment may 
also be of help in supporting those who have to take decisions on science and technology 
policies.
206  Back stage processes refers to the practical, yet often invisible, coordination work that needs to be done 
to make research evidence fit the policy perceptions and requirements (Bekker et al., 2010; Bijker et al., 2009). 
See also section 2.7.
207  Note that the depoliticising of policy problems may also hamper a more structural second-order policy 
reflection (see Chapter 4).
Table 7-5: Some policy instruments to facilitate public deliberation on the values that (in)directly drive 
animal research
Type Function Possible instruments
Characteristics, 
limitations
References
Sermon Facilitate Public deliberation Who decides when 
the debate is closed?1; 
societal learning or 
expert learning?
(e.g. Dortmans, 
2016; Paula, 
2008)
Carrot Stimulate Support research 
that addresses the 
structuring values 
of animal research
1 The moment of closure creates a big problem in the organisation of a public debate, especially if there is 
some form of time pressure as with the evaluation and reflection of the values structuring animal research. As 
Lino Paula has summarised accurately: “a debate on fundamental ethical issues cannot simply be declared as 
‘closed’ by the arbitrary fiat of some authority like the government”(Paula, 2008, p. 186). He also points to the 
temporary character of closure: “Closure is, both in principle and in practice, only temporary” (idem, p. 187).
7.6 Concluding remarks
There are indications that there is a political and societal will in the Netherlands to change 
the current public policy on animal research. The question remains, however, to what 
extent and in which direction this policy change will occur.
The goal of this chapter was to consider the possible means of facilitating policy change 
for animal experimentation, including animal-testing alternatives. The chapter departed 
from the national government as central actor in such a change, even though I argue that 
implementation and outcomes are based to a greater extent on the interplay between 
the various actors, values, assumptions, and rationales involved (e.g. Colebatch, 2009; 
Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 2000b). Fischer’s logic of policy evaluation (1995, 2003) was 
used to distinguish between two levels of reflection within such a possible new policy 
framework. Applied to the present situation, first-order reflection assumed that the 
development and implementation of animal-testing alternatives would ultimately lower 
the number of research animal in the Netherlands. Animal-testing alternatives were thus 
regarded as the solution to the problems associated with animal research. On the technical-
analytical level, I proposed to stimulate the involvement of relevant users in the research 
practice of three-R alternatives. On the contextual level, I suggested taking into account the 
context in which three-R alternatives ought to be implemented – in other words, looking 
into the stakeholders’ values, needs, and systems regarding scientific quality, animals, and 
innovation, amongst others issues. Both levels of suggestions focused on the development 
of more relevant three-R alternatives. 
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In the second-order of reflection, the logic of policy deliberation shifted to the societal 
context and the values (in)directly driving animal research. The problems associated with 
animal experimentation were thus attempted to tackle thorough consideration of the guiding 
infrastructures in place and the societal values of modern society. On the systematic level, I 
suggested providing additional information to stimulate a more responsible use of animals 
within Dutch research practice. On the ideological level, I recommended looking into and 
reflecting on the societal values driving our modern dependence on animal research.
Public policy may be understood as an interplay between all four levels of reflection, where 
the beliefs and values on the second order form the ideological base for the more concrete 
policy measurement on the first level. However, while new policies are formulated and 
policy is executed, this second order must not pass out of sight.208 After all, the development 
of animal-testing alternatives would appear to be inadequate and ineffective if they were 
not going to be used, nor if the values driving modern animal research remained the same. 
Therefore, effective policy design includes all four levels of reflection, which may include 
the policy focus: Making policy means making decisions.
Finally, animal experimentation remains a sensitive policy topic, and any of the proposed 
changes are likely to face resistance at the beginning. Therefore, and following John Grin 
and Henk van de Graaf (1996a), I suggest that further studies on the feasibility of potential 
means, objectives, and instruments should at least include a thorough understanding of 
the actors’ different interpretations in order to promote mutual learning between them. 
I believe that such an understanding helps to establish change in practice, instead of a 
more ritual dance on paper. In addition to a broader understanding of feasibility, I suggest 
including additional indicators that better visualise learning and change than the current 
outcome indictor of animal numbers (e.g. Drooge & Spaapen, 2011a; Drooge et al., 2011b; 
Power, 1997). This chapter aimed to inspire a sustainable transition as to better reflect 
the societal concerns regarding animal research (i.e. “sustainable development”, e.g. Grin, 
Rotmans, & Schot, 2010). Yet, the decision (of how) to move forward remains above all a 
societal and political consideration.209 
208  Policy change on this level is also likely to be less vulnerable to small societal and political changes, such 
as the expanding legal definition of research animals, or the inclusion of new techniques as animal-testing 
alternatives. The more animals are counted as research animals by law, the fewer animals are regarded as 
animal-testing alternatives, which results in a negative impact on the current indicator of policy effectiveness. 
Moreover, the inclusion of new techniques under the header of ‘animal-testing alternatives’ runs the risk of 
over-acceptance and loss of discriminative power between alternatives and non-alternatives. Which techniques 
and research will be granted funding and which ones will not? (See also Chapter 5). 
209  Following John Grin, Jan Rotmans and Johan Schot (2010), such transitions also require the “quest for 
new value systems” (p. 2). It forms the third level of their analysis of transitions: values and their expression in 
life-styles. 
Table 7-6: Summary of all four levels of policy evaluation, including their relevant questions and the 
underlying assumptions.
develop useful 
alternatives
stimulate use of 
alternatives
responsible 
animal use life choices
Fischer’s level of 
policy evaluation
technical-analytical 
discourse
contextual 
discourse
systematic 
discourse
ideological 
discourse
Guiding 
questions
How do we 
develop more 
useful alternatives 
through research?
How do we create 
the conditions in 
which alternatives 
are in demand?
What type of 
animal research 
do we find 
acceptable?
How do we wish 
to live?
Assumes / 
Accepts
- necessity of 
animal research
- animal-testing 
alternatives as 
solution to the 
problems of 
animal research
- developing 
animal-tetsing 
alternatives
- necessity of 
animal research
- animal-testing 
alternatives as 
solution to the 
problems of 
animal research
- necessity of 
(some) animal 
research
- none of the 
previous
Actor researchers researchers  
and users
all actors in chains 
(thus including 
researchers and 
users)
society as a 
whole
Approach developing useful 
alternatives by 
user involvement 
in research
connecting to 
stakeholders’ 
values by 
reframing
using research 
animals responsibly 
by discouraging 
animal research 
and the provision 
of additional 
information
reflecting on 
societal values 
that guide animal 
experiments 
by public 
deliberation
Possible policy 
instruments
impact paragraph 
in research 
proposals, 
training for user 
involvement
three-R 
databases, 
elongation of 
patent expiry 
date, rules and 
regulations
labelling and 
traceability of 
products, animal 
testing tax or levy, 
systematic reviews
public 
deliberation 
for more 
meaningful 
policy reflection
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Illustratie hfst 88 Lost in technification
This research project has studied the extent to which the Dutch discourse coalition on animal experimentation reflected societal concerns regarding this issue. The aim has 
been to understand the incongruence between scientific and technological promises and 
societal expectations on animal research, and perhaps more importantly, to stimulate a 
more viable and effective policy in the future.
This concluding chapter assembles the insights and scientific contributions that the research has 
provided. I will recapitulate the findings of this process as concisely but accurately as possible. 
I argue that the present discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands 
has only provided a partial answer to societal concerns regarding animal experimentation 
in the country. Societal expectations on the decreasing numbers of research animals lagged 
behind the shifting discourse coalition’s understanding of animal-testing alternatives and 
three-R research, and this delay may have contributed to the present incongruence. I will 
also argue that some level of policy change is needed to stimulate a more sustainable future 
for animal experimentation – one that heeds societal expectations. 
Firstly, I will answer the research questions that were presented in this dissertation’s 
introduction. Secondly, I will discuss the main insights in terms of their scientific 
contributions and relevance for the animal research practice in the Netherlands, including 
the implications for (future) three-R research. Finally, I will identify the most important 
questions that remain and the specific challenges for future research.
8.1 Answering the research questions
The main research question in this dissertation was: To what extent does the present 
discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives have the ability to reflect the societal 
concerns regarding animal experimentation in the Netherlands? In this section, I 
recapitulate the answers to the three main sub-questions: 
1. How can the present incongruence between societal expectations and technological 
promises from the dominant discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives be 
understood from an interpretive framework of policy evaluation?
2. How can the mobilising power of the dominant discourse coalition on animal-
testing alternatives in the Netherlands be valued?
3. How can there be a sustainable change in policy that would do justice to the 
societal expectations regarding animal experimentation in the Netherlands?
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8.1.1 Understanding the present incongruence 
The answer provided in Part II of this dissertation (Chapters 3-5), is primarily empirical. 
The case studies - Dutch policy discourse on animal experimentation including animal-
testing alternatives, ZonMw research programmes on animal-testing alternatives, and the 
research practice of the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre - were analysed by using the 
interpretive framework of policy evaluation and reflection, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 described the shifting interpretation of the concept of animal-testing alternatives 
in Dutch policy discourse by means of an analysis of policy frames in documents dating to 
the time between the publication of the draft of the Animal Experimentation Act in 1970 
and the Cabinet’s Action Plan in 2011. Chapter 4 described how the re-interpretation of 
animal-testing alternatives upon the delegation of policy implementation to the ZonMw 
research council strengthened the technification of the policy issue. Chapter 5 identified 
several tensions within the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre (NTC) in their attempt to 
produce societally relevant knowledge on animal-testing alternatives.
The empirical observations have focused on the Dutch animal research discourse(s), and on 
policy and research programmes related to animal-testing alternatives. Most observations 
have therefore been directly related to the policy framing and discourse coalition’s 
interpretation of animal research and animal-testing alternatives. However, having 
examined the research-policy mediation infrastructure in relation to three-R research as 
well, some observations touch upon the co-production of knowledge and policy, the way 
in which innovation was stimulated and on the societal relevance of science as well. The 
following are the nine most important empirical observations that help explain the present 
incongruence between the societal expectations and the discourse coalition’s technological 
promises regarding animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands. 
The empirical case studies suggested that the introduction of the concept of animal-testing 
alternatives in Dutch policy discourse successfully reframed the policy issue of animal 
experimentation from a trade-off between animal welfare and public health to a win-win 
situation. This new discourse on animal testing established a new discourse coalition in 
which many opponents from the previous discourse(s) on animal experimentation were 
able to work together towards one ostensibly shared normative horizon.
This reframing redefined the policy problem in terms of an animal-testing alternatives 
shortage. This redefinition paved the way for a technical solution to the societal problems of 
animal experimentation: The development of animal-testing alternatives became the most 
successful policy intervention to reduce the numbers of research animals. Non-technical 
policy interventions, such as tax incentives to stimulate the use of animal-free research 
methods, were hardly debated.
For the realisation of these plans, the Dutch government depended heavily on the 
infrastructure that mediates research-policy interactions on this issue, including research 
councils and large research programmes. In the absence of an unambiguous moral 
government standpoint on animal experimentation, the fundamental and political choices 
regarding animal research and animal-testing alternatives’ development were left up to 
the research council ZonMw (Chapter 4), the Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI) and 
the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre (Chapter 5). These intermediary organisations gave 
meaning to the policy issue in interaction with other members of the discourse coalition 
(i.e. co-production of science and policy), including scientists, NGOs, and industries. 
Collectively, the discourse coalition (including the intermediary organisations) on animal 
experimentation created the promise that science and technology were the answer 
to the societal problems of animal experimentation. The negotiated and co-produced 
knowledge seemed to have further technified the policy issue of animal experimentation 
and overshadowed possible non-technological policy interventions.
Within this shaping practice of knowledge and policy, the interpretation of what counted 
as good animal-testing alternatives has shifted over the past decade as well. Upon its 
introduction into the Dutch policy discourse in 1970s, the term was understood as an 
alternative to the animal model in experiments (i.e. animal-free; “first-generation animal-
testing alternatives”). In the 1980s, this term was re-interpreted to mean methods that 
could either replace, or refine and reduce animal experiments (i.e. 3Rs; “second-generation 
animal-testing alternatives”). Presently, a significant number of animal-testing alternatives 
focus on the understanding of underlying mechanisms of disease, toxic (side) effects and 
overall response and aim to overcome animal experimentation (i.e. “third-generations 
animal-testing alternatives”). 
The discourse coalition’s understanding of the type of three‑R research that needed (public) 
funding shifted alongside the changing interpretation of animal-testing alternatives as 
well. In the earlier programmes on animal-testing alternatives (such as PAD), only research 
substituting animal models was subsidised (i.e. “first-generation research on animal-testing 
alternatives”). Until around 2000, relevant three-R research was interpreted as research 
that would lead to a one-on-one replacement, refinement or reduction of the former animal 
model in an experiment (“second-generation three-R research”). This type of research 
was directly related to animal models in research and therefore also to the annual total of 
research animals. Meanwhile, emerging technologies, such as genomics and system biology, 
were welcomed into the discourse coalition thanks to their animal-reducing potential. This 
inclusion appeared to stretch the interpretation of three-R research to include fundamental 
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research focusing on the underlying biological mechanisms of disease and toxic responses, 
as well (“third-generation three R-research”). While this type of research may eventually 
avoid the use of animal models in research altogether, thanks to the development of more 
relevant models, the impact on animal numbers seems more uncertain. 
Along these expanding interpretations of animal-testing alternatives and three-R 
research gradually shifted the (technical) discourse coalition’s promise from an absolute 
to a relative promise of reducing animal numbers. Animal-testing alternatives from first-
generation research aimed to substitute animal experiments for animal-free experiments 
(“replacement”) or experiments that used fewer research animals (“reduction”). Therefore, 
these first-generation animal-testing alternatives that were developed were to decrease 
the absolute number of research animals in the Netherlands.210 However, the second and 
third generation of animal-testing alternatives were not so much aimed at substituting 
the animal experiments, as it was to gain more relevant knowledge for the human 
health situation. In this understanding, increased knowledge production from an animal 
experiment (e.g. through ’omics or imaging technologies) or methods that may improve 
the pre-screening of substances were also understood as animal-testing alternatives. The 
majority of such second- and third-generation alternatives are added to the present system 
of animal experimentation and may at best reduce the number of animals per test, method 
or substance. This shift in the understanding of animal-testing alternatives may thus lead 
to a relative reduction of research animals, but not necessarily to an absolute reduction in 
the number of research animal in the Netherlands as registered by the NVWA every year.
The public funding of the development of animal-testing alternatives takes a science and 
technology-push approach to innovation. Such an understanding assumes that scientific 
understanding (rather than demand) drives the rate and direction of innovation. This 
linear model of innovation supported the programmes’ investment in (three-R) research 
to develop animal-testing alternatives. Combined with the reframed policy problem of 
animal-testing alternatives shortage, this model supported the belief that the availability of 
animal-testing alternatives would guarantee their use and subsequently lower the number 
of research animals as well. Although the more recent programmes seemed to focus 
more on the implementation of animal-testing alternatives by demanding co-financing, 
the argument of scientific understanding appeared to be sustained as a crucial link to the 
development of animal-testing alternatives.
210  “Refinement alternatives” are deliberately excluded here, as such alternatives improve the welfare of 
research animals but do not affect the numbers of animals in experiments. 
Moreover, the present science system seems not fully equipped to truly advance societally 
relevant research, including the development of animal-testing alternatives. For example, 
my analysis of the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre showed that policy believed the 
potential animal-reducing rationale of genomics, against the prevailing concerns regarding 
increased animal use in genomics research. The animal-reducing potential of genomics 
research thus seemed to legitimise the massive public investment in this type of research. 
Yet, in the execution of the research programme, the public goal of developing animal-
testing alternatives seemed to have shifted to the background. The “business case” 
approach, as well as the dominant science rewarding system, seemed to value the economic 
valorisation and publication of research more than the reduction of animal numbers. The 
extent to which the research contributed to the progress or development of animal-testing 
alternatives within the programme seemed to rely more on the individual researcher than 
on the programmes’ organisation.
Finally, the infrastructure that mediates research-policy interactions on this issue seemed 
to limit the level of policy reflection in the absence of clear policy objectives and/or a moral 
standpoint. The evaluation of research programmes focused on the extent to which animal-
testing alternatives were developed, rather than on evaluating the investment in three-R 
research in relation to the policy goals of reducing animal numbers. Reflection on the way 
in which other societal values, as reflected in other policies, influenced the need for animal 
experiments thus seemed to play no part in the neither the programme’s evaluation nor 
the discourse coalition’s deliberation (i.e. “social choice”). 
I argue that societal expectations of reducing absolute animal numbers lagged behind the 
discourse coalition’s re-interpretations and shifts regarding animal-testing alternatives 
and three-R research. These gradual diverging understandings eventually resulted in the 
present incongruence between the societal expectation and technological promise on 
animal experimentation including animal-testing alternatives.
8.1.2 Valuing the mobilising power of the discourse coalition
Chapter 6 mainly provided the answer to this question. In this chapter I showed how 
ethical, economic, and scientific arguments led to a disruption of the old discourse(s) on 
animal research and boosted the formation of a new discourse with a strong orientation 
towards animal-testing alternatives. I also showed how the low level of policy reflection, the 
concept’s flexibility, and the creation of promises and expectations (i.e. “enabling discursive 
processes”) matured the new discourse into the dominant discourse in the Netherlands.
Thanks to its mobilising power, the introduction of the concept of animal-testing alternatives 
thus initially helped to move beyond the impasse of the discourse on animal experimentation 
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in the 1990s: Various actors were able to recognise themselves in the “replace-reduce-refine 
discourse” and to work towards one ostensibly shared normative horizon: Together they 
formed a new discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives. Publicly, this newly formed 
discourse coalition created the technological promise that the investment in animal-testing 
alternatives would lead to a decrease in research animal numbers. The discourse coalition 
seemed to co-create and strengthen the societal expectation for this matter as well. 
However, at present it appears that the enabling discursive processes have been pushed 
too far. Public disagreement on the current approach from within the discourse coalition 
(e.g. stimulating three-R research to decrease annual research animal numbers, and the 
effectiveness of the public policy on animal experimentation) seem to be breaking down 
the foundations of the discourse coalition. Furthermore, the coalition mainly consists of 
actors from within the direct science-policy nexus, including scientists, universities and 
other knowledge institutes, research councils and, to a limited extent, NGOs.
Based on the empirical findings, and the vulnerabilities of the present discourse coalition, 
I argue that the concept of animal-testing alternatives, or the “three Rs”, is losing its ability 
to act (i.e. “power” Avelino, 2011). The present discourse coalition is only marginally able to 
mobilise new players outside the direct science-policy nexus (e.g. professional technology 
investors, wealthy civilians, NGOs and other societal organisations, such as health 
organisations, and CSR-platforms) to join the discourse coalition. Yet, such mobilisation 
is urgently needed for the sustainable transition that better reflects the societal values 
regarding animal research. As Dutch public policy heavily depends on broad agreement to 
act, the vulnerability of the present discourse coalition demands a more thorough policy 
reflection in order to stimulate policy change in the desired direction. 
8.1.3 Stimulating meaningful policy reflection for sustainable policy change
In Chapter 7, I elaborated on issues that need to be addressed further in public deliberation 
in order to stimulate a more meaningful policy reflection and to advance sustainable policy 
change. The chapter anticipated on the four levels of policy evaluation and reflection 
(i.e. “technical-analytical”, “contextual”, “systematic”, and “ideological discourse”) and 
suggested several means on how policy may be performed (and improved) from a central 
government’s perspective. The suggested approaches included user involvement in three-R 
research, the reframing of the issue so as to better fit the various stakeholder’s values and 
motives, the discouragement of animal experimentation, and reflection on the societal 
values driving animal experimentation. For each of these means, different potential public 
policy instruments were suggested (e.g. co-financing, patent elongation, cap-and-trade 
system, and the a more meaningful public deliberation).
I have differentiated between “first-order” and “second-order policy evaluation” (e.g. 
Fischer, 1995), both of which reflect the underlying assumptions guiding policy change. 
Policy evaluation on the first-order level assumed that animal experimentation is, at 
least to some extent, necessary and accepts animal-testing alternatives as a solution 
for the problems associated with animal research (i.e. ethical, economic, and scientific 
arguments). Policy change on this level is therefore primarily focused on the development 
of more relevant three-R models. Evaluation on the second order, however, seeks out an 
understanding of the mechanisms requiring animal experimentation models as a means to 
answer societal questions. Consequently, policy change on this level is primarily focused on 
stimulating relevant research models and a more balanced inclusion of other, yet related, 
societal values. 
This research was based on animal welfare as the main societal value in the public debate on 
animal research (i.e. societal expectation on reducing animal numbers). However, I argued 
that real and sustainable policy change on this topic is rather unlikely without the inclusion 
of other, perhaps even conflicting, societal values that greatly affect the appreciation of 
animal models, including our present understanding of health (e.g. Huber, 2014), the 
acceptance of risks (e.g. Beck, 1992), the societal relevance of science (e.g. Hessels, 2010), 
and the stimulation of the “knowledge economy” (e.g. EZ, 2013), among others. 
This research suggests that, without denying the first-order implications, public deliberation 
on the second-order level of policy reflection (i.e. “ideological discourse”) creates a more 
societally balanced policy on animal experimentation than the focus on animal welfare 
alone. Without a doubt, this deliberation will require some tough policy decisions. 
8.1.4 Lost in technification
Based on the answers to this study’s sub-questions, I argue that the present discourse 
coalition on animal-testing alternatives has only partly lived up to the societal concerns 
regarding animal experimentation in the Netherlands. I explicitly say “partly”, because 
there are two sides to this conclusion. On the one hand, the discourse coalition on animal-
testing alternatives has indeed failed to live up to the societal expectations of reducing 
numbers. The annual count of research animals has remained more or less stable over 
the past decade, despite members’ intentions and expenditure. The inclusion of the so-
called “killed-in-stock” animals would have even led to a more negative evaluation, as this 
category would have doubled the total number of animals in the research context.211 On 
the other hand, however, the new discourse on animal research including the discourse 
211  By law, this category is not counted as research animals. See also Section 1.2.3 for a discussion on “counting 
as” (Stone, 1997a). 
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coalition on animal-testing alternatives has also been quite successful, as it has been able 
to overcome the impasse of the previous discourse(s) on animal experimentation and has 
placed the issue higher on the political and societal agenda. It seems unlikely that this could 
have occurred without the introduction of the concept of animal-testing alternatives (i.e. 
the 3Rs). 
Yet, I also argue that the present Dutch discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives 
is vulnerable and approaching a crossroad. In the near future, it appears likely that the 
present “three-R discourse” will disrupt and, as a consequence, boost the formation of 
new discourses, for example one organised around the transition towards an animal-free 
research world (i.e. replacement, avoidance), and another that is organised around the 
present system of animal experimentation (i.e. refinement and reduction). The foreseen 
crossroad underscores the urgent need to elaborate specific issues in public deliberation as 
to stimulate a more meaningful policy reflection and to advance sustainable policy change.
As on this moment, I argue that technification is deeply embedded in the current system(s) 
of animal research, including public policy, research programmes on animal-testing 
alternatives, and research practices. This includes a) the (policy) discourse’s assumption 
that the social problem of animal research can be solved with the technical solution of 
developing animal-testing alternatives; b) the policy problem definition as a shortage of 
animal-testing alternatives and the need for more funding212; c) the primarily science-
driven approach to innovation in the research programming of animal-testing alternatives; 
d) the understanding of animal-testing alternatives as a spin-off of other more mainstream 
research; and e) the technical/scientific understanding of a relative reduction of animal 
numbers as a result of the implementation of animal-testing alternatives. I conclude that 
because of this technification, the latent clash of societal values and the absence of some 
tough decisions, the present Dutch public policy discourse on animal research is “lost in 
technification”.
8.2 Scientific contributions and societal relevance 
In this section I discuss the main insights of this research in terms of its scientific contribution 
and societal relevance, especially with regard to research funding and policy making.213
212  The assignment for a temporarily established Think-tank of which I have been involved as the secretary, 
also supports this policy assumption. The Think-tank was asked to formulate ways to generate additional 
funding to generate a “push” in research into animal-testing alternatives (Dijksma, 2014; EZ, 2014b). 
8.2.1 Scientific contributions 
This study examined the extent to which the discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives 
in the Netherlands reflects the societal concerns regarding animal experimentation. The 
approach combined theoretical insights from Science and Technology Studies, innovation 
studies and policy sciences. I will briefly discuss the four main scientific contributions 
emerged from this dissertation, which are related to the following themes: interpretative 
policy analysis, understanding societal relevance and the co-creation of promises, frame 
analysis, and policy reflection.
First, this study has contributed to a fuller understanding of the use of interpretive policy 
analysis and contributed to the increasing body of literature with new empirical data. 
Following Henk Wagenaar, Frank Fischer, Dvora Yanow and others, I argue that meaning is 
“constitutive” of political actions, governing institutions and public policy, and an integral 
part of the policy process. It is precisely for that reason that meaning can shape practices, 
institutions and policies that bring them into being (e.g. Fischer, 2007a, 2007b; Fischer 
& Forester, 1993: See also Chapters 1 and 2; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 1996). Interpretive 
(policy) analyses seem essential to describe and understand societal incongruences or 
“implementation problems” for policy problems such as animal experimentation. 
Second, this study has contributed to a fuller understanding how “persistent problems” are 
understood and re-interpreted along the science-policy nexus, especially within the interplay 
of expectations and promises (i.e. “sociology of expectations”, STS). My distinction between 
the promise and the expectation may provide a valuable analytical tool to describe the 
co-creation of promises, whereas the addition of the adjective “technological” to Fischer’s 
level of policy reflection may offer a useful way to describe incongruences between policy 
intentions and the public at large. The theoretical framework and empirical observations 
of this study may therefore be also relevant to scholars studying the interplay between 
societal values and policy goals in other domains and research programmes. 
Third, it has contributed to a further operationalisation of frame analysis as part of the 
larger family of interpretative methods. Frames name and claim a specific situation in a 
way that provides an answer to the question of what is going on. Building on the work 
of Peter Scholten (2007, 2011), I classified four frame characteristics that represent the 
different features of (policy) frames. These are issue identification, which refers to the 
contextualisation of the issue; categorisation, which draws the boundaries of the issue 
213  The distinction between the scientific contributions and societal relevance of (my) research is purely 
practical, and I consider the “scientific contributions” to be just as social as the “societal relevance” of my 
research. 
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defined; attributed responsibility, which describes which actors are held responsible; and 
causal story, which describes how the problems, categories, and actors are glued together 
in an intelligible and convincing story to make an issue comprehensible. The classification of 
the four frame characteristics proved to be of great value to describe the frame shifts over 
time and may be helpful to analyse frame shifts in other (policy) issues, too. 
Fourthly, this study has shown how Fischer’s framework for policy evaluation (e.g. Fischer, 
2003) reflected the various levels of policy change. This suggests that Fischer’s four-level 
model may also be of value in designing policy – in addition to analysing policy214 – and in 
proposing concrete policy instruments that could promote policy change in the desired 
direction. The integration of all four levels of policy reflection (“discourse”) in future policy 
appears to create a more coherent and robust policy change than change based on a first-
order level of reflection only. 
8.2.2 Societal relevance
This research has studied how diverging societal values have been translated and re-
interpreted along the science-policy nexus in public policy, research programming and 
research practices for animal-testing alternatives. Given its empirical focus, this study 
holds particular relevance for the “animal research practice”, including (three-R) scientists, 
research councils, NGOs, political parties, industries, regulators, civil servants and the public 
at large. However, the empirical observations – including the functional flexibility of societal 
relevance and the observed tensions within research programmes – seem also relevant for 
studying and understanding other persistent problems. 
This study has contributed to a fuller understanding of why the promise of developing 
animal-testing alternatives has not lived up to the societal expectation of reducing research 
animal numbers. It has also shown that the transition towards an animal-free research 
world is much more complex than often assumed and presented, exactly because of the 
diverging – and sometimes even conflicting – societal values and stakeholders’ priorities. 
This may help actors both within and outside the present discourse coalition to reflect 
on their own role in the establishment of the current incongruence and to improve the 
situation within reach of their abilities (i.e. shaping of sustainable policy change that better 
reflects the different societal values). 
214  His framework has been used to reconstruct policy theories on ethnicity policy arguments in the 
Netherlands (Hoppe, 1993), fleet ballistic missiles in the United States, the packing of fresh dairy products in 
the Netherlands (Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996b), wind turbine development in Denmark (Grin & Van de Graaf, 
1996a), and eutrophication control (Loeber, 2003), among others.
I have argued that the present Dutch public policy discourse on animal research is “lost 
in technification” and that at least some level of policy change is needed. Especially as 
put forward in Chapter 7, I have identified issues that need to be addressed further in 
public deliberation so as to stimulate more meaningful policy reflection and to advance a 
sustainable transition that better reflects the societal concerns regarding animal research. 
I argue that without a clearer picture of the future - or normative horizon - of animal 
experimentation in the Netherlands, public policies on this issue will continue to drift and 
are likely to lead to increasing societal and political debate with regard to their effectiveness.
 
This study has contributed in particular to a better understanding of the difficulties in 
developing animal-testing alternatives in both research programming as well as in research 
practices. The empirical observations suggested that the goal of developing animal-testing 
alternatives within three-R research have become “spin-offs” or “positive side effects” of 
more mainstream research. This observation raises the question whether the relatively low 
budget of three-R development is to be spent on (fundamental) knowledge development 
about the biological mechanisms underlying disease and adverse effects or emerging 
technologies. Without questioning the importance of such research, the question remains 
whether this type of research should indeed be part of the policy budget for animal-testing 
alternatives or be financed as part of the overall research budget in the Netherlands (i.e. by 
the ministry of Education, Culture and Science, ‘OCW’). It seems likely that scientists, public 
organisation, and private companies will further invest in emerging technologies when they 
are convinced of the scientific and/or economic advantages over traditional animal research. 
In other words, this type of innovative research is likely to more or less spontaneously 
find its way to those places where it can contribute to the reduction or replacement of 
animal research. (If this appears not to be the case, it seems wiser from a governmental 
perspective to invest in bridging those worlds than to develop more scientific knowledge). 
Spin-off research may thus well be relevant for scientific purposes, but apparently fails to 
live up to the societal expectation of reducing animal numbers in the short term.
I argue for a more systematic and demand-pull approach to these innovations with the 
conviction that research programming on animal-testing alternatives remains necessary in 
advancing the transition, but without wishing to pre-empt the decisions that are yet to be 
made in public deliberation. Such an approach implies that the research programming starts 
with the users’ needs and only funds that type of knowledge development (e.g. mechanisms, 
models, technologies) for which there is a need to improve – and perhaps even guarantee - 
their implementation. Given the on-going public debate on animal experimentation, one may 
also image a more “societal pull” approach in three-R development, in which the society at 
large helps to prioritise those fields in which animal research is least accepted (e.g. regulatory 
testing, academic use, industrial use for detergents and other household products).
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Optimisation of such a demand/societal-pull approach to innovation also seems to require 
a structure different to the current research programming, especially with regards to the 
funding applicants and the type of funding available. In current research programmes on 
animal-testing alternatives, the main applicant for the research funding ought to be public 
(e.g. universities, knowledge institutes), excluding SMEs, larger industries, and other private 
organisations. The question arises whether such distinction of the public and private still 
holds in accelerating the transition. 215 For example, SMEs may be much better equipped to 
translate scientific knowledge into commercial products and to advance the replacement 
of animal models in both science and industry than scientists alone. One may also imagine 
a system in which different types of funding (e.g. subsidies, philanthropy, venture capital) 
match the different phases of innovation, including the notorious ‘valley of death’.216 
Government funding may then be spent on those projects, research, or experiments that 
others (including “the market”) are less likely to invest in. Whether this systematic approach 
to innovation and allowance of other applicants is desirable and legally allowed (e.g. 
whether it remains within the EU rules of state support) in the stimulation of sustainable 
futures (e.g. fewer research animals) requires further political deliberation. Here the issue 
on animal experimentation can learn from other (adjacent) policy issues as to stimulate 
a more sustainable society, for example in bridging the valley of death in eco-innovations 
(e.g. Van der Vooren & Hanemaaijer, 2015) and future-proof rules and regulation for 
technological developments (e.g. “big data”) and new business models (Kamp, 2015).
Besides reflecting on the structure and organisation of research programming on animal-
testing alternatives, the transition may also be advanced when animal experimentation is 
truly understood as a means to answer a scientific research question rather than as a goal in 
itself. For example, the current debate on the “synthesis of evidence”, including the use of 
systematic reviews prior to animal studies, has the potential of a substantial game changer 
if made compulsory.217 Furthermore, such a understanding of animal experimentation 
215  This question was also raised in the “transition sessions” in June 2015 as part of the Think tank’s advice on 
additional three-R research funding. 
216  The ‘valley of death’ refers to the funding gap between basis research and the commercialisation of a 
product (in Dutch better known as “de vallei des doods’, e.g.Van der Vooren & Hanemaaijer, 2015)
217  In short, this issue relates to the gathering of scientific evidence prior and during the animal experiment 
and includes the meta-analysis of existing scientific literature (i.e. systematic reviews, SRs) on the topic. The 
use of systematic reviews is very common in clinical studies and its expected that the use of such reviews in 
preclinical animal studies lead at least to more relevant animal studies and likely also to fewer animal studies 
(e.g. Ritskes-Hoitinga et al., 2014). 
The possible introduction of SRs in animal research leads to much tumult in the scientific community, as many 
share the opinion that SRs do not add anything to the present literature searches, are time-consuming, and 
as such fit not within the scope of the average research project (e.g. Swankhuisen & Smit, 2014). Yet, ZonMw 
supports the work of the Systematic Review Centre for Laboratory animal Experimentation (SYRCLE) and has co-
organised workshops for biomedical researchers on the topic. Currently, the Netherlands National Committee 
for the protection of animals used for scientific purposes [‘Nationaal Comité advies dierproevenbeleid, NCad’] 
may also help to connect the issue with other policy issues as to advance a sustainable 
transition, including health promotion and prevention, drug development, eco-innovations, 
and responsible research innovation. It is suggested that the interlinkage between animal 
research policies and these other relevant issues and their policies may help to gather more 
(political) support for the issue itself, as well as to help with the development of more 
relevant policy indicators to evaluate the policies’ effectiveness rather than on research 
animal numbers alone. 
Finally, the empirical observations of this study suggest that the public legitimacy of scientific 
research is vulnerable to overpromising, which may contribute to the loss of a scientist’s 
or a scientific field’s credibility. This study may help actors (e.g. scientists, NGOs, research 
councils) to reflect on their role in the “science-credibility cycle” (Hessels, 2010), including 
their role in the retention of a public “science-on-demand image”,218 which presumably 
creates unrealistic societal expectations about the progress and contribution of science in 
society in general, and that of an animal-free research world in particular. 
8.3 Remaining questions and challenges for future research 
This project has explored the translation process of societal values regarding animal 
experimentation along the science-policy nexus in the Netherlands. Doing research - or 
any other type of work - requires demarcation at some point to establish closure. Several 
decisions in this study’s research design therefore lead to suggestions and requirements for 
further scientific research. 
The first issue concerns the actors studied. I focused on the national policy concerning 
animal research and three-R alternatives, relevant funding organisations in this field, and 
researchers within relevant scientific programmes as part of the discourse coalition on 
animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands. The role of industries, NGOs and health 
funding organisations, among others, in shaping the definition and policy on animal research 
and the three-Rs therefore remained largely outside the scope of this study. In addition, the 
focus was trained on the Dutch situation. Much of the legislation is left up to individual 
member states of the European Union to implement (i.e. “discretionary space”), as animal 
research for scientific purposes is not prescribed in legislation, and as the Netherlands still 
has its own policy and funding organisations on animal research and three-R alternatives. 
is preparing a recommendation on the ‘synthesis of evidence’, which is expected to be due at the end of 2015. 
218  This image includes the assumption that knowledge application, including the development and validation 
of animal-testing alternatives, may be feasible within the scope of a (four years) research project. 
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It would be of interest to expand the scope of this study to other, more internationally 
orientated actors and to look into (public policy) instruments from their perspective and 
range of influences, too.
The second issue relates to the current discussions on the reporting and evaluating of the 
societal relevance of scientific research. While this issue has been raised throughout the 
study – specifically in Chapters 5 and 7 – a more detailed elaboration (on specific indicators, 
for example) did not make it into the research design. However, the field of animal research 
and three-R alternatives may benefit greatly from these debates, as they argue for more 
societally relevant research without undermining the value of fundamental research or 
giving in to the “audit explosion” (Power, 1997), and they include work on the development 
of more suitable indicators to make such progress visible (e.g. Drooge & Spaapen, 2011a; 
Drooge et al., 2011b; Hessels, 2010; Spaapen et al., 2007). Given the vulnerability of the 
policy indicator of animal numbers, it seems prudent to study which (combination of) 
indicators can both visualise the progress of the field and evaluate policy in this respect. 
The development of such indictors, however, ought to start with a public deliberation of the 
normative horizon of animal experimentation in the Netherlands. 
The third issue concerns the relation between research and policy in general and on 
animal research, including animal-testing alternatives in particular. Many studies have 
shown that what part of the policy problem belongs to the policy realm and what to the 
research realm, is often decided through processes of negotiation between research and 
policy makers rather than being clear cut from the outset (e.g. Bijker et al., 2009; Halffman, 
2005; Jasonoff, 1990; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). In that sense, boundaries between research 
and policy should be seen as the outcomes of negotiating rather than as inputs to those 
processes (Bekker et al., 2010). The observed technification central to this study sheds 
new light on the increasing rational (and linear) perspective on the relation between 
research and policy (i.e. evidence-based policy making) in the Netherlands. As Wiebe Bijker 
and colleagues (2009) argue in their research on the backstage processes of the Health 
Council in formulating advice, such a linear model often misses the often unstructured and 
ambiguous nature of many policy problems. Rather than delegating the normative decision-
making to intermediary organisations, such as research funding organisations (Chapter 4) 
or research programmes (Chapter 5), this study underscores the importance of research-
policy interactions and negotiations as crucial elements for success. A further ‘decoupling’ 
of research and policy may lead to more losses than gains (Bekker et al., 2010). This study 
hints to the co-production of knowledge and policy in developing a shared understanding 
of the issue. Further research is needed as how to organise such co-production, for instance 
by explicitly studying the backstage of intermediary organisations as ZonMw in shaping 
the (policy) issue of animal experimentation and to consider the potential role of advisory 
councils and planning bureaus (i.e. “boundary organisations”) in facilitating the public 
deliberation on animal research in relation to other societal values. 
8.4 Call for a sense of urgency 
Despite the increasing societal and political attention directed towards animal research, 
the topic still seems to lack the sense of urgency that has been a great driver of change in 
other animal-related policy issue. For example, in response to PETA’s219 revelations about 
the harvesting of angora wool, some major textile and clothing industries banned this wool 
from their products. Here, reputational damage was a major incentive for change. In other 
issues, the looming threat of government intervention seemed an accelerator for change. 
For example, the practice of livestock husbandry reached self-regulation on the use of 
antibiotics in a covenant in 2008 (LNV, 2008).220 
Furthermore, animal research seems to differ from other practices involving animals 
because of the significant lack of influence that consumers and citizens seemed to have. For 
example, consumers may choose to eat organic meat or reduce their consumption of meat 
and fish. Citizens may choose not to visit circuses and zoos and to buy fur-free clothing. But 
when it comes to animal experiments, consumers do not really have a choice in the matter, 
unless they systematically abstain from the use of medication, surgery, household products, 
chemical products such as paint and pesticides, and many of the functional foods, such as 
hypoallergenic infant nutrition and specialised food for Alzheimer patients.221 Nonetheless, 
the use of research animals for the testing of cosmetic products was successfully banned in 
the EU after fierce public discontent. In addition, the use of non-human primates is subjected 
to stringent regulation. The public thus could be a fierce accelerator of sustainable policy 
change. 
Moreover, bringing together various public policies into one normative horizon on animal 
research may facilitate a true and sustainable transition. Setting policy goals require some 
219  PETA is the acronym for the nongovernmental animal welfare organisation People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals. 
220  Personal communication with the responsible civil servants, April 2014. See for example H&M’s press 
release: http://about.hm.com/en/news/newsroom/news.html/en/hm-stops-the-production-of-all-angora-
products.html. In 2010, the then acting Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (‘LNV’) Gerda Verburg 
constrained additional reduction objectives to the self-regulated covenant: a total reduction of 20% in 2011 and 
50% in 2013 as compared to the situation in 2009 (see also Rijksoverheid, 2015).
221  In earlier years, the purchase of “cruelty free” cosmetics (e.g. Bodyshop, Lush) was an exception to this. 
Since the European testing ban on finished cosmetic products in 2004 and the marketing ban on ingredients or 
combination of ingredients in 2009, this distinction is no longer needed. See also http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
sectors/cosmetics/animal-testing/index_en.htm. 
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though – and likely painful – decisions. However, without guidance and commitment from 
adjacent policy issues, public policy on animal research is too vulnerable for the overruling 
of other policies affecting the practice of animal research in the Netherlands. Such vision 
and ambition require measures to monitor and evaluate the policy as ways to learn and 
improve, rather than giving in into the increasing demand of the “audit society” (Power, 
1997).222
The principles of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) could provide the linking pin between 
various actors both in, as well as outside, the chains of animal research (see also §7.4).223 
Embracing CSR is a way of showing that you take your clients, consumers, civilians and 
the society at large seriously, and that you are willing to share the dilemmas you face and 
hurdles you encounter in daily practice, regardless of what that practice is (doing research, 
making policy, funding research, breeding research animals, developing consumer products, 
teaching laboratory skills etc.) Building on Everett Rogers’ diffusion of innovation theory 
(2003), once the “innovators” and “early adopters” support the CSR framework in the field 
of animal research, others will eventually follow. 
Lastly, I believe it is time to open up for public scrutiny the activities that still concern research 
animals instead of masking them, to develop a sustainable and responsible view of the use 
of animal research in the Netherlands, and to create a climate in which organisations can 
openly and truthfully stand behind their animal research choices, including the outsourcing 
of research, the housing of research animals, the investment in non-animal models, or the 
non-use of research animals altogether. A sustainable transition that better reflects the 
societal values regarding animal research may be much closer than anticipated.
222  In The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Michael Power (1994) asks how auditing can be such a robust 
policy tool when it often seems to fail so spectacularly and what it mean when a society relies so heavily on an 
industry of checking (what Power calls “audit explosion”). 
223  It is more appropriate to think of multiple chains linked together at some points than being one linear 
chain. Such an institutionalisation of CSR elements has also been reflected in Hub Zwart’s work on molecular 
genetics, in where he argues that the ethics of the research practices has shifted from an ego-centred concern 
towards the institutionalisation, operationalization and implementation of social norms and values (such 
as responsibility, transparency, fairness and the like, i.e. “macro-ethics”) (Zwart, 2008, 2013). Note that the 
CSR framework resembles the recent developments in funding research in both Europe and the Netherlands 
towards more responsible research and innovation (RRI) (EC, 2013b; NWO, 2013).
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Animal research. It is hard to think of another issue that generates so many strong emotions 
and is of such ethical concern among the public, even while it remains a relatively minor 
issue in public policy discourse. I wondered why research practices today still use research 
animals so frequently despite the general disgust and unease among Dutch society, the 
existence of public policy seeking to stimulate the development of alternative methods to 
animal experimentation, and the sky-high potential of emerging technologies. It is exactly 
this puzzle that is central to this study.
Furthermore, I was baffled by how animal research seemed to change meaning – that 
is, how differently it is interpreted and framed – in policy, research funding and research 
practices. This research analyses how abstract societal values with regard to human health, 
safety or animal welfare, for instance, as well as the more recent debate about the societal 
relevance of science, are translated into concrete policy and research programmes in the 
Netherlands. More specifically, it studies why public policy on stimulating animal-testing 
alternatives fails to live up to the societal expectation of decreasing animal numbers in 
research. The main research question of this thesis is: To what extent does the present 
discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives have the ability to reflect the societal 
concerns regarding animal experimentation in the Netherlands?
To answer this question, animal-testing alternatives are studied as innovations amidst 
diverging (and often, conflicting) societal values along the science-policy nexus from an 
interpretive policy perspective. I study how animal-testing alternatives acquire meaning 
in three different yet related contexts: in public policy, in research councils and in research 
programmes. Moreover, I study where these understandings intersect and may create 
friction that hampers the transition to an animal-free research world. This research is based 
on the premise that there is at least some societal desire to limit animal research as much 
as possible, and that public policy on animal-testing alternatives indeed aims to stimulate 
the use and development of such alternatives.
With this research, I aim to provide to a fuller understanding of the complex implementation 
process of allegedly desirable innovations in society, such as animal-testing alternatives. 
Such an understanding may help to reflect on the desired normative horizon and stimulate 
a more meaningful public debate on the future of animal research in order to bring about 
a more sustainable policy change.
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My theoretical starting point is that (policy) problems, including those concerning animal 
research and animal-testing alternatives, are socially constructed and organised in and 
through various discursive practices. This means that the way in which one approaches 
the issue, as well as how the issue is positioned, communicated and framed, shapes 
understanding in a particular context. This shaping also determines whether an issue is 
a problem or not, and how this possible problem may be solved. One can imagine that 
framing animal research as a lack of alternative, animal-free methods requires a different 
(policy) solution than the moral rejection of the use of animals, or the acceptance of animal 
experimentation to benefit human health. 
Interestingly, and despite all the different and often conflicting values, individuals and 
organisations still find ways to work together: So-called discourse coalitions can be formed 
without the need to specify underlying values. The mobilising power of the present 
discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives seems to lie in the promise – or perhaps 
even the expectation – of a sustainable future in which animal welfare is associated with 
other generally shared public values, such as economic progress, scientific relevance and 
technology development, in a fair and equal manner. As such, many realities about animal 
research can coexist, depending on how one makes sense of the issue. 
This understanding of policy problems also implies that policy implementation is an integral 
part of policy-making and involves the (re)definition of the relevant concepts, as well as the 
prioritisation of public values. Building on interpretive approaches to policy that assume 
the discursive character of policy-making and the constant struggle over interpretation and 
power, this study fits within an argumentative tradition with regard to policy analysis.
Based on this theoretical foundation, I develop and use three central concepts to analyse 
the interactive translation process of societal values into concrete policy and research 
programmes: policy frames, policy reflection and technification. Drawing on the framing 
literature, I develop a way to construct policy frames on animal research in Dutch policy 
discourse. Such policy frames capture the interpretation of animal research in a particular 
context and time, including policy documents in the ’90s and in present research 
programmes. Building on Frank Fischer’s work on policy argumentation, I was able to 
evaluate the level of policy reflection. This understanding helps to explain the incongruence 
between societal expectations and the technical promise with respect to animal research, 
including animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands. Finally, I introduce the concept of 
technification as the over-representation of technical and scientific futures as solutions to 
social problems, such as animal research. 
This study follows a case study approach, as made clear in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis: Dutch public policy on animal research, the ZonMw programmes on animal-testing 
alternatives and the Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre research programme. Data have 
been drawn from in-depth interviews with academic researchers and representatives 
of various organisations in the research system. In addition, I have analysed numerous 
governmental policy documents and policy debates on the issue of animal experimentation, 
as well as a selection of reports, strategic plans and evaluations of research councils and 
research programmes. 
After the introductory Chapter 1, which presents the background of this study, Chapter 
2 provides the thesis’s theoretical framework in greater detail. Drawing on discourse and 
framing theories, the vast body of literature on interpretive and argumentative policy 
analysis, as well as insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS) on the role of 
expectations in the research practice and the process of innovation, this chapter constructs 
a multidisciplinary theoretical framework. Central to this framework is the role of (policy) 
frames and the level of policy reflection. I consider frames to be sense-making devices that 
include both a problem definition and the presumed answer to this definition. Frames thus 
capture a particular understanding of animal research, including animal-testing alternatives 
for a certain period of time within a specific context. Frames may operate on a different level 
of reflection ranging from a more technical level of whether or not a particular (research) 
programme fulfilled its stated objectives, to the more fundamental level of how we value 
health and safety. This ordering of frames helps me to position the present policy discourse 
on animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands and facilitates a better understanding of 
the apparent mismatch.
After the introductory and theoretical exercise, Part II continues with the empirical basis of 
this thesis. It approaches the science-policy nexus from different entry points: the Dutch 
public policy on animal research, the research council’s programmes on animal-testing 
alternatives and research practice. Chapter 3 shows how the Dutch policy discourse on 
animal research changed dramatically since the introduction of the Animal Experimentation 
Act in 1977. By analysing the various frame shifts over time, including a shifting interpretation 
of research animals, the expanding definition of animal-testing alternatives, the win-win 
positioning and the increased focus on chain responsibility, I revealed how animal-testing 
alternatives gradually became the leading, technical solution to the social problem of animal 
research. Chapter 4 studies how research councils, as intermediary organisations between 
science and policy, cope with various expectations from both worlds. By analysing various 
frame shifts in ZonMw’s research programmes on animal-testing alternatives, I argue that 
the implementation of animal research policies in research programmes has strengthened 
the technification of the policy issue. That is, the policy problem became increasingly 
framed as a shortage of animal-testing alternatives, supporting the development of more 
such alternatives. This chapter also exposes how the delegation of fundamental choices 
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to a research council, as well as a particular science-push understanding of stimulating 
innovation and the technical level of programme evaluation, has increased this process of 
technification. Chapter 5 shows how the increasing quest for societally relevant research 
and the expectation of developing animal-testing alternatives produces several types of 
tensions in scientific practice. By studying the research programme of the Netherlands 
Toxicogenomics Centre (NTC), I argue that tensions over the public legitimation of 
research, the assessment of research programmes and the daily practice of research may 
paradoxically widen rather than bridge the gap between science and society. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of emerging technologies like toxicogenomics in the alternative-discourse has 
quietly moved the scientific interpretation of alternative models even farther away from the 
societal expectation of reducing animal numbers: It has become more and more technical 
and hard to grasp from an outsider’s perspective.
These empirical chapters question whether small research projects, such as the one funded 
by ZonMw (Chapter 4) or large research consortia such as the NTC (Chapter 5), can truly 
advance animal-testing alternatives and ensure they live up to the societal expectation of 
decreasing animal numbers, or whether they are merely an excuse to reassure the public. 
These chapters suggest that without public deliberation on the societal relevance and the 
values grounding such policy and research programmes, their activities and outcomes are 
unlikely to meet the public’s expectations of the societal relevance of science.
Part III continues with the assessment and concluding chapters of this thesis. Chapter 
6 studies how the discourse coalition on animal-testing alternatives was initially able to 
accommodate a large variety of actors, values and goals but now seems to be falling apart. 
Based on the insights from the empirical chapters, I conclude that the relatively low level 
of policy reflection, the flexibility of the concept of animal-testing alternatives and the 
strong and appealing promises and expectations accommodate the discourse coalition in 
the first place. However, I also show the downside and vulnerability of each of these gluing 
discursive processes. The discourse coalition‘s orientation on science and technology as 
a solution to animal experimentation, the created societal expectation of a decrease in 
animal numbers as a direct result of the investment in three-R research224 and the public 
statements of discontent by several members from within the discourse coalition indicate 
that the present discourse coalition is under pressure and likely to rupture in the near future. 
Chapter 7 elaborates on issues that need to be addressed further in public deliberation 
in order to stimulate a more meaningful policy reflection and advance sustainable policy 
change that would better reflect societal values regarding animal research. It anticipates the 
224 Three-R (or 3R) refers to the replacement, reduction and refinement of animal experimentation and is 
often used as a more accurate synonym for animal-testing alternatives.
various levels of policy reflection and suggests several approaches – and the corresponding 
public policy instruments – to design and improve policy. These instruments include the 
establishment of a three-R database, the introduction of a tax on animal experimentation 
and the labelling and traceability of products, among others. 
In the concluding Chapter 8, I provide a further reflection on the material presented in the 
preceding chapters. I answer the general research question by addressing the following 
three sub-questions:
1. How can the present incongruence between societal expectations and 
technological promises from the dominant discourse coalition on animal-
testing alternatives be understood from an interpretive framework of policy 
evaluation?
The case studies suggest that at least nine important empirical observations help to explain 
the present incongruence between the societal expectations and the discourse coalition’s 
technological promises regarding animal-testing alternatives in the Netherlands. These 
include successfully reframing the policy issue of animal experimentation as a win-win 
situation, redefining the policy problem in terms of an animal-testing alternatives shortage 
and supporting a technical solution to this problem: research programmes on animal-
testing alternatives. The delegation of policy choices to research councils and research 
programmes has further technified the issue and overshadowed possible non-technological 
policy interventions. Moreover, with the shifting interpretation of what counted as good 
animal-testing alternatives and three-R research in need of funding, the coalition’s promise 
has drifted away from the societal expectations of reducing absolute animal numbers in 
research. With a focus on academic development rather than demand, the increasing 
pressure on the economic valorisation of research and the low level of policy reflection, the 
effect of such policies remains to be seen.
I argue that societal expectations of reducing absolute animal numbers lag behind the 
discourse coalition’s re-interpretations and shifts regarding animal-testing alternatives 
and three-R research. This gradual divergence in understanding eventually resulted in the 
present incongruence between the societal expectation and the technological promise of 
animal experimentation, including animal-testing alternatives.
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2. How can the mobilising power of the dominant discourse coalition on 
animal experimentation in the Netherlands be valued? 
Based on the empirical findings, as well as the vulnerabilities of the present discourse 
coalition, I argue that the concept of animal-testing alternatives, or the “three Rs”, is losing 
its capacity to produce action. Besides, the present discourse coalition is only marginally 
able to mobilise new players outside the direct science-policy nexus to join the discourse 
coalition. Yet, such mobilisation is urgently needed for a sustainable transition that better 
reflects the societal values regarding animal research. As Dutch public policy heavily depends 
on broad agreement to act, the vulnerability of the present discourse coalition demands a 
more thorough policy reflection in order to stimulate policy change in the desired direction. 
3. How can there be a sustainable change in policy that would do justice to the 
societal expectations regarding animal experimentation in the Netherlands?
In Chapter 7, I elaborate on issues that need to be addressed further in public deliberation 
in order to stimulate a more meaningful policy reflection and to advance sustainable policy 
change. Anticipating the four levels of policy reflection, I suggest several approaches and the 
corresponding public policy instruments to support the desired direction of policy change. 
And yet, the decision (of how) to move forward remains above all a societal and political 
consideration. This study does suggest, however, that public deliberation including more 
fundamental questions about what we consider as healthy and safe – that is, second-order 
reflection – will likely yield a more societally balanced policy on animal experimentation. 
Without a doubt, this deliberation will require some tough (policy) decisions.
Based on these sub-questions, I argue that the present discourse coalition on animal-testing 
alternatives in the Netherlands has only provided a partial answer to societal concerns 
regarding animal experimentation in the country. Societal expectations on the decreasing 
numbers of research animals lag behind the shifting discourse coalition’s understanding of 
animal-testing alternatives and three-R research, and this delay may have contributed to 
the present incongruence. Furthermore, I argue that the present Dutch discourse coalition 
on animal-testing alternatives is vulnerable and approaching a crossroad. The foreseen 
crossroad underscores the urgent need to elaborate specific issues in public deliberation 
in order to stimulate more meaningful policy reflection and to advance sustainable policy 
change.
In conclusion, I argue that technification is deeply embedded in the current system(s) of 
animal research, including public policy, research practices and research programmes 
on animal-testing alternatives. This technification includes a) the (policy) discourse’s 
assumption that the social problem of animal research can be solved with a technical 
solution, namely the development of animal-testing alternatives; b) the policy problem 
definition as a shortage of animal-testing alternatives and the need for more funding; c) the 
primarily science-driven approach to innovation in the research programming of animal-
testing alternatives; d) the understanding of animal-testing alternatives as a spin-off of more 
mainstream research; and e) the technical/scientific understanding of a relative reduction in 
animal numbers as a result of the implementation of animal-testing alternatives. I conclude 
that because of this technification, the latent clash of societal values and the absence of 
some tough decision-making, the present Dutch public policy discourse on animal research 
is “lost in technification”.
My findings have two major implications for the debate on animal research policy and 
the deployment of research programmes to stimulate the reduction of animal numbers in 
experimental settings. First, my thesis shows that the present discourse coalition on animal-
testing alternatives is under pressure to live up to the various and often diverging societal 
expectations related to modern animal research. Without a clearer picture of the future 
– or a normative horizon – of animal experimentation in the Netherlands, public policies 
on this issue will continue to drift and are likely to lead to increasing societal and political 
debate with regard to their effectiveness. Second, my work indicates that the stimulation 
of animal-testing alternatives through research (i.e. “three-R research”) alone will not 
accelerate the desired transition. I observed various tensions between research activities 
and funders’ criteria when it comes to striving for societally relevant research that will not 
be solved by the current approach.
Based on my findings, I formulate two sets of recommendations for animal research policies. 
Regarding policy design and evaluation, I warn about a short-term (economic) valorisation 
of alternative-research in terms of reducing animal numbers. The emphasis on short-term 
benefits leads to ineffective policy and overshadows the long-term ambition with regard to 
this issue. I recommend to:
•  initiate public deliberation to develop long-term policy ambition with 
regard to this issue;
• aspire towards a coherent policy discourse that accounts for adjacent 
policy issues as well, including drug innovation, environmental legislation 
and science policies;
• actively bridge with related (policy) issues that help to accelerate the 
desired policy change – or perhaps even the transition, such as sustainability 
regulations and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as well as the business 
case of disruptive technologies and innovations;
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• broaden the criteria of policy evaluation and include (qualitative) indicators 
of societal impact as well.
With regard to science and innovation policies on alternative methods, I point to the 
perverse side effect of stimulating societally relevant research. My work indicates that 
research on animal-testing alternatives increasingly becomes a “positive side effect” of 
more mainstream research with an uncertain effect on animal numbers. Moreover, funders’ 
criteria and science system requirements often create tensions in the research practice. I 
recommend to:
• initiate a demand-pull approach in funding three-R innovations to safeguard 
implementation and use;
• focus on three-R innovations that are less likely to be picked up instinctively 
by academia or the market;
• allow for private organisations to apply for 3R-funding (without denying the 
rules of state support) so as to accelerate the desired policy change;
• broaden the criteria of performance evaluations and include (qualitative) 
indicators of societal impact as well; 
• expand funding to social innovations that may help to accelerate the 
desired policy change.
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Illustratie/ gekleurde pagina? Samenvatting
Dierproeven. Hoewel het een onderwerp is dat heftige emoties oproept onder de Nederlandse 
bevolking, is het slechts een marginaal onderwerp in het hedendaagse beleidsdiscours. 
Waarom gebruiken onderzoekspraktijken vandaag de dag nog proefdieren, ondanks de 
weerstand in de Nederlandse samenleving, de aanwezigheid van publiek beleid dat er op 
gericht is om de ontwikkeling van alternatieven voor dierproeven te stimuleren en het 
torenhoge potentieel van opkomende technologieën? Dit vraagstuk vormt de kern van dit 
onderzoek.
Bovendien lijkt de betekenis – de verschillende interpretatie en framing – van dierproeven 
te veranderen tussen de verschillende praktijken van beleid, wetenschapsfinanciering en 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Dit onderzoek analyseert op welke wijze abstract geformuleerde 
en breed gedragen maatschappelijke waarden zoals gezondheid, veiligheid en dierenwelzijn, 
evenals het meer recente debat met betrekking tot de maatschappelijke relevantie van 
onderzoek, worden vertaald in concrete beleids- en onderzoeksprogramma’s in Nederland. 
Concreter, het onderzoekt waarom het publiek beleid ten aanzien van alternatieven voor 
dierproeven niet in staat is om tegemoet te komen aan de maatschappelijke verwachting 
van afnemende proefdieraantallen. De centrale onderzoeksvraag van deze thesis is: In 
hoeverre weerspiegelt de huidige discourscoalitie ten aanzien van alternatieven voor 
dierproeven de maatschappelijke zorgen over dierproeven in Nederland?
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, worden alternatieven voor dierproeven bestudeerd als 
zijnde innovaties tussen uiteenlopende, en vaak conflicterende, maatschappelijke waarden 
langs de wetenschaps-beleidslijn vanuit een interpretatief beleidsperspectief. Ik bestudeer 
op welke manier alternatieven voor dierproeven betekenis krijgen in drie verschillende, 
maar gerelateerde contexten: in publiek beleid, in wetenschapsfinancieringsorganisaties 
en in onderzoeksprogramma’s. Ik onderzoek waar de verschillende betekenissen elkaar 
ontmoeten en waar deze tot spanningen leiden die een grote verandering op dit gebied 
in de weg staat. Deze studie is gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat er een zekere 
maatschappelijke wens is om het aantal dierproeven zoveel mogelijk terug te dringen, en 
dat publiek beleid gericht op alternatieven voor dierproeven de ontwikkeling en het gebruik 
van deze methoden daadwerkelijk wil bevorderen.
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan een beter begrip van complexe implementatieprocessen van 
ogenschijnlijk gewenste innovaties, zoals alternatieven voor dierproeven. Een dergelijke 
begrip kan helpen om te reflecteren op de gewenste ‘normatieve horizon’ en een meer 
betekenisvol publiek debat te stimuleren ten aanzien van de toekomst van dierproeven met 
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als doel om een duurzame beleidsverandering te bewerkstelligen.
Ik beschouw beleidsproblemen als sociaal geconstrueerd en georganiseerd binnen en door 
verschillende discursieve praktijken. Met andere woorden, de manier waarop iemand een 
bepaald kwestie benadert, evenals de wijze waarop de beleidskwestie is gepositioneerd 
en wordt gecommuniceerd, bepaalt in grote mate de betekenis in een bepaalde context. 
Hierdoor wordt een kwestie juist wel of niet tot een probleem gemaakt en wordt ook 
de oplossing voor een mogelijk probleem al indirect gegeven: het positioneren van de 
dierproefkwestie als een tekort aan alternatieve methoden vraagt om een andere oplossing 
dan wanneer de kwestie wordt neergezet als een moreel vergrijp of als een onoverkomelijk 
gegeven ten behoeve van de menselijke gezondheid.
Interessant genoeg, en ondanks alle verschillende en vaak tegengestelde waarden, 
zijn individuen en organisaties nog altijd in staat om samen te werken in zogeheten 
discourscoalities. De mobiliserende kracht van de huidige discourscoalitie op het gebied 
van alternatieven voor dierproeven lijkt daarmee te liggen op de belofte – of mogelijk 
zelfs de verwachting – van een duurzame toekomst waarin proefdierenwelzijn even 
hoog wordt geprioriteerd als andere breed gedragen maatschappelijke waarden, zoals 
economische vooruitgang, wetenschappelijke relevantie en technologieontwikkeling. 
Binnen discourscoalities kunnen er dus verschillende ideeën en werkelijkheden ten aanzien 
van dierproeven naast elkaar bestaan, afhankelijk van de manier waarop iemand het issue 
benadert.
Een andere veronderstelling in dit onderzoek is dat beleidsimplementatie een integraal 
onderdeel is van beleid maken en onder meer de (her)definitie van relevante concepten 
en de prioritering ervan, behelst. Dit onderzoek bouwt voort op interpretatieve 
beleidsbenaderingen die het discursieve karakter en het continue gevecht om interpretatie 
en macht van beleid maken, veronderstellen en past daarmee in de argumentatieve traditie 
van beleidsonderzoek.
In dit onderzoek ontwikkel en gebruik ik drie centrale concepten om de vertaling van 
maatschappelijke waarden in beleids- en onderzoeksprogramma’s te analyseren: 
beleidsframes, beleidsreflectie en technificering. Gebaseerd op de wetenschappelijke 
framing literatuur, ontwikkel ik een manier om beleidsframes ten aanzien van dierproeven 
te construeren uit het Nederlandse beleidsdicsourse. Dergelijke frames omvatten hoe 
in een bepaalde context en tijdsperiode over dierproeven wordt gedacht. Deze frames 
kunnen bijvoorbeeld worden gehaald uit beleidsdocumenten uit de jaren ’90 en recente 
onderzoeksprogramma’s. Daarnaast ontwikkel ik, voortbouwend op het werk van Frank 
Fischer ten aanzien van beleidsargumentatie, een manier om het niveau van beleidsreflectie 
te bepalen. Dit begrip helpt om de incongruentie tussen de maatschappelijke verwachtingen 
en technische beloftes ten aanzien van dierproeven en alternatieven voor dierproeven in 
Nederland, te verklaren. Tot slot introduceer ik het begrip ‘technificering’ (technification) 
als de oververtegenwoordiging van technische en wetenschappelijke oplossingen voor 
sociale problemen, zoals dierproeven. 
Dit onderzoek is opgebouwd uit verschillende casestudies die elk een apart hoofdstuk 
in het empirische deel van dit proefschrift beslaan: het Nederlandse publiek beleid 
ten aanzien van dierproeven, de ZonMw programma’s betreffende alternatieven voor 
dierproeven en het onderzoeksprogramma van het Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre 
(NTC). Gegevens voor het onderzoek zijn verzameld door middel van diepte-interviews 
met universitaire onderzoekers en deskundigen en vertegenwoordigers van verschillende 
organisaties in het onderzoekssyteem. Daarnaast heb ik beleidsdocumenten, rapporten 
en strategische plannen en evaluaties van wetenschapsfinancieringsorganisaties en 
onderzoeksprogramma’s geanalyseerd.
Na een inleidend hoofdstuk 1 dat de achtergrond van deze studie behandelt, biedt 
hoofdstuk 2 een overzicht van het theoretische kader en de methodologie van deze 
studie. Dit multidisciplinaire kader is gebaseerd op zowel discours en framing literatuur, 
als op een toenemende hoeveelheid literatuur uit de interpretatieve en argumentatieve 
beleidswetenschappen, en inzichten uit wetenschap- en technologiestudies (STS) ten 
aanzien van de rol van verwachtingen in de onderzoekspraktijk en het innovatieproces. 
De rol van frames en het niveau van beleidsreflectie staan centraal in dit theoretische 
raamwerk. Ik beschouw frames als zogenaamde betekenisgevende middelen die zowel 
de probleemdefinitie als de oplossing voor dit probleem omvatten. Een frame vertelt ons 
dus iets over de wijze waarop dierproeven en alternatieven voor dierproeven worden 
geïnterpreteerd in een bepaalde context en tijdsperiode. Dergelijke frames kunnen zich op 
verschillende niveaus van reflectie begeven, variërend van een technisch niveau waarbij 
het er vooral om gaat of vooraf vastgestelde doelen zijn gehaald, tot frames die zich op een 
fundamenteler niveau begeven en bijvoorbeeld ingaan op de vraag hoe wij als samenleving 
willen leven en wat we verstaan onder gezondheid en veiligheid. Dit herschikken van 
frames helpt me om het huidige discours ten aanzien van alternatieven voor dierproeven 
te positioneren en een beter begrip te ontwikkelen van de ogenschijnlijke incongruentie.
Deel II vervolgt met de empirische basis van dit proefschrift. In dit deel wordt de interactie 
tussen wetenschap en beleid vanuit drie verschillende invalshoeken benaderd: het 
Nederlands publiek beleid ten aanzien van dierproeven en alternatieven, de programma’s 
van wetenschapsfinancieringsorganisaties betreffende alternatieven voor dierproeven 
en de onderzoekspraktijk. Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat het Nederlandse beleidsdiscours 
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ten aanzien van dierproeven sterk is veranderd sinds de invoering van de Wet op de 
dierproeven in 1977. In dit hoofdstuk komen verschillende verschuivingen in frames aan 
bod, waaronder de veranderende betekenis van proefdieren, de steeds omvangrijker 
wordende definitie van alternatieven voor dierproeven, de win-win positionering van 
de ontwikkeling van alternatieven voor dierproeven en de toenemende aandacht 
voor ketenverantwoordelijkheid. Het hoofdstuk laat duidelijk zien hoe alternatieven 
voor dierproeven geleidelijk aan worden beschouwd als dé technische oplossing 
voor het sociale probleem van dierproeven. Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt vervolgens hoe 
wetenschapsfinancieringsorganisaties als intermediaire organisaties tussen wetenschap en 
beleid omgaan met de verschillende verwachtingen vanuit beide werelden. Op basis van de 
verschillende verschuivingen in de wetenschapsprogramma’s ten aanzien van alternatieven 
voor dierproeven, beargumenteer ik dat de implementatie van het dierproevenbeleid in 
onderzoeksprogramma’s de beleidskwestie heeft getechnificieerd: het beleidsprobleem 
wordt in toenemende mate neergezet als een tekort aan alternatieven voor dierproeven 
dat de verdere ontwikkeling van dergelijke alternatieven ondersteunt. Dit hoofdstuk 
laat ook zien dat het delegeren van de uitvoering van het dierproevenbeleid naar een 
wetenschapsfinancieringsorganisatie, alsook de druk op wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling 
van innovaties en de technische aard van evaluaties heeft bijgedragen aan een verdere 
technificering van de beleidskwestie. Hoofdstuk 5 laat vervolgens zien hoe de toenemende 
wens naar maatschappelijk relevant onderzoek en de ontwikkeling van alternatieven 
voor dierproeven leidt tot verschillende typen spanningen in de wetenschapspraktijk. Op 
basis van het onderzoeksprogramma van het Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre (NTC) 
concludeer ik dat deze wens naar maatschappelijke relevantie paradoxaal genoeg juist leidt 
tot spanningen in de publieke legitimering van onderzoek, de beoordeling van onderzoek 
en de dagelijkse onderzoekspraktijk. Hierdoor wordt de kloof tussen wetenschap en 
samenleving juist verbreed in plaats van overbrugd. Bovendien heeft de acceptatie van 
opkomende technologieën zoals toxicogenomics het wetenschappelijke discours ten aanzien 
van alternatieven voor dierproeven stilzwijgend afgedreven van de maatschappelijke 
verwachting ten aanzien van proefdierreductie: het discours wordt continu technischer en 
daardoor moeilijk te volgen voor een buitenstaander.
Op basis van de inzichten uit de empirische studies kunnen we ons afvragen of kleine 
onderzoeksprojecten zoals die gefinancierd worden door ZonMw (hoofdstuk 4) of grote 
onderzoeksconsortia zoals het NTC (hoofdstuk 5) daadwerkelijk een verschil kunnen 
maken ten aanzien van de aantallen dierproeven, of dat dergelijke programma’s vooral het 
publiek moeten geruststellen. Deze hoofdstukken suggereren dat zonder publiek debat 
over de maatschappelijke relevantie en onderliggende waarden van dergelijke beleids- en 
onderzoeksprogramma’s, het sterk de vraag is of hun inzet de publieke verwachtingen ten 
aanzien van maatschappelijk relevant onderzoek ten goede komt.
Deel III gaat verder met de concluderende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift. Hoofdstuk 
6 gaat in op de vraag hoe het kan dat de discourscoalitie ten aanzien van alternatieven 
voor dierproeven in eerste instantie juist in staat was om een grote diversiteit aan spelers, 
waarden en doelen aan zich te binden, nu tegen zijn grenzen aan lijkt te lopen. Op basis van 
de empirische analyses beargumenteer ik dat het relatief lage niveau van beleidsreflectie, 
de flexibele betekenis van het begrip ‘alternatieven voor dierproeven’ en de sterke en 
aantrekkelijke beloftes in eerste instantie bijdroegen aan de vorming van de discourscoalitie. 
Tegelijkertijd laat ik ook zien dat elk van deze bindende discursieve processen ook een 
zekere mate van kwetsbaarheid in zich draagt. De focus op wetenschap en technologie 
als oplossing voor het dierproevenprobleem, evenals de gecreëerde maatschappelijke 
verwachting dat de inzet op 3V-onderzoek direct bijdraagt aan het terugdringen van het 
aantal dierproeven en de recente uitspattingen van verschillende spelers in het discours, 
suggereren dat de hedendaagse coalitie onder druk staat en elk moment kan bezwijken. 
Hoofdstuk 7 gaat vervolgens in op de kwesties die nadere aandacht verdienen in publiek 
debat teneinde een meer betekenisvolle beleidsreflectie te stimuleren en zorg te dragen voor 
een beleidsverandering die beter aansluit bij de maatschappelijke waarden met betrekking 
tot dierproeven. Vooruitlopend op de verschillende niveaus van beleidsreflectie biedt 
het hoofdstuk verschillende manieren en bijbehorende beleidsinstrumenten om beleid 
te ontwikkelen en te verbeteren. Deze instrumenten omvatten onder meer de oprichting 
van een 3V-database, de invoering van een belastingsysteem op proefdiergebruik, alsook 
het labelen en verbeteren van de traceerbaarheid van producten waarbij dierproeven zijn 
gebruikt. 
Het concluderende hoofdstuk 8 biedt een nadere beschouwing op het empirische materiaal 
en ik beantwoord de hoofdvraag op basis van de drie deelvragen:
1.  Hoe kan de huidige incongruentie tussen de maatschappelijke verwachtingen 
en technologische beloften binnen de dominante discourscoalitie ten 
aanzien van alternatieven voor dierproeven worden begrepen vanuit een 
interpretatieve benadering van beleidsevaluatie?
De casestudies laten ten minste negen observaties zien die helpen om deze ogenschijnlijk 
incongruentie beter te begrijpen. Deze observaties hebben betrekking op de succesvolle 
wijze waarop de beleidskwestie is neergezet als een win-win situatie voor zowel menselijke 
gezondheid als proefdierenwelzijn, net als de wijze waarop het probleem is gedefinieerd. 
Door de kwestie te framen als een tekort aan alternatieven voor dierproeven ontstond 
er meer ruimte voor de technische oplossing van meer onderzoeksprogramma’s 
betreffende deze alternatieven. Het delegeren van fundamentele beleidskeuzes aan 
wetenschapsfinancieringsorganisaties en onderzoeksconsortia heeft bovendien bijgedragen 
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aan de verdere technificering van de beleidskwestie waardoor mogelijke niet-technische 
beleidsoplossingen grotendeels buiten beschouwing zijn gebleven. 
De empirische inzichten laten zien dat door de veranderende kijk op wat door de 
discourscoalitie als goede proefdieralternatieven en goed 3V-onderzoek wordt beschouwd, 
de belofte van de coalitie steeds verder af is komen te staan van de maatschappelijke 
verwachtingen ten aanzien van proefdierreductie. Met de nadruk op de wetenschappelijke 
ontwikkeling in plaats van de vraagarticulatie ten aanzien van alternatieven voor 
dierproeven, de toenemende druk op de economische valorisatie van onderzoek en 
het relatief lage niveau van beleidsreflectie, is het de vraag of dergelijke programma’s 
daadwerkelijk tegemoet kunnen komen aan deze verwachtingen. 
In mijn proefschrift stel ik dat de maatschappelijke verwachtingen over proefdierreductie 
achter loopt op de herinterpretaties en verschuivingen ten aanzien van alternatieven voor 
dierproeven en 3V-onderzoek binnen de discourscoalitie. Deze stapsgewijze divergentie 
heeft uiteindelijk geleid tot de hedendaagse incongruentie tussen de maatschappelijke 
verwachtingen en technologische beloften van de discourscoalitie ten aanzien van 
dierproeven en alternatieven voor dierproeven. 
2. Hoe kan de mobiliserende macht van de dominante discourscoalitie ten 
aanzien van dierproeven in Nederland worden gewaardeerd?
Op basis van de empirische inzichten en de kwetsbaarheid van de huidige discourscoalitie 
betoog ik dat het begrip alternatieven voor dierproeven of “de 3V’s” zijn mobiliserende 
kracht aan het verliezen is. Daarbij is de huidige coalitie nauwelijks in staat om nieuwe 
spelers buiten het directe wetenschaps- en beleidsdomein aan zich te verbinden, terwijl 
deze spelers juist hard nodig zijn voor de beoogde duurzame beleidsverandering. Omdat 
het Nederlandse publiek beleid sterk leunt op het creëren van draagvlak in de samenleving 
(het zogeheten “polderen”), vraagt de kwetsbaarheid van de hedendaagse discourscoalitie 
om een grondige beleidsreflectie teneinde een beleidsverandering in de gewenste richting 
te stimuleren. 
3. Hoe kan een duurzame beleidsverandering worden gestimuleerd die 
beter aansluit bij de maatschappelijke verwachtingen ten aanzien van 
dierproeven?
In hoofdstuk 7 ga ik in op de kwesties die nadere aandacht verdienen in publiek debat 
teneinde een meer betekenisvolle beleidsreflectie te stimuleren en zorg te dragen voor een 
duurzame beleidsverandering. Vooruitlopend op de vier niveaus van beleidsreflectie opper 
ik enkele manieren en bijbehorende beleidsinstrumenten om de gewenste beleidsrichting 
te ondersteunen. De keuze (hoe) verder te gaan blijft echter bovenal een maatschappelijke 
en politieke keuze. Dit onderzoek suggereert desalniettemin dat een publiek debat dat 
eveneens een antwoord probeert te vinden op meer fundamentele vragen betreffende 
gezondheid en veiligheid – zogeheten tweede-orde reflectie – een meer maatschappelijk 
gebalanceerd beleid ten aanzien van dierproeven oplevert. Dit debat vraagt zonder twijfel 
om enkele lastige (beleids)beslissingen.
Op basis van de antwoorden op de deelvragen, stel ik dat de huidige discourscoalitie ten 
aanzien van alternatieven voor dierproeven slechts gedeeltelijk tegemoet komt aan de 
maatschappelijke zorgen over dierproeven. Het feit dat de maatschappelijke verwachtingen 
ten aanzien van proefdierreductie achter lopen op de veranderende interpretatie van de 
discourscoalitie ten aanzien van alternatieven voor dierproeven en 3V-onderzoek heeft 
bijgedragen aan de aanwezige incongruentie. Bovendien stel ik dat de hedendaagse 
discourscoalitie kwetsbaar is en een tweesprong nadert. Dit onderschrijft de behoefte aan 
publiek debat teneinde een meer betekenisvolle beleidsreflectie te stimuleren en zorg te 
dragen voor een duurzame beleidsverandering op dit dossier.
Samenvattend concludeer ik dat technificering stevig is ingebed in de huidige systemen 
rondom dierproeven, inclusief publiek beleid, onderzoeksfinancieringspraktijken en 
wetenschappelijke onderzoeksprogramma’s met betrekking tot alternatieven voor 
dierproeven. Deze technificering beslaat a) de veronderstelling dat het sociale probleem 
van dierproeven kan worden opgelost met de technische oplossing van alternatieven voor 
deze dierproeven; b) de definitie van het beleidsprobleem als een tekort aan alternatieven 
voor dierproeven die de financiering van meer onderzoek veronderstelt; c) de voornamelijk 
door wetenschap gedreven innovatie-aanpak in de onderzoeksprogrammering ten aanzien 
van alternatieven voor dierproeven; d) het gegeven dat 3V-onderzoek voornamelijk wordt 
beschouwd als een zijstroom van meer gangbaar wetenschappelijk onderzoek; e) de relatie 
met proefdierreductie in relatieve zin. Ik concludeer dat door deze technificering, alsook 
de latente botsing van maatschappelijke waarden en het niet willen nemen van moeilijke 
beslissingen, het hedendaagse publieke beleidsdiscours ten aanzien van dierproeven aan 
het dwalen is. Of, zoals de titel van dit proefschrift stelt: “Lost in technification”.
De resultaten van dit proefschrift hebben twee grote implicaties voor het debat aangaande 
het toekomstige dierproevenbeleid en de inzet van onderzoeksprogramma’s om het 
gebruik van dierproeven terug te dringen. Allereerst laat mijn onderzoek zien dat de 
huidige discourscoalitie ten aanzien van alternatieven voor dierproeven moeite heeft om 
tegemoet te komen aan de maatschappelijke verwachtingen ten aanzien van hedendaags 
proefdiergebruik. Zonder een duidelijker beeld van de toekomst, ofwel de zogenaamde 
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normatieve horizon van het proefdiergebruik in Nederland, zal publiek beleid blijven dwalen 
en waarschijnlijk tot meer maatschappelijk en politiek debat aangaande hun effectiviteit 
leiden. Ten tweede, mijn onderzoek suggereert dat 3V-onderzoek alleen niet genoeg is voor 
de gewenste transitie. De door mij geobserveerde spanningen tussen onderzoeksactiviteiten 
en criteria van wetenschapsfinancierders zullen niet worden weggenomen met de huidige 
aanpak. 
Op basis van mijn bevindingen formuleer ik twee soorten aanbevelingen voor het 
dierproevenbeleid. Met betrekking tot beleidsontwerp en -evaluatie, waarschuw ik voor een 
kortzichtige (economische) valorisatie van 3V-onderzoek in termen van proefdierreductie. 
De nadruk op de voordelen op de korte termijn leidt tot ineffectief beleid en overschaduwt 
de ambitie op dit dossier voor de lange termijn. Ik adviseer daarom om:
• in publiek debat toe te werken naar duurzame beleidsambities op het 
dierproefdossier voor de lange termijn; 
• te streven naar een coherent beleidsdiscours dat aangrenzende 
beleidskwesties, zoals geneesmiddelenontwikkeling, milieuwetgeving en 
wetenschapsbeleid met elkaar verbindt;
• actief aansluiting te zoeken bij gerelateerde (beleids)kwesties die de 
gewenste beleidsverandering – of wellicht zelfs transitie – kunnen versnellen. 
Denk hier bijvoorbeeld aan duurzaamheidsregelingen (zogenaamde 
‘groene regelingen’) en Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen (MVO) 
alsook het verdienmodel van disruptieve technologieën en innovaties;
• de evaluatiecriteria ten aanzien van het dierproevenbeleid te verbreden en 
daarin ook (kwalitatieve) indicatoren voor maatschappelijke impact mee te 
nemen.
Met het oog op het wetenschaps- en innovatiebeleid betreffende alternatieven voor 
dierproeven, wijs ik op het perverse neveneffect in het streven naar maatschappelijk 
relevant onderzoek. Mijn onderzoek laat zien dat onderzoek naar alternatieven voor 
dierproeven in toenemende mate wordt gezien als een nevenspoor van regulier onderzoek 
waardoor het effect op de proefdierreductie op zijn minst onzeker is. Daarbij komt 
dat de criteria die wetenschapsfinancieringsorganisaties hanteren en de vereisten die 
vanuit het wetenschapssysteem zelf worden opgelegd, vaak leiden tot spanningen in de 
onderzoekspraktijk. Ik adviseer daarom om:
• toe te werken naar een vraaggestuurde aanpak in de financiering van 
3V-innovaties om de implementatie en gebruik van deze innovaties te 
realiseren;
• de publiek gefinancierde onderzoeksprogramma’s aangaande 3V-innovaties 
te richten op die ontwikkelingen die minder vanzelfsprekend door de 
wetenschap of door de markt worden opgepikt; 
• het mogelijk te maken dat private organisaties 3V-financiering kunnen 
aanvragen om de gewenste beleidsverandering te versnellen (zonder 
daarmee de regels voor staatssteun te overschrijden);
• de evaluatiecriteria ten aanzien van 3V-onderzoek te verbreden en daarin 
ook (kwalitatieve) indicatoren voor maatschappelijke impact mee te 
nemen; 
• financiering van sociale innovaties die helpen om de gewenste 
beleidsverandering te versnellen, uit te breiden.
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Dankwoord
Ik wil deze laatste pagina’s graag gebruiken om iedereen te bedanken die heeft 
bijgedragen aan mijn promotietraject. Van inhoudelijke discussies, het bijbrengen van 
onderzoeksvaardigheden en het delen van kennis en ervaringen in de onderzoekswereld 
tot de fijne (spelletjes)avondjes, sportmomentjes en koffietjes in de stad: alles was even 
waardevol!
Allereerst mijn begeleiders Hub Zwart en Willem Halffman. Hub, bedankt voor de ruimte 
die je me hebt gegeven om mijn eigen onderzoek vorm te geven. Zonder jouw interesse 
in het proefdierenvraagstuk had ik hier nooit gestaan. Willem, ik had me geen betere 
co-promotor kunnen wensen! Je was mijn gids, spoorde me aan om door te gaan en zei 
wanneer het genoeg was. Hoe vaak hoor ik je nog zeggen, “Meggie, pick your battles”. Ik 
vond het ontzettend fijn om met je samen te werken!
De leescommissie: prof. dr. Merel Ritskes-Hoitinga, prof. dr. Barend van der Meulen, prof. 
dr. John Grin. Hartelijk dank voor het kritisch lezen van mijn manuscript en het zitting 
nemen in mijn corona. 
De begeleidingscommissie van het project: Marianne Kuil, prof. dr. Merel Ritskes-Hoitinga, 
prof. dr. Coenraad Hendriksen, prof. dr. Jos Kleinjans en dr. Sjaak Swart. Bedankt voor jullie 
inbreng gedurende mijn project. 
Graag wil ik alle geïnterviewden hartelijk bedanken voor het delen van hun kennis, ideeën 
en ervaringen. Zonder jullie had ik dit verhaal niet kunnen vertellen! Ik hoop van harte dat 
mijn analyses bijdragen aan zinvolle discussies in de toekomst. René Reijnders en prof. dr. 
Jos Kleinjans van het Netherlands Toxicogenomics Centre wil ik bedanken voor de door 
hen gedeelde informatie en documenten. Tot slot wil ik prof. dr.  Aldert Piersma hartelijk 
bedanken voor het leveren van commentaar op hoofdstuk vijf.
Grote dank gaat uit naar mijn collega’s van het Nijmeegse ISIS en het landelijke CSG-netwerk, 
in het bijzonder de collega’s van het eerste uur: Kristy, Frans, Maria, Annemiek, Bart, Riyan, 
Ron, Martin, Luca en later ook Marjolein, Olga en Barbara. Vera en Lizette, ontzettend 
bedankt voor jullie aanpakkersmentaliteit, op jullie kun je bouwen! Ook wil ik mijn collega-
promovendi bedanken voor het helpen landen in de wondere wereld van de wetenschap. 
Tom, Jan en Koen, Jochem en postdoc Martin, bedankt voor de inspirerende gesprekken en 
gezelligheid, ik heb veel van jullie geleerd! Sanne en Inge, mijn kamergenoten in Mercator, 
veel dank voor de fijne gesprekken en jullie relativeringsvermogen! Samen kwamen we er 
toch altijd weer op uit dat het leven zo veel meer is dan werken en promoveren. Ik hoop 
dat we elkaar in de toekomst nog vaak zien. Maud en Gijs, super dat ik de kans kreeg om 
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mijn onderzoek te valoriseren in een aanvullend project. Daan, ontzettend bedankt voor je 
coaching op het ondernemerschap en scherpe kijk op dingen!
Ik wil de onderzoeksschool WTMC bedanken, in het bijzonder de (voormalig) coördinatoren: 
prof. dr. Sally Wyatt, dr. Willem Halffman en dr. Teun Zuiderent-Jerak. De workshops waren 
altijd een welkome afwisseling, al was het maar omdat het klooster zo’n ontzettend fijne 
plek is om je even helemaal af te sluiten. Ook wil ik alle WTMC- leden bedanken voor de 
fijne tijd door de jaren heen!
De Wageningse leesgroep over interpretatief (beleids)onderzoek wil ik graag bedanken 
voor het gezamenlijk uitpluizen van wetenschappelijke literatuur binnen dit - voor mij tot 
dan toe - nieuwe onderzoeksveld. Tevens wil ik de onderzoekers van het platform 3V SWP 
bedanken: Marie-Jeanne, Marlous, Rob en Judith. Ik heb het als ontzettend leerzaam 
ervaren om met jullie, vanuit sociaalwetenschappelijk perspectief, de proefdiercasus te 
verkennen. Hoewel het platform haar oorspronkelijke functie heeft verloren, weet je maar 
nooit waar en wanneer het weer van pas komt!
De laatste anderhalf jaar heb ik met veel plezier mijn promotiewerkzaamheden 
gecombineerd met verschillende projecten op het proefdierdossier. Allereerst wil ik mijn 
voormalige collega’s (en inmiddels zo veel meer dan dat!) van het NKCA, Inge, Sophie, 
Marjolein en Anke bedanken. Jullie enthousiasme en gedrevenheid zijn aanstekelijk! Aan 
ons zal het niet liggen... Vanuit het NKCA was ik ook betrokken bij de eerste periode van 
het ondersteunend bureau voor de CCD en NCad. Ik wil iedereen vanuit de RVO, en in het 
bijzonder Ger en Leane bedanken voor jullie frisse blik op het proefdierdossier. Tijdens de 
afrondende fase van mijn proefschrift was ik als secretaris van de Denktank Aanvullende 
Financiering alternatieven voor dierproeven werkzaam bij ZonMw. Alle ZonMw collega’s, 
in het bijzonder de collega’s van SAAB, ontzettend bedankt voor het warme welkom en de 
fijne tijd (inclusief borrels, sportdag en personeelsfeest)! Erica en Rob, dank voor de vele 
bijpraatmomenten, jullie maken het MKMD programma! Ook de leden van de Denktank 
en de aanwezigen van de transitiesessies wil ik hartelijk bedanken en ik kijk uit naar de 
toekomstige sessies samen. Tot slot, Henk, bedankt dat je me deze kans gunde, ik heb er 
erg van genoten en veel van je geleerd! Dank ook voor ons ‘benen-op-tafel-gesprek’ over 
evidence-based policy en het meelezen van hoofdstuk vier. 
Zonder familie en vrienden is het doorstaan van een promotietraject onmogelijk! Lieve pap 
en mam, jullie hebben me gesteund in al mijn keuzes, ook al maakte ik het mezelf (en 
anderen) daarmee niet altijd even makkelijk. Dank voor het oneindige vertrouwen in mijn 
kunnen! Mam, het is altijd fijn thuiskomen bij zo’n warm, lief en begripvol persoon als jij! 
Huib, het is super om te zien dat je mijn moeder zo laat stralen! Jouw rust en inlevend 
advies doet ons allen goed. Pap, van jou hoorde ik vaak dat de proefdierenkwestie in de 
media was voordat ik het zelf had gezien, bedankt voor jouw alertheid en medeleven! 
Ineke, ontzettend fijn dat jij en papa elkaar hebben gevonden, dat doet mij ook goed. 
Marlou, lieve grote zus, en zo veel meer! Je weet niet half hoeveel je voor me betekent, ik 
vind je goud! Ewan, ik kan niet vaak genoeg benadrukken dat ik je werk en creatieve geest 
fantastisch vind! Ontzettend bedankt voor het geweldige design van mijn proefschrift! 
Maya & Finn, mijn twee kleine (grote) schatten! Jullie maken het tante-zijn een feestje! 
Max, lieve grote broer. We gaan onze eigen weg en hebben (vaak) een andere kijk op de 
wereld. Maar belangrijker dan dat, we zoeken elkaar altijd weer op. Ik ben ontzettend blij 
met je! Carlijne, wat fijn dat je er bent!
David, Janneke & Joris, mijn extended familie. Eindelijk het grote gezin dat ik altijd al had 
willen hebben, super gezellig dat jullie er zijn! 
Wim, Ria, Martijn, Jeroen, Natalie, Kasper en Zara, mijn lieve schoonfamilie. Dank voor 
jullie begrip als ik weer eens een familiesamenzijn liet schieten, voor de warmte en het 
gewoon er zijn! Vanaf nu heb ik weer alle tijd.. Kasper en Zara, wanneer komen jullie 
logeren?
Lieve familie, we zijn met te veel om jullie hier allemaal persoonlijk te noemen. Ik bof met 
zo veel fijne en lieve mensen om me heen en kijk uit naar het volgende familieweekend! 
Oma Lubbers, ik kan me geen betere oma voorstellen! Wat ontzettend fijn dat u er vandaag 
nog bij kan zijn! Judith, jij kent de grillen van de wetenschap als geen ander, ontzettend 
bedankt voor je fijne en opbeurende gesprekken wanneer ik het even echt niet meer zag 
zitten! Tot bij de pilates :-)
En dan mijn lieve vriendjes en vriendinnetjes. Lieve Sas, Jacq, Joost, Di, Coen, Hanneke, 
Michiel, Hilde, Ruud, Sanne Bo, Wessel, Willemijn, Florian, Ben, Madelijne, Sanne Bij, 
Michael, Arjan, Suus, Jos, Naomi, Jornt, Maaike, Dave, Sander, Tessa en ook de kleine 
Jinte, Luke, Marit, Sep, James, Hugo en Olaf, wat geweldig dat jullie er zijn: jullie maken de 
wereld (vaak letterlijk!) een stukje mooier!
Jacq en Di, mijn lieve GKH chica’s. Het is altijd zo fijn om bij jullie te zijn. Jacq, jouw 
onuitputtelijk energie en positieve houding werkt aanstekelijk, heerlijk! Di, jij kent de 
valkuilen van het schrijfproces als geen ander, bedankt voor de vele bieb/schrijf-momenten 
en fijne wandelingetjes! Coen, met jou erbij wil ik altijd wel Dingen Doen! :-) Joost, en 
natuurlijk ook kleine Sep, jullie zijn schatten!
Hanneke, Sanne, Sander en Hilde, mijn lieve bestuursbuddies. Hanneke, je straalt helemaal 
wanneer je je dromen najaagt, je bent een super mens! Sanne, ik ken geen attenter persoon 
dan jou, je bent geweldig! Hilde, met jou laad ik altijd weer helemaal op, je bent een mooi 
mens! Wessel, mijn persoonlijke bloemist, wat ben je toch een lieverd! Michiel, ik kan je 
niet vaak genoeg bedanken voor al je uren werk die je in de opmaak hebt gestoken. En dan 
te bedenken dat ik je eigenlijk nog nauwelijks ken... Laten we nog vaak gaan flipperkasten! 
:-)
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Sas, je bent er een om in een doosje te stoppen en voor altijd mee te nemen! Je mag ook 
altijd bij mij. Ben super trots op je dat je hebt doorgezet, you go girl. Willemijn, je kunt me 
raken met de juiste vragen, ik ben je daar super dankbaar voor!
Jessica, we go way back en dat vind ik super! We love cheese & wine! :-) Marlous, Joyce, 
Ruben en Joost, spelletjesavonden met jullie zijn top! Sigrid, fijn dat we elkaar weer hebben 
herontdekt!
Anne-Marije, je kent me door en door. Met jouw warmte, vertrouwen en humor kan ik me 
geen betere paranimf voorstellen. Ik hoop dat je nog heel lang naast me wilt staan! Mare, 
ik vind je een schatje en ben graag jouw trein-tante!
Lief vriendje, lieve Bastiaan. Je veroverde mij door jezelf te zijn: betrokken, lief en een 
tikje lomp :-) Je accepteert me in al mijn grillen en geeft me tegengas. Maar misschien 
belangrijker nog, bij jou voel ik me rustig en durf ik onzeker te zijn. Je bent een doorzetter 
die ik diep bewonder! It only gets better (oohh oohh oohh oohh)!
